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ABSTRACT 
Public education, growth, and political regimes 
by Mauricio Armellini 
This study investigates some of the reasons why countries spend 
public money on education, the impact of education on economic growth, why 
and how political regimes interfere in the impact of education on growth and 
how education can be a lever for political change. Conclusions are derived 
from theoretical models and modem econometric techniques. 
The research puts forward altruism as one of the determinants of the 
cross-country variation in public subsidies to education: altruism tends to act 
as a deterrent for public subsidies to education. The research into altruism and 
education subsidies exploits previously underused data to present a new proxy 
to make international comparisons between levels of altruism. 
The analysis of this thesis shows how the defence-education trade-off 
constrains the extractive powers of a dictator, it illustrates why dictatorial 
regimes may have incentives to undermine the effects of education on 
economic growth, and how this relates to regime transitions. The analysis also 
demonstrates that more redistributive policies should be expected in 
democracies than in non-democracies. 
Finally, this research provides evidence of the more tangible effects of 
education on growth once the democratic environment is taken into account, 
clearing the 'micro-macro' paradox of the effects of education on income. 
This thesis sets an agenda for future research, including the need to 
observe the evolution of altruism over time and how it relates to variations in 
cross-country expenditure in education. Also, it demands a continuous re-test 
of the relationship between education and growth under different political 
regimes as longer and more informative time series become available. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
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Economic growth literature has been interested in understanding the 
dynamics and the determinants of economic growth. Human capital is usually 
included in the list of possible determinants of growth, not only in the 
theoretical models, but also in the regressions that try to identify the 
determinants of growth empirically. This is supported by the idea that a more 
educated workforce should be more productive, and also by the fact that a 
cross sectional observation of countries show that the richest countries are 
those that have a more educated population. 
Although the expected benefits of education are not limited to a higher 
level of output (other benefits in welfare include violence reduction, health 
prevention, etc), the objective of promoting education is usually supported by 
an alleged causal link from education to growth. This has been taken as an 
axiom for economic policy, so most (if not all) of the countries in the world do 
nowadays spend a significant part of their budgets in public education 
expenditure. 
While the incidence of education on the determination of personal 
income has been well documented by the scholars (see the first two sub-
sections below), the same is not true when it comes to the effects of education 
on macroeconomic growth, where different data sets and models have yielded 
contradictory results. This raises the question of whether poor countries 
should not re-direct their public budgets, decreasing the expenditure in 
education and increasing other social policies that may help reduce poverty 
more effectively. 
This thesis investigates some of the possible reasons why countries 
spend public money in education in the way they do, why different countries 
devote different proportions of their resources to public education, what is the 
impact of education on economic growth, why and how different political 
regimes interfere in the impact of education and growth, and how education 
can be a driver of political change. 
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Literature review and motivation 
The Micro-Macro paradox 
The relationship between education and economic growth has been 
extensively investigated, and is still a growing area of research (see for 
example the reviews of Krueger and Lindahl 2001, Temple 200 I b or 
Gradstein, Justman and Meier 2005). However, the question of how education 
affects economic growth is not yet fully resolved. 
One of the issues that causes controversy ts that of the apparent 
contradictions between the effects of education on the growth of personal 
income (microeconomic effect) and on macroeconomic growth 
(macroeconomic effect). Regarding the microeconomic effect, the consensus 
is that on average, more education tends to increase an individual's earnings. 
For example, Psacharopoulos ( 1993), Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) and 
Michaelowa (2000) show international comparisons and conclude that people 
with more education tend to have higher wages, a result that seems to be 
consistent across countries and for the various years analysed. As Pritchett 
(2001) puts it, "people with more education have higher wages. This is 
probably the second (after Engel' s law) most well-established fact in 
economics" (Pritchett 2001, page 368). 
The standard procedure to calculate the effect of education in 
individuals' earnings has been to use the Mincerian wage equation (Mincer 
1974): 
where In W; is the natural log of the wage of individual i, S; is years of 
schooling, X; is years of labour market experience, and E; is the disturbance 
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term. The coefficient on schooling is usually interpreted as the private return 
to education, and empirical estimates suggest that the private rate of return to 
an additional year of schooling is typically between 5% and 15% (Temple 
200lb). 
Observing across countries, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) show 
that the return to education is decreasing on education and on income, i.e., 
more education yields higher returns (in terms of income) in poorer countries 
than in richer countries. In particular, Psacharopoulos reviews and expands his 
original research on several occasions, always finding similar results ( 1973, 
1981, 1985, 1993, 2002 with H. Patrinos). 
The results obtained by Psacharopoulos are consistent with Griliches 
and Mason (1972). Observing a sample of military veterans from the United 
States, Griliches and Mason (1972) conclude that differences in schooling 
contribute to explain differences in income. The consistency of positive 
effects of education on income at the microeconomic level suggests that 
something similar should happen at the macroeconomic level. 
As Pritchett (1996, 2001) points out, education externalities, if 
existent, should make macroeconomic effects greater than microeconomic 
effects. If education is good for growth, then when an individual receives 
education it should not only increase their productivity and consequently their 
personal income, but also the spillovers of a more educated and more 
productive individual should benefit the rest of the economy as well. 
However, the results obtained at macroeconomic level tend to show that 
macroeconomic returns to education are lower than the microeconomic returns 
(in other words, that one additional year of education has a positive impact on 
the income of the individuals, but its effect on macroeconomic income is less 
clear). Pritchett (1996) refers to this as the 'micro-macro paradox', because 
initially, we should expect macroeconomic effects to be at least as important 
as the microeconomic effects (plus possible externalities). 
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The absence of clear positive macroeconomic returns to education 
feeds into the discussion referred above about public expenditure in education: 
if there is not consistent evidence of the positive macroeconomic effects of 
education, should governments spend at all in public education? 
Education and economic growth 
Some of the divergences found at macroeconomic level are due to the 
framework in which the relationship between education and growth is 
analysed. Aghion and Howitt ( 1998) distinguish between two approaches. One 
approach, which they identify with Lucas (referring to Lucas 1988), is 
associated with the idea of growth being primarily driven by the accumulation 
of human capital. According to this approach, the differences in the growth 
rates observable across countries are primarily due to differences in the rates 
of human capital accumulation over time. The authors identify the second 
approach with Nelson and Phelps (1966). According to this approach, growth 
is driven by the stock of human capital, which has an effect on a country's 
ability to innovate and generate technical progress, which in turn affects 
economic growth. 
Aghion and Howitt (1998) suggest that both of the previous 
approaches can be 'true' at the same time, because they may be referring to 
different aspects of human capital. They propose a distinction between 
increases in the human capital stock by improving basic education for all 
workers (for example improving literacy), and raising the human capital stock 
by training a small number of workers to higher education levels. Whereas 
they associate the first aspect to a normal input in the growth process (and 
could be associated with what they call the Lucas approach), the second aspect 
could be more relevant to innovation (and associated with the Nelson and 
Phelps approach). In this line, Aghion, Meghir and Vandenbussche (2006) 
Mauricio Armellini PageS 
analyse data for a sample of 19 OECD countries every five years between 
1960 and 2000. They conclude that for countries closer to the technological 
frontier, the greater growth-enhancing impact of education will come from the 
level of high-skilled labour available, as this will allow those countries to 
innovate and grow. However, for countries farther away from the 
technological frontier and with unskilled labour, imitation of technologies is 
the main engine of productivity growth. Observing the 48 continental states of 
the United States, Aghion et al (2009) find comparable results: expenditure in 
low level education is more growth-enhancing in the states that are farther 
away from the technological frontier. 
Other differences in the empirical results obtained at macroeconomic 
level could be attributed to differences in the datasets used, or in the way that 
education is measured. In some cases they find positive effects of increased 
education on macroeconomic growth (see for instance Sylwester 2000 or 
Krueger and Lindahl 2001 ); in some cases they find weak or no direct effect 
of increased education on growth (see for example Temple 2001, Bosworth 
and Collins 2003, Pritchett 2004); and in some cases they find indirect effects 
through technical progress, as in Nelson and Phelps (Benhabib and Spiege1 
1994). In the paragraphs below I discuss briefly each of these papers. 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) estimate a Cobb-Douglas production 
function in which human capital is one of the factors of production. They 
regress macroeconomic growth (log differences in income) on changes in 
capital stock, changes in the size of the labour force, increase of the stock of 
human capital, log of initial income, a dummy for oil-exporting countries, 
geographical dummies, a measure of the size of the middle class (as a measure 
of income distribution), and a measure of political instability. They run their 
regressions using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for a set that contains 
between 115 and 40 countries (depending on the availability of data for each 
specification). They test different specifications and use different sources of 
data: for example, to account for human capital they use data from Kyriacou 
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(1991), Barro and Lee (1993) and data on literacy. Their results show 
consistently that the coefficient for the growth of human capital is non-
significant to explain changes in income. 
However, they introduce further specifications where they show that 
both the level of human capital and the interaction (multiplication) of the level 
of human capital times a measure of differences in technology across 
countries1 have positive and significant effects on economic growth. Also, 
they present a last set of regressions in which the level of human capital has a 
positive and significant effect on the accumulation of physical capital. The 
authors' interpretation of their results is that the level of human capital has a 
significant effect on the rate of domestically generated technological 
innovation and in attracting physical capital from abroad, which, in turn, both 
have a positive effect on economic growth. 
Sylwester (2000) observes the relationship between public education 
expenditure and economic growth. Using a sample of 54 countries, the author 
regresses the growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 1970-1985 
on initial real GDP (year 1970), initial level of human capital (year 1970), 
initial income inequality (year 1970), the average of the ratio of public 
education expenditures to output from 1970 to 1985, and the same variable 
averaged for the period 1960-1964. Sylwester (2000) finds that 
contemporaneous education expenditure has a negative effect on economic 
growth: when both variables are taken for the period 1970-1985 the effect of 
public education expenditure is negative. However, education expenditure 
appears to have a positive long-run effect: education expenditure in the period 
' Thoi• m<a'"re of tho tochoology gap i• ( y-Y;- Y; } who« Y = i• tho ioitial iooom< P'' 
worker of the country with highest income, and Y, is the initial level of income of each 
country. The authors argue that the technology gap, defined in this way, captures the changes 
in income due to ·catch up' effects. 
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1960-1964 has a positive effect on economic growth in the period 1970-1985. 
The author concludes that this may be one of the reasons why part of the 
literature fails to find a positive effect between the growth of human capital 
and economic growth: if looked at in the short-run, the effect of education 
expenditure on growth is negative, whereas looked at in the long-run, the 
effect is positive. 
Krueger and Lindahl (200 1) review the conflicting evidence on the 
effect of education on economic growth. They propose that measurement 
errors in education may account for at least some of the contradictory results. 
To illustrate this, they examine the relationship between two measures of the 
change in average years of schooling used in previous research, and find that 
the correlation is too low. This suggests that an important portion of the 
measured change in the average years of schooling is non-inforrnative. 2 
The authors find that in regressions that look at changes in short 
periods of time (i.e. five years), changes in education do not appear with a 
significant positive sign when used as a regressor to explain economic growth. 
When the same is done over longer periods of time (ten- or twenty-year 
periods), changes in education become significant to explain economic 
growth. Krueger and Lindahl (2001) argue that in short periods of time, 
changes in the variables used to map for education have low informational 
content relative to their measurement error, whereas over longer periods of 
time, real changes in education will predominate over the measurement error 
they contain. In consequence, they run regressions over different periods of 
time and conclude that changes in education are positively associated with 
economic growth once measurement error in education is accounted for. 
Temple (2001) reviews the failures of previous research and revisits 
the empirical data, to conclude that "the aggregate evidence on education and 
2 I discuss the problems of measurement in the data further below. 
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growth, for large samples of countries, continues to be clouded with 
uncertainty" (Temple 2001 page 916). However, he stresses the fact that it is 
the level of schooling (rather than the change in schooling) what has a positive 
effect on subsequent economic growth. In another piece of research this author 
is 'optimistic' in the sense that he thinks that a positive relationship does exist 
between education and economic growth, though he admits that he cannot 
provide convincing empirical evidence for this: "the results we have provide 
some grounds for optimism [ ... ]. This suggests that better data, and more 
sophisticated methods, may yet lead to a steady improvement in the precision 
of our estimates of the growth effects of education" (Temple 2001 b, page 20). 
Bosworth and Collins (2003) claim that most of the variability of the 
empirical results obtained for the effects of education on growth are due to 
variations in the sample of countries observed or definitions used, the time 
periods covered, measurement problems, and the inclusion of additional 
explanatory variables. Also, they point at unrealistic expectations: given that 
the change of the average years of schooling changes very slowly, its effects 
on output may be difficult to detect in the cross-country data. According to 
these authors, the failure to replicate the microeconomic results at 
macroeconomic level could be due to at least three factors: (i) the social 
returns to education may indeed be lower than the private returns; (ii) there are 
problems with measurement error in the data (more on this below); and (iii) 
cross-country variations in educational attainment may fail to account for 
variations in the quality of education. 
They regress the growth in output per worker over 1960-2000 on the 
growth of physical capital per worker, growth in human capital per worker, 
initial level of average years of schooling, educational quality and a set of 
initial conditions. Their measure of educational quality is based on the results 
of international tests of academic performance and mathematics in 1965-1991 
(a discussion on this kind of measure is presented below). They conclude that 
educational quality is positively and significantly related to the growth in 
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output per worker only if the control for the quality of the government 
institutions is not included. When the quality of the government institutions is 
included, the coefficient for educational quality remains positive, but smaller 
and statistically insignificant. They conclude that "although the notion that 
the quality of education matters for growth is eminently sensible, we cannot 
distinguish it from more general concepts of the quality of government 
institutions [ ... ] educational quality is highly correlated with measures of the 
quality of governing institutions and may simply be a proxy for this broader 
concept" (Bosworth and Collins 2003, page 147). 
Pritchett (2004) reviews the literature and finds four dimensions that 
affect the estimates of the effects of schooling on education: (a) mapping from 
years of schooling into an aggregate schooling capital; (b) the 'production 
function' assumed (mapping from schooling capital into output); (c) how 
physical capital enters the production function assumed; and (d) how 
measurement errors and the length of horizon of the data are dealt with. In 
particular, Pritchett (2004) argues not only that a positive link between 
education and growth is far from demonstrated, but also that one should be 
sceptical about the possibilities of finding such a link. The reasons for being 
sceptical are the five 'hard to' issues that the author identifies when trying to 
use schooling to explain economic growth: (i) it is hard to explain stable 
historical growth rates with trending schooling levels; (ii) it is hard to explain 
diverging output levels with converging schooling levels; (iii) it is not easy to 
explain falling growth rates in developing countries with rising schooling 
levels or stable growth in schooling; (iv) it is difficult to explain volatile 
growth rates with stable schooling levels and growing schooling; (v) it is 
harder to attribute big output effects to schooling when they create puzzles 
(negative growth of the residual) than when they solve puzzles (reduce a large 
positive residual). 
In fact, Pritchett (2003) provides an explanation of why nearly all 
countries have public educational policies, without referring to the 
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macroeconomic effects of education on growth. He argues that schooling 
conveys beliefs, and the rulers of a nation are not indifferent about these 
beliefs. To control the beliefs embedded on instruction, powerful national 
regimes sought control of the beliefs instruction directly, so public schooling 
became a dominant form of schooling. Public schooling later expanded due to 
supply (pressure of strongly ideological regimes) or demand (pressure of 
increasingly powerful citizens), but was originally motivated by the need to 
control the beliefs of the population. For this reason, the author argues that the 
decision to spend more or less resources on education is driven by factors 
other than private, social or macroeconomic returns. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis provides an alternative possible explanation to 
why countries spend different amounts in public education. 
Introduction to Chapter 2 
Using data for USA between 1963 and 1992, Krusell et al (2000) show 
that unskilled labour can be substituted with new capital equipment, which in 
turn increases the marginal product of skilled labour. In this way, every time 
better and cheaper capital becomes available, the marginal productivity of 
skilled workers increases, and that of unskilled workers decreases. The authors 
conclude that increasing the earnings of the lowest skilled requires more and 
better education, so they can use new equipment and raise their own 
productivity. A similar implication can be extracted from Psacharopoulos and 
Patrinos (2002; discussed above): according to their findings of decreasing 
returns to education on income, poorer countries should be expected to take 
advantage of those decreasing marginal returns, strongly committing to 
widening education across the population. 
However, as I show in chapter 2, this has not happened: richer 
countries still devote proportionally more resources to public education than 
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poorer countries (see Keefer 2004), which probably explains why the 
difference in returns to education between rich and poor countries persists. 
What explains this cross-country distribution of the public spending in 
education? The results presented by Pscharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) and 
Michaelowa (2000) fail to explain why richer countries spend relatively more 
in education than poorer countries. Pritchett (2004) maintains that this is 
because ultimately, countries do not spend more or less in education just 
because it has higher or lower returns. As Pritchett himself admits, this 
contradicts a vast body of literature that justifies public expenditure on 
education on the existence of positive returns (see for instance Sheenan 1973). 
In this thesis, chapter 2 addresses this issue by focusing on only one 
source of public expenditure on education (subsidies to private education 
expenditure) and by making use of a non-economic cause to shed light on the 
cross-country variation in public subsidies to education: altruism. Previous 
research explains and characterises intergenerational transfers and charitable 
giving through the concept of altruism. For example, Andreoni ( 1989, 1990) 
and Amegashie (2006) discuss the implications of 'pure' and 'egoistic' 
altruism for the utility that individuals receive from giving. They do not 
discuss how different degrees of altruism affect the optimal rate of education 
subsidy that the government should set. This is what I discuss in chapter 2. 
If altruism explains (at least part of) the private educational transfers 
between parents and children, then altruism can be useful to explain part of the 
public transfers to education too. If people receive education early in their 
lives (when they are children), they cannot themselves decide how much 
education to provide; the older generations make this decision for them. If 
those who make the budgetary decisions assign different values to the 
education of future generations (they differ in the utility they obtain from 
educating their children, i.e., their intergenerational degree of altruism differs), 
then they will probably differ in the level of education subsidies that they will 
set. The initial research hypothesis of chapter 2 establishes that countries with 
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different levels of altruism will differ in the level of education subsidies that 
they will set. Specifically, the hypothesis is that countries with greater levels 
of private intergenerational altruism will need lower levels of public education 
subsidies; the intuition is that more private altruism necessitates lesser public 
subsidies to education, because more altruistic parents will naturally spend 
more on their offspring's education, substituting at least part of the public 
spending. 
In chapter 2 I present a cross-country measure of educational subsidies 
that is new in the literature (there are no data available on educational 
subsidies at cross-country level) and also introduce a novel proxy for the 
degree of altruism for a cross section of countries. Previous research has used 
monetary transfers made by individuals as a proxy for altruism. For example, 
Bouhga-Hagbe (2006) looks at the remittances of migrant workers as an 
expression of their altruism. Andreoni (2006) compares altruism across 
countries by looking at the percentage of cash revenues of the non-profit 
sector that are received from philanthropy. Castillo and Carter (2002) run 
behavioural experiments in South African communities, and derive their 
measure of altruism from the amount of money that the individuals are willing 
to transfer in their 'dictator game'. However, these are not real proxies for 
altruism but rather some of its consequences. Using an under-exploited source 
of data I bring a new measure of altruism to the economic research. The proxy 
is derived from the World Values Survel, question A026. 4 
3 European and World Value Survey four-wave integrated data file, 1981-2004. v .20060423, 
2006. The European Values Study Foundation and World Values Survey Association. 
Aggregate File Producers: ASEP/JDS, Madrid, Spain!Tilburg University, Tilburg, The 
Netherlands. Aggregate File Distributors: ASEP/JDS and ZA, Cologne, Germany. 
4 The question is "Which of the following statements best describes your views about parents' 
responsibilities to their children?: A- Parents' duty is to do their best for their children even 
at the expense of their own well-being; B- Parents have a life of their own and should not be 
asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children". The results I use here 
are for all the respondents, regardless of whether they have children or not. 
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In principle, it could be argued that chapter 2 does not explicitly 
incorporate the concept of democracy, which is a central concept of this thesis. 
However, a closer look shows otherwise. This is not only because the 
regressions in that chapter control for the degree of democracy, but most 
importantly because the model presented is applicable only in democracies. I 
assume a benevolent government that maximises the individuals' utilities. 
Although 'benevolent government' and 'democratic government' are not 
synonyms, in general one can expect a democratic government to be more 
interested in maximising the social well-being than a dictatorial government, 
which may have a separate agenda. In particular, the government in chapter 2 
is aware of each individual's utility function, which includes altruism. When 
the optimal subsidy rate is found, individual altruism is taken into account, 
which can only be done by a government that is aware of and internalises 
individuals' values and preferences. This is a characteristic of democratic 
governments. Additionally, in the model of that chapter the government sets 
the subsidy rate that maximises the utility function of infinite future 
generations, meaning that the government cares about the very long run. As I 
argue later in this chapter, this is a characteristic of democratic governments, 
while we can expect dictatorships to be more short-sighted. When I 
incorporate a totally short sighted government in the model of chapter 2, the 
result is an optimal subsidy rate equal to zero, meaning no public subsidies to 
education. 
Also, chapter 2 opens new questions for future research and 
hypothesises on the relationships between altruism, subsidies to education and 
democracy. If the relationship between altruism and democracy is in the 
direction pointed by some of the preliminary results presented in the chapter 
(which is in line with the conclusions of previous research, see Kolm 2006), 
then altruism could be a powerful non-economic factor driving the 
democracy-education link. The lack of historical data prevents the testing of 
this, but the question is highly relevant. 
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The 'piracy' argument: institutions and economic growth 
To explain the possible causes of the apparent micro-macro paradox to 
which I referred above, Pritchett ( 1996 and 2001) claims that one of the 
reasons why the impact of education on growth has been below expectations 
is that the institutional and governance environment of some countries is 
perverse enough to distort the effects of education on growth. He argues that a 
bad institutional environment favours the application of new skills to activities 
that are privately remunerative but socially wasteful. Using North's (1990) 
expression, Pritchett claims that education can create better educated 'pirates' 
(Pritchett 2001 page 387). By 'piracy', he means activities that increase the 
personal income of someone at the cost of someone else, without increasing 
total output. 5 Rodrik (2000) also argues that in the absence of adequate 
institutions, incentives would generate perverse results or not work at all. 
This idea has been supported by other authors (see for instance Temple 
2001) and is consistent with the evidence of 'sheepskin effects' (Jaeger and 
Page 1996) and the 'signalling' models to explain wages (see for example 
Weiss 1995), according to which, in some cases, diplomas and university 
degrees are more successful in increasing the bearer's wage than their actual 
productivity. 
What are the conditions that minimize the risk of educating pirates 
instead of educating individuals whose increased productivity will 
legitimately promote growth and create positive externalities to other 
individuals? In other words, how does education become a positive input for 
5 Examples would be a person that applies her education to hack software, or copy and sell 
copyrighted movies. or someone that uses her great knowledge of the tax system to find ways 
to cheat and evade. 
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growth instead of a fuel for piracy? These questions are not directly addressed 
in the literature, but there are clues to unveil a possible answer. 
A lead is given by Bosworth and Collins (2003), which I discussed 
above. Analysing the effects of education on growth, they observe that the 
coefficient on educational quality is not robust to the inclusion of a measure of 
the quality of the government institutions. Their interpretation is that 
educational quality is just a proxy for the broader concept of the quality of 
governing institutions. More recently, Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) 
conclude that "the macroeconomic effect of education depends on other 
complementary growth-enhancing policies and institutions" (Hanushek and 
Woessmann 2008, page 648). This fits Pritchett's idea (above) that the 
institutional and governance environment of some countries is perverse 
enough to distort the effects of education on growth. Putting both arguments 
together, the question that arises is how the institutional characteristics of a 
country influence the impact of education on growth. This question is high on 
the research agenda of the political economy of education ("cross national 
[ ... ]data allows the exploration of the impact on returns to schooling (or the 
gap between private and social returns) of differences in economic 
environments. This last question has been and seems a promising line for 
future research", Pritchett 2004, page 1 ). Other researchers also put this issue 
on top of the research agenda: after Temple's (2001) failure to find clear 
connections between increased education and economic growth, he concludes 
that "A perhaps more interesting task for future research is to explore the fine 
details of the institutional and incentive structure that best allocates a fixed 
amount of educational expenditure. [This question has] an immediate 
connection to policy, and the need for future research in this area is apparent 
more than ever" (Temple 2001, page 917). 
The idea that institutions directly affect growth is not new and there is 
some debate around it, fed by the failure of previous research studies to arrive 
at clear conclusions. For instance, Barro and Lee ( 1994) introduce measures of 
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civil liberties and political rights in their growth regressions and find puzzling 
results6, explicitly stating that this is an open area of research. 
Bosworth and Collins (2003) use measures of institutional quality from 
1982, introducing them as regressors in their growth regressions for two 
periods: 1960-1980 and 1980-2000. The institutional quality in 1982 performs 
better as a regressor for the growth in 1980-2000 than in 1960-1980, which 
Bosworth and Collins (2003) interpret as evidence that causation runs 
primarily from institutional quality to growth rather than the converse. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) try to estimate the effect of 
institutions on economic performance. They acknowledge the problem that 
political institutions and economic performance reinforce each other through 
time and that mutual causation operates throughout history, which is precisely 
what makes the effect of one on the other difficult to measure. To avoid this 
problem, the authors use instrumental variables. This methodology looks for 
sources of variation of the 'independent variable' (institutional setup) that are 
not due to variations in the 'dependent variable' (economic performance). 
This allows for the measurement of the portion of the effect of the 
independent variable on the dependent that is not due to reverse causation. 
The instrumental variable they use is 'mortality of colonisers' as a source of 
variation of current institutions. 
The argument is that during colonisation, the environments of the 
different regions of the world posed different health threats to colonisers. 
Therefore, the different mortality rates of the colonisers in the different 
6 Barro and Lee (1994) introduce a measure of political rights and a measure of civil liberties 
in their growth regressions. Though both variables are highly correlated, the authors observe 
that they enter with opposite signs in their regressions: while the civil liberties variable has a 
significantly positive coefficient, the political rights variable has a significantly negative 
coefficient. The authors say that "it is unclear what effects are picked up in the sample by the 
differential between political rights and civil libenies ", so "we therefore claim only that the 
results on political freedom and civil liberties are an interesting topic for further research" 
(Barro and Lee 1994, page 25). 
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territories affected whether they wanted to settle or not in some of those 
territories. In turn, whether the colonisers wanted to settle or not in a territory 
affected which kind of institutions they established to govern each region 
(institutions that were favourable or detrimental to economic progress). That 
initial setting persisted through inertia across time and affected the current 
institutions, which, in turn, affect current economic performance. Therefore, 
the authors estimate the effect of the mortality rate of colonisers on current 
institutions, and that fragment of the current institutions is known not to be 
caused by the current economic performance (reverse causation is avoided). 
With this methodology, the authors find strong effects of institutions on 
economic performance, which is robust to controlling for latitude, climate, 
current disease environment, natural resources, religion, current racial 
composition and other variables. These results hold when the institutions 
observed are related to property rights (economic institutions) but also when 
the institutions observed are political and related to the openness of the 
political participation. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) provide further evidence of 
how institutions affect economic performance. They argue that among the 
regions colonised by European countries during the past 500 years, those that 
were initially relatively rich are now relatively poor, and vice-versa. They 
suggest this is the result of European intervention generating an 'institutional 
reversal' in those regions. Their explanation is that Europeans introduced 
institutions that were investment-friendly in regions that were previously poor, 
while in regions that were previously rich it was more profitable to introduce 
extractive institutions. 
In consequence, during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
the countries with the most favourable institutions took the opportunity to 
industrialise. They overtook the previously relatively richer countries, which 
were used as sources of extraction, but were left with institutions that were not 
favourable for investment and economic growth. In this context, extractive 
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institutions mean a concentration of political power in the hands of a few 
(elite) that can expropriate the goods and the labour (slavery) of a majority. 
Therefore, in the societies where a small ruling elite had a strong interest in 
keeping the established relations of power and exploitation, there were little or 
no incentives to introduce changes (like industrialisation) that could affect the 
establishment and give power to other individuals. Indeed, industrialisation 
required "the participation of a broad cross section of the society - the 
smallholders, the middle class, and the entrepreneurs" (page 1279). In this 
way, again, the reversal of economic 'fortune' is explained by institutional 
factors. 
Some scholars have found that the causation works in the other way, 
from growth to the institutions of government. Lipset ( 1960) claims that 
increased income generates favourable conditions for democracy because (i) a 
higher income means fewer distributive conflicts, so that less pressure on the 
democratic system makes it less vulnerable; (ii) a higher income favours the 
strengthening of the middle class. Given that the middle classes tend to soften 
conflicts and generate a perception of equality, democracy is favoured; (iii) a 
higher income means more supply and demand of education. More educated 
societies are in a better position to form citizens that are tolerant, responsible 
and equal, essential values to form a democratic society; (iv) a higher income 
increases the propensity to participate in private organisations. Those 
organisations form, regulate and soften opinions, and also organise opposition. 
These processes are also healthy for democracy. 
Glaeser et al (2004) agree with the direction of causality suggested by 
Lipset ( 1960). They start by arguing that the traditional measures of 
institutions are not appropriate, because they do not measure real constraints 
on the political power, and they are too volatile (they expect institutions to be 
more stable over time). In contrast, the authors claim that measures of 
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democracy like that of Polity IV 7 measure an institutional outcome, rather 
than an institution itself. For that reason, these variables cannot be used to 
establish causalities between institutions and economic growth. Therefore, the 
authors run (static OLS) regressions of economic growth over 1960-2000 on 
some proposed institutional measures (measures that, according to the authors, 
do a better job at capturing stable constraints of the government): executive 
constraints, expropriation risks, autocracy, government effectiveness, judicial 
independence, constitutional review, plurality and proportional representation. 
They find that these 'more appropriate' measures of institutions do not have a 
significant explanatory power over economic growth. Also, once the 
'appropriate' variables for institutions are included, the initial level of average 
years of schooling becomes significant explaining subsequent growth. From 
this, the authors conclude that the traditional (and inappropriate) measures of 
institutions are correlated with economic growth because of reverse causality: 
education is good for growth, and with higher income, they can afford 
democracy. 
Glaeser et al (2004) also discuss what they understand are the pitfalls 
of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson's (2001) selection of instrument 
(presented above). Among other issues, Glaeser et al (2004) claim that the 
instrument chosen by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) is incorrect, as 
it may be picking up the effect of human capital: colonisers may have brought 
with them institutions, but they certainly brought their human capital. In this 
case, the instrument chosen becomes invalid, because valid instruments must 
be uncorrelated with the error term: if the pattern of settlement affects growth 
through channels other than institutions, then they are not valid instruments. 
7 Polity IV is a dataset provided by the University of Maryland, that contains data on regime 
authority characteristics for a large set of countries from the year 1800 onwards. In particular, 
the dataset contains a widely used measure of democracy (variable 'Polity', which measures 
the degree of institutionalised democracy from -10 to I 0, with higher numbers representing 
more democratic countries). 
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Yi Feng ( 1997) argues that the positive effect of democracy on growth 
is not direct, but there is an indirect channel: democracy promotes political 
stability, which in turn is good for growth. With a model of simultaneous 
equations and using three-stage least-squares estimations, Yi Feng concludes 
that democracy promotes growth indirectly by inducing regular government 
changes and inhibiting political instability. Also, he finds that although in the 
short run the effect of growth on democracy may be ambiguous, in the long 
run it is positive, which explains the contradictory results in the literature. 
Barro ( 1999) observes over 1 00 countries from 1960 to 1995 and finds 
that higher per capita GDP increases the level of democracy, being measured 
by the level of electoral rights or by the level of civil liberties. Among other 
controls, he uses a variable that accounts for colonial history: he uses a 
dummy for former colony/non-colony and also introduces a breakdown 
among British, French, Spanish and Portuguese colonies. In both cases he 
finds that those dummies do not account for different levels of democracy, 
though he hypothesises that former colonial status may influence democracy 
indirectly through effects on the level of income. If this is put together with 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) (discussed above), the joint 
hypothesis would be that previous colonial history has an effect on the later 
standard of living, which in turn affects the level of democracy. 
Pinto and Timmons (2005) conclude that democracy affects how 
countries grow rather than how much they grow. Using time series for a panel 
of 44 to 91 developed and developing countries over 20 to 38 years 
(depending on data availability for different regressions), they conclude that 
political competition lowers the rate of factor mobilisation8 but increases the 
rate of human capital accumulation and productivity. First, democracies 
8 Factor mobilisation refers to physical capital accumulation. They expect that "Countries 
with higher scores on the political competition index will have Lower levels of capital 
fonnation relative to gross domestic product (GDP) •· (Pinto and Timmons 2005, page 35). 
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should have a negative effect on investment levels for two reasons: (i) if the 
income of the median voter is below the mean, she will push for 
redistribution, which would discourage investment from the rich. On the other 
hand, if only the rich could vote (nondemocratic elite), the probability of 
redistributing the investment proceedings decrease, which provides more 
incentives for investment; (ii) political competition could affect fiscal and 
monetary policies, originating political business cycles that undermine 
incentives to invest. According to the authors, "in the face of highly 
competitive elections, politicians have incentives to forsake long-term 
stewardship for short-term exigencies, promoting fiscal and monetary 
extravagance" (Pinto and Timmons 2005, page 22). 
Second, democracy could have a similar effect on labour supply: 
whereas democracies have to rely on consent, less democratic regimes can use 
coercion, repressing labour organisations and mobilising labour by direction. 
These first two points are shared by Krugman ( 1994 ), who compares the 
experience of the East Asian 'miracle' countries in 1966-1994 with that of the 
Soviet Union in the nineteen-fifties, and concludes that in both cases growth 
was a result of a massive increase in inputs rather than in return per unit of 
expenditure. Krugman argues that in the case of the Soviet Union, the 
authoritarian regime allowed an unprecedented ability to mobilise great 
amounts of physical and human resources, making growth the result of a 
quantity effect. 
Third, Pinto and Timmons (2005) claim that in democracy, the median 
voter would push for the provision of public goods, especially education, 
raising the level of human capital and increasing the long-run growth. This is 
consistent with Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), which is discussed below. 
Fourth, the authors claim that democracies are more likely to see 
productivity gains for two reasons: (i) politically competitive regimes allow 
for the best ideas to move freely and filter through the economic and political 
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system, eventually turning into policies and products9; and (ii) more 
competitive regimes are more likely to remove sources of rents and encourage 
the efficient use of resources. 
Pinto and Timmons (2005) claim that all these factors affect how 
countries grow rather than how much they grow. Quinn and Woolley (200 1) 
point in a similar direction when they conclude that democracy does not affect 
the rate of growth, but the stability of growth (democracies tend to have more 
stable rates of growth). 
The literature does not limit the economic effects of democracy only to 
growth. Among other effects, scholars have been debating the effects of 
democracy on budget allocations (see for example Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-
Martin 2004; this is discussed in chapter 3), on the quality of policy outputs 
(Lake and Baum 2001) and on income inequality (Acemoglu and Robin son 
2006). However, no previous research directly explains how democracy 
intervenes in the impact of education on growth. 
Education and democracy 
I have shown that the relationship between democracy and growth 
does not bring consensus between scholars, and that establishing links 
between education and growth has brought discrepancies. The relationship 
between democracy and education does not bring a full consensus either: 
9 This point is related to Lucas' (1988) idea that human capital has strong 'external' effects 
(positive externalities) when individuals interact with each other: he claims that the positive 
externalities of human capital have to do with "[the] influences people have on the 
productivity of others. so the scope of such effects must have to do with the ways various 
groups of people interact. which may be affected by political boundaries" (Lucas 1988, page 
37). He goes a step further and claims that "human capital accumulation is a social activity, 
involving groups of people" (Lucas 1988, page 19). Therefore, if individuals are left to 
interact and exchange ideas freely (something that is a characteristic of democratic regimes), 
these positive 'external' effects could be enhanced. 
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some authors claim that more education brings more democracy (for example, 
Barro 1999, Glaser et al 2004, Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer 2006, Benavot 
1996), others claim that it is democracy that brings more education (Baum and 
Lake 2003, Stasavage 2005). Yet others reject the hypothesis that education 
makes democracy more likely (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared 
2004), and others claim that it is the distribution of education (and not the 
average years of schooling) that makes democracy thrive (Castell6-Climent 
2008). Some of these pieces of research are commented upon below. 
Barro' s ( 1999) research on the determinants of democracy was 
discussed above for the relationship between income and democracy. In his 
regressions he also finds that an additional year of average school attainment 
raises his electoral rights indicator by 0.01 in the short run and 0.04 in the long 
run (the electoral rights indicator that he uses ranges from 0 to 1, where a 
higher value means more rights). 
Glaeser et al (2004) was already discussed above, when I referred to 
the relationship between democracy and growth. However, it is also worth 
mentioning that the authors refer to the relationship between education and 
institutions. Trying to find a relationship between these two factors, the 
authors regress growth in years of schooling (using five-year intervals 
between 1960 and 2000) on country fixed effects, initial schooling, initial 
level of GDP per capita and several measures of political institutions 
(executive constraints, expropriation risks, autocracy, government 
effectiveness, judicial independence, constitutional review, plurality and 
proportional representation). They find that political institutions have no effect 
on the growth of schooling. Additionally, they regress the changes in political 
institutions over five-year periods on country fixed effects, initial schooling, 
initial level of economic development and initial levels of the political 
institutions. They find that initial levels of schooling are a strong predictor of 
changes in institutions, even after using different measures of institutions. 
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Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer (2006) argue in the same direction. 
They assume that while democracy requires the support of a broad base of 
citizens who face weak incentives to fight for democracy, dictatorship offers 
much stronger incentives to fewer supporters. Critically, they assume that 
education raises the benefits of political participation, so that when more 
people receive education, they have stronger incentives to fight for it, 
increasing the probability of a transition to democracy and increasing the 
stability of democracy once it has been established. I discuss more features of 
this paper in the next section. 
Baum and Lake (2003) claim that democracy has a positive impact on 
growth through its effect on female secondary enrolment rates. They find that 
the level of democracy has a significant (and contemporaneous) effect on 
female secondary enrolment, which in turn has a positive effect on growth 
(whereas their results show that democracy has an insignificant direct effect 
on economic growth). This paper is discussed in more detail below, when I 
refer to the interaction between education, democracy and growth. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2004) assess Glaeser et al 
(2004). They argue that the results of Glaeser et al (2004) are driven mainly 
by a cross-country correlation between education and democracy rather than 
by variations within countries. They argue that if there was a link between 
education and democracy, a link between changes in education and changes in 
democracy should be evident, and they show that it is not (see figure 2 in their 
paper). They conclude that this is an indication that the cross-country 
correlation between education and democracy is caused by some common 
omitted factors affecting both education and democracy (which they argue is 
behind the results of Glaeser et al 2004). When Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 
and Yared (2004) estimate a dynamic panel data model controlling for country 
specific effects and analyse the relationship between education and democracy 
within countries (they use first-difference Generalised Method of Moments 
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(GMM) estimation, discussed in more detail in chapter 4 ), they find no 
relationship between the increase of one and the increase of the other. 
Castell6-Climent (2008) assesses Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and 
Y ared (2004 ), and concludes that their results are biased due to the use of 
first-difference GMM estimation in the presence of persistence in the 
explanatory variables (this is discussed in more detail in chapter 4). To solve 
this problem, she uses system-GMM estimation (this is the estimation method 
used in chapter 4 in this thesis) and concludes that even when controlling for 
fixed omitted variables, more education is related to more democracy. But her 
main result is that the distribution of education (measured by the percentage of 
education attained by sixty per cent - the third quintile - of the population) is 
the relevant educational variable determining democracy. Bobba and Coviello 
(2007) also point to the same weakness of Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and 
Yared's (2004) results, re-estimate them using system-GMM, and also 
conclude that the lack of education-democracy link was due to a bias produced 
by the use of first-difference GMM estimation rather than system-GMM. 
Education. democracy and growth: a possible interaction 
The findings of Pritchett ( 1996, 2001) and Bosworth and Collins 
(2003) mentioned above could be consistent with the existence of a mediating 
effect of democracy in the education-growth link. Persson and Tabellini 
( 1994) use political institutions to explain the impact of inequality on growth: 
instead of directly regressing growth on inequality, they use interaction terms 
between political institutions and inequality, and conclude that a negative link 
between inequality and growth is only present in democracies, because it is 
only in that political environment that the poor can press for redistribution. If 
this were the case, then, in a democratic environment, more equal societies 
should grow faster. 
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Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) reach a conclusion opposed to that of 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) (although they do not provide empirical 
evidence, as Persson and Tabellini (1994) do). Using a non-overlapping 
generations model, Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) conclude that in democracy 
inequality could be good for growth as long as that inequality provides more 
support for public education. On the other hand, if the poorest are excluded 
from the electoral process (which could be associated with a lack of 
democracy), the authors expect inequality to reduce the support for public 
education, which would have a negative impact on growth. 
Until now, an analysis similar to that of Persson and Tabellini (1994) 
has not been performed to explain the relationship between education and 
growth; in other words, the question of whether the effect of education on 
growth is altered by the political freedom has not been answered. 
The theoretical background and models provided by Bourguignon and 
Verdier (2000) and Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer (2006), as well as the 
theory, models and historical evidence exposed by Acemoglu (2003), 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2002 and 2006) and Robinson (1999) provide 
a comprehensive explanation for how democracy and education may have 
evolved together across time. They state that dictators find a trade-off when 
they have to decide whether to provide education or not. If they educate the 
population, the economy can grow faster and they can benefit from that 
growth (for example, through the extraction of more resources). But at the 
same time, a more educated and richer population poses a bigger threat to the 
ruling dictator. 
Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) present a model in which education 
raises political participation (they assume that only the educated can vote) and 
generates positive externalities to the wider economy. The uneducated have 
lower incomes and do not vote, whereas the educated are richer and do vote. 
The rich can choose to keep the poor uneducated and maintain their monopoly 
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of the political decisions, or can choose to make the necessary transfers to 
educate the poor and benefit from the externalities, but at the same time share 
the political rights with the newly educated. With this second option, the rich 
also risk that the newly educated (who may still earn less than the average 
income after receiving education) may vote for more redistribution, which 
may be against the interest of the rich. Further below I comment on additional 
features of Bourguignon and Verdier (2000). 
Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer (2006) provide some empirical 
evidence indicating that education promotes democracy, and ask why a 
dictator would choose to provide education knowing that doing so is against 
the survival of their regime. They propose three possible answers: (i) many 
dictators face external threats, so they need to grow their economies and their 
armies even if this increases the chances of democratization; (ii) dictators can 
derive personal benefits from economic growth, and therefore promote 
education to get richer; (iii) all dictators face ouster risks, and it is much better 
for the dictator's safety to be replaced by a democracy in an educated country 
rather than by a new dictatorship in an uneducated one. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006) claim that at first the dictator 
can offer some small transfers and benefits to the masses (like public 
education) in order to keep them satisfied and under control. But transfers can 
be instated and later removed, according to the will of the dictator and to the 
threats he perceives, so the population knows that public education can be 
transitorily provided to the masses as a way to avoid revolutions. During 
periods of acute unrest and when people can overcome the collective action 
costs (for example, because education could bring the collective action costs 
down), the power of the dictator is challenged beyond the limits that transitory 
concessions and transfers can reach. In those situations, the authors claim that 
the most cost-effective option for the dictator is to transfer more than money: 
when the dictator transfers political power to the masses, he is showing a real 
commitment to long-run transfers. This is because when the dictator transfers 
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power, he is limiting his capacity to stop specific transfers and benefits in the 
future. 
In this way, the extension of the franchise (the transfer of political 
power from the dictator to the masses) is a strategy that the dictator can use to 
avoid revolutions against him. This allows the dictator to cede power slowly 
(giving away power thus extending democracy) rather than cling to power and 
risk losing everything violently because his transfers are not sufficient to stop 
a revolution. Finally, the newly enfranchised population may use democracy 
to tilt economic institutions and the income distribution in their favour, for 
instance, through extending public education. 
Introduction to Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 in this thesis builds around these concepts: a dictator has 
limited resources, which he can use to educate people (raising general income 
and thus his proportional tax revenue) or to recruit more soldiers and make his 
dictatorial regime less likely to be overthrown. Previous research referred to 
this budgetary trade-off and concluded that dictatorships tend to spend more in 
the military than democracies (Lebovic 2001, Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-Martin 
2004, Habibi 1994; these papers are discussed in chapter 3). In the case of 
chapter 3, the trade-off is used to set up a model of political transitions, and is 
put under more strain when educated individuals offer transfers to uneducated 
individuals to persuade them not to join the army, with important implications 
in terms of income distribution. As the chapter shows, the potential effects of 
education on income have a crucial role to play in the amount of transfers 
observed in society (and thus in the distribution of income) and on the 
transitions to and from democracy. 
A critical difference of chapter 3 with Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) 
is that they put the decision to extend the political rights in the hands of the 
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elite (in this case, the dictator): in their model the elite decide whether to 
provide public education (the poor are liquidity-constrained and cannot afford 
education by themselves), and they also assume that only the educated have 
political rights. In terms of the relationship between education and democracy, 
this amounts to assuming causality from education to democracy. Therefore, 
when the elite decide to extend public education, they are also deciding to 
share power with the newly educated. However, the elite may decide to do this 
because they benefit from the positive externalities of a more educated 
population, so they have to compare the benefits they obtain from the positive 
externalities with two sets of costs: directly, the costs of the transfers needed 
to educate the poor; indirectly, the costs associated with the probability that 
once educated, the newly enfranchised individuals may vote for more transfers 
from the rich to the poor. Faced with these benefits and costs, the elite may 
decide to educate only a number of poor that will not change the voting 
majority, so that the elite maintain the political power but at the same time can 
benefit from the educational externalities. This favours the appearance of the 
middle class, and at the same time reduces the growth rate that would be 
observable if all the poor received education. 
In contrast, the model of chapter 3 allows for transitions to democracy 
to either be caused by the dictator himself or promoted from the citizenry. 
This, I believe, provides a more realistic approach. Additionally, in the model 
of chapter 3, one of the critical factors that limit the ability of the dictator to 
maintain democracy has to do with the effect that education expenditure has 
on income: the greater the effect of education expenditure on income, the more 
difficult it is for the dictator to maintain dictatorship. This, to the best of my 
knowledge, has not been incorporated before. 
The same difference applies with Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), who 
also put the final decision to democratise in the hands of the dictator. They 
assume that repression always succeeds, so the dictator can always deter 
democratising threats through repression. Ultimately, the dictator compares 
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the costs and benefits of repression and democracy and then decides which to 
choose. 
The model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) is oriented in a different 
way to the model presented in chapter 3: for example, they observe the effect 
of income distribution on the transitions to democracy, which is something I 
do not do in this model. The model presented in chapter 3 of this thesis does 
not assume that educated individuals earn more than soldiers or informal 
workers. This differs from Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), who assume that 
there are 'rich' and 'poor' individuals, and that the rich are the 'ruling elite' 
and the poor are the citizenry. So while I assume that there is only one dictator 
and that the citizenry is divided between educated and non-educated (with 
potentially different levels of income between those two groups), Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2006) assume that there is a 'ruling elite' with a level of 
income higher than that of the rest of the citizens (who all earn the same). 
However, the most important difference between this model and that of 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) is that in their case, income does not depend 
on education expenditure, whereas in this model, education expenditure has a 
central role (and is the determinant of the level of income of the educated 
population). 
One of the features incorporated by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) is 
what they call the 'cost of revolution' (J-1. in their model), which reflects the 
fraction of total income that is lost in a democratising revolution due to the 
economic disruption generated. The citizenry, before starting a revolution, 
compare that cost of the revolution with the benefits they can obtain (the share 
of income that during a dictatorship is held by the ruling elite, represented by 
8 in their model). In the model of this chapter, the concept of fl is partly 
reflected in the level of transfers T, as they represent the cost that has to be 
paid (by the educated individuals) to obtain democracy. On the other hand, the 
benefits of democracy (the 8 of Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) are in chapter 
3 derived from two different factors: (i) the cessation of the dictatorial taxes 
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paid by the educated individuals during dictatorship (having them removed in 
democracy is a benefit for them); and (ii) the increase in income during 
democracy that results from more resources being directed to education. Also, 
other benefits of democracy include the transfers that some non-educated 
individuals receive from the educated individuals, though those transfers are 
not seen as benefits by those who ultimately promote the transition to 
democracy (the educated individuals, who promote the transitions, do not see 
the benefits of the transfers received by the non-educated; on the contrary, 
those transfers are costs for educated individuals). 
Eight possible interaction channels 
None of the work mentioned above analyses how the interaction 
between education and democracy affects growth. Here, I present eight 
channels through which the institutional and governance environment of 
dictatorships can weaken the expected education-growth relationship. 
Firstly, in a non-democracy the ruling elite can divert expenditure in 
education to favour themselves, subsidising, for instance, higher-level 
education even in contexts of high illiteracy. This is still education 
expenditure, but at the same time it reinforces the power of the elite, which 
may then become even more powerful to introduce distortions that prevent 
further growth. 
Second, although corruption is present in both democracies and non-
democracies, the accountability of a democratic system is (at least 
theoretically) higher than that of a dictatorship (see for example Lederman, 
Loayza and Soares 2005 or Aghion, Alessina and Trebbi 2007, discussed 
below), making diversion of educational funds less feasible in a democracy. 
There is evidence that in some countries a large share of government spending 
in education is not actually going to education, and that there are huge 
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problems with issues such as teacher absence (see for example Chaudhury, 
Hammer, Kremer, Muralidharan, and Rogers 2006 or Duflo and Hanna 2005). 
Third, a dictator may expropriate goods or generate a feeling of 
lawlessness that inhibits the capacity of education to promote growth (Dixit 
2004, among many others). For instance, if property rights are at risk because 
the dictator can expropriate arbitrarily, private investment becomes less 
attractive, so the possibilities for educated people to contribute to the economy 
are reduced. An extension of this point is that of Pritchett's (2001) 'piracy'. 
Similarly, this kind of environment is favourable to information asymmetries, 
which can intensify the 'signalling' and 'sheepskin' effects mentioned above. 
Fourth, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that in dictatorial 
regimes, the burden of repression or coups often falls on the individuals who 
are killed during conflict. This makes it difficult for dictatorships to take full 
advantage of the education embodied in individuals. 
Fifth, dictatorial countries tend to exile or expel part of the population, 
which seeks asylum abroad. Again, this makes it difficult for dictatorships to 
take full advantage of the education embodied in individuals. But additionally, 
educated people may find it easier to leave the country and start a new life 
abroad, and may be more likely to do so if they face the risk of political 
repression. In this case, the investment in education that is embedded in them 
may not promote growth. 
Sixth, according to Sylwester (2000), governments with different time 
horizons perceive different benefits and costs from educational expenditure. If 
governments with longer time horizons perceive more benefits from spending 
money in education than governments with shorter horizons, a relevant issue 
to observe is whether dictators have shorter time horizons than democratically 
elected governments. At this point I cannot answer this question, but some 
reasonable assumptions can be made: dictators usually face a constant threat 
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of being overthrown; they will not need to face re-election; they do not 
necessarily belong to a party that needs to build reputation; and they do not 
necessarily benefit from the well being of future generations (while the 
citizenry may benefit from this, and so their democratically elected 
government). All this suggests that dictators have shorter time-horizons (or 
higher discount rates) than democracies. In this case, I do not only expect that 
dictators will spend less in education, but also that they may spend differently, 
promoting expenditures in education that maximize immediate visibility of the 
government, but not necessarily growth in the long-run. 
Seventh, as noted by Lott ( 1990, 1999), totalitarian governments can 
use public education to spread indoctrination. Whereas a democratic 
government cannot avoid the plurality of views and ideas, a dictator can 
channel whatever religious, political or moral principles are convenient for his 
regime through a public educational system that allows no opposition. In this 
case, the educational expenditure devoted to spread indoctrination would not 
necessarily add to the productivity or level of skills of individuals, thus 
reducing the impact of that educational expenditure on economic growth. 10 
Eighth, some dictatorships tend to concentrate the decision power 
centrally at the expense of individual free choice (the centrally planned 
communist economies are an example of this). In this case, if individuals 
cannot choose their work freely, there is a chance of misallocation of talent 
which has negative implications for growth, meaning that the potential of the 
education embedded in individuals may not be fully realised (for the effects of 
the allocation of talent on growth, see for example Murphy, Shleifer and 
Vishny 1991 ). 
Table 1 summarises the eight channels described above. 
10 Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer (2006) claim that in democracies education is also used to 
indoctrinate, though in that case the indoctrination is about the benefits of political 
participation. 
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Table 1 
1 Dictator has the discretion to allocate education expenditure in ways that favour 
the ruling elite. 
2 Corruption and lack of accountability favour diversion of education expenditure in 
dictatorship. 
3 Dictator's unaccountable powers threaten rule of law and property rights, which 
discourages investment and damages growth. 
4 In dictatorship, the burden of repression falls on individuals (and the education 
embedded in them). 
5 Exile or persecution expels individuals (and the education embedded in them). 
6 Different time horizons mean dictators may emphasise education expenditure with 
high short-run visibility but lower long-run impact. 
7 Dictators may use education to spread indoctrination rather than productive skills. 
8 Central power can be ineffective at allocating talent. 
Introduction to Chapter 4 
All these channels call for a consideration of the effect of democracy 
on growth through education, and of education on growth through democracy, 
instead of the traditional approach that presents both channels separately. 
These effects are considered in chapter 4: I test whether democracy is an 
intervening factor in the education-growth relationship, using interaction 
terms and different measures of education. If the interaction of democracy and 
education is relevant to explain economic growth, this means that education 
and democracy reinforce each other's effect on economic growth; To act as a 
proxy for 'education', I use an input of the education process (expenditure on 
education) and an output of the education process (average years of 
schooling). The econometric tool used is Arellano and Bover' s (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond's (1998) system-GMM estimator. 
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Addressing this question will shed light on the relevance of education 
and political institutions to the growth process, and will also help to explain 
some of the divergence found in the literature. At the same time, the policy 
implications to be drawn are of paramount relevance: if democracy has indeed 
a role to play in the education-growth relationship, should not some countries 
(mainly poor ones) get the 'right institutions' before engaging in education 
spending? 
Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2007) test whether the economy's 
proximity to the world technological frontier increases the positive effects of 
democracy on economic growth. They test this using interaction terms: they 
multiply their measure of proximity to the technological frontier by a measure 
of democracy, and find that the interaction is significant and negative, while 
the direct effect of democracy on growth is positive. This means that when 
countries are close to the technological frontier (so the distance decreases), the 
effect of democracy on growth is positive (the positive direct effect of 
democracy is greater than the interaction term, which may be zero if the 
country is in the technological frontier, or very small in absolute terms if the 
country is close to the frontier), while for countries that are far from the 
technological frontier, the negative interaction term overrides the positive 
direct effect of democracy, meaning that democracy becomes growth-
diminishing. Although the effect of democracy on growth has been 
approached by other scholars before (see discussion above), Aghion, Alesina 
and Trebbi (2007) argue that the novelty of their contribution is that no one 
before has interacted democracy with the economy's proximity to the world 
technological frontier. The novelty of chapter 4 in this thesis is derived in the 
same way: though previous scholars have observed the effect of education and 
democracy on economic growth, no one has actually interacted both factors as 
I do in chapter 4. 
As referred to above, Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) acknowledge 
that the effect of education on growth depends on other policies and 
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institutions, though they do not refer explicitly to democracy. They show that 
mapping for education through cognitive skills can account for three times the 
variation in economic growth of models that use years of schooling to map for 
education. Using data from different international student achievement tests 
(in literacy and numeracy), they build a measure of cognitive skills which 
outperforms years of schooling as an explanatory variable for economic 
growth. They conclude that this is due to the fact that including years of 
schooling in the growth regressions implies that a year of education produces 
the same increase in knowledge and skills regardless of the educational 
system, whereas the cognitive skills actually acquired by the population are a 
better indicator of the outcome of the education received. For example, 
differences in the quality of the education establishments or the educational 
systems of two countries can explain why two individuals with the same 
number of years of schooling may have different levels of productivity, and 
therefore have different impacts on economic growth. 
A particularly relevant feature of Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) is 
that they use interaction terms between their measure of education and 
measures of the 'appropriateness' of institutions, which is methodologically 
similar to what I do in chapter 4 (in the sense that I also use interaction terms 
to measure the education-enhancing capabilities of institutions). This leads 
them to the conclusion that education not only impacts on growth directly, but 
also that better institutional quality increases the impact of education on 
growth, which is precisely what I test in chapter 4. However, there are a 
number of considerations to be made when comparing chapter 4 to Hanushek 
and Woessmann (2008). 
First, Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) do not consider democracy as 
one of the institutions conducive to growth. Instead, they use trade openness 
and protection against expropriation. Though I do use trade openness as one of 
the possible explanatory factors of growth in chapter 4, my main institutional 
regressor (and the one I interact with education) is democracy. The next sub-
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section explains why I believe that democracy may be a better measure of the 
appropriate institutional framework for education to have an impact on 
economic growth. 
Second, data on cognitive skills, as measured by Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2008), are now available for only 77 countries (see Hanushek 
and Woessmann 2009). On average, the number of countries included in the 
regressions of Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) is less than half the number 
of countries included in the regressions of chapter 4 (additionally, the authors 
admit that their sample is biased towards developed economies). Even more 
limiting, the internationally comparable data on cognitive skills are in most 
cases available as one or two observations per country. In Hanushek and 
Woessman (2009), the closest that the authors get to a time series analysis is a 
observation of 15 (rich) countries with two data points (1975 and 2000). This 
makes it hard to assess whether changes of cognitive skills over time really 
have an impact on economic growth. The data available allow for the 
observation of cross sectional correlations between education and growth, 
rather than within variations (how changes in cognitive skills affect the rates 
of growth). 
Third, the analysis of Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) compares a 
unique initial year with a unique final year, whereas that of the regressions 
included in chapter 4 uses time series including various years. The option to 
use time series is one of the benefits derived from the relative abundance of 
the data I use when compared to that used by Hanushek and Woessmann 
(2008). 
These last two considerations were also identified by Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004) when they conclude, after using a test-scores variable, that "the 
overall indication is that the quality of education is far more important for 
economic outcomes than the years of schooling. Unfortunately. the limited 
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amount of international data on test scores makes it difficult to go further with 
this analysis" (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004, page 537). 
For this reason, the analysis in chapter 4 becomes all the more 
relevant: if educational quality is only a proxy for the quality of institutions 
(as argued by Bosworth and Collins 2003), then including measures of the 
governing institutions (like democracy) may be better than introducing 
measures of cognitive skills and arguing that those are the result of the 
mediating effect of educational quality on years of schooling. In other words, 
democracy may already include the relevant part of the 'appropriate' 
institutional environment, probably (as concluded by Bosworth and Collins 
2003) doing a better job than the 'educational quality' that is supposedly 
embedded in the cognitive skills. Issues related to the availability of data also 
contribute against the use of cognitive skills, though this may change in the 
future if longer time series of cognitive skills become available. 
All this means that it is necessary to make a case for the inclusion of 
democracy as the relevant institutional 'enhancer' of education. 
A related (though not equal) approach is taken by Baum and Lake 
(2003). Their analysis has two steps. First, they estimate a regression of 
female school enrolment rate on democracy and some controls. 11 They find 
that democracy contemporaneously affects the female school enrolment rate. 
Second, they estimate a regression of GDP per capita growth on some 
controls, democracy and female secondary enrolment lagged 4 periods, and 
find that female secondary enrolment positively affects economic growth 4 
periods later, while democracy has an insignificant (and negative) effect on 
economic growth. 
11 The authors focus on female school enrolment rates because they anticipate that these 
enrolment rates will be more sensitive to variations in regime type than those of men. 
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They interpret these results saying that democracy has no direct effect 
on economic growth, though it has an indirect effect through education: more 
democracy increases education (first regression), which in turn increases 
economic growth (second regression). To measure that indirect effect, the 
authors multiply the coefficient of democracy in the first regression by the 
coefficient of female secondary enrolment in the second regression. The 
indirect effect estimated in this way becomes positive and significant (at 10%) 
only for countries with a GDP per capita above US$ 2500. However, this does 
not explain how democracy intervenes in the impact of education on growth; 
in this model the effect of education on growth is not affected by democracy. 
In turn, Baum and Lake's (2003) contribution is to provide a causal chain 
through which democracy may affect growth via a quantity effect: more 
democracy means more education (though the idea that democracy affects 
education contemporaneously is questionable), which some periods later is 
translated into more growth. All this also has the caveat that the results are 
only significant for countries above a certain threshold of GDP per capita, and 
that it is only tested for female secondary enrolment. 
Education: error measurement in the education variables 
A recurrent problem that appears in the literature when trying to assess 
the effects of education on economic growth is error in the measurement of 
education. This, according to some of the researchers, may account for the 
absence of an association between increases in educational attainment and 
economic growth. 
Krueger and Lindahl (200 1) compare the data on average years of 
schooling provided by Barro and Lee (1993) (henceforth 'Barro-Lee dataset') 
with that provided by Kyriacou (1991). Whereas Kyriacou's data (used among 
others by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994 ), discussed above) refer to the 
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education of the work force, the Barro-Lee dataset refers to the entire 
population of age 25 and older and of age 15 and older. According to Krueger 
and Lindahl (2001), Kyriacou (1991) derived his data as follows: first, 
estimates of the average years of schooling for 42 countries in the mid-l970s 
were regressed on the countries' primary, secondary and tertiary school 
enrolment rates. With the estimated coefficients, the author predicted the years 
of schooling from enrolment rates for all countries in 1965 and 1985. Krueger 
and Lindahl (200 I) argue that this procedure can create substantial noise in the 
data, because the estimated regression may not hold for all the countries and 
time periods (plus enrolment rates tend to be mismeasured and the enrolment 
rates are not fully aligned with the workforce). 
On the other hand, the Barro-Lee dataset is based on survey- and 
census-based estimates reported by UNESCO. From those initial values, the 
authors derived more observations from historical enrolment flow data using a 
'perpetual inventory method' (Barro and Lee 1993). Krueger and Lindahl 
(2001) argue that the Barro-Lee dataset is superior to previous international 
measures of educational attainment, although errors in measurement are likely 
to persist because of the dubious quality of some of UNESCO' s enrolment 
rates. By regressing one dataset on the other (the Barro-Lee dataset and 
Kyriacou's dataset) and observing relatively low correlations, Krueger and 
Lindahl (200 I) conclude that an important portion of the measured change in 
the average years of schooling is non-informative. However, they conclude 
that to estimate the effect of educational improvements, the Barro-Lee dataset 
is preferable to that of Kyriacou. 
Bosworth and Collins (2003) compare the Barro-Lee dataset with 
another dataset provided by Cohen and So to (200 1) (henceforth 'Cohen-Soto 
dataset'), who compute the educational attainment at the beginning of each 
decade for the period 1960-2000, where they assume that the educational 
attainment of a specific age cohort is constant in successive ten-year periods. 
Bosworth and Collins (2003) report that this dataset is highly correlated with 
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the Barro-Lee dataset, though the same is not true for the changes over time. 
The authors conclude that neither of these two approaches is convincingly 
better than the other, and that their divergences are evidence of the 
measurement error. For this reason, they choose to use a simple average of the 
Cohen-Soto and the Barro-Lee datasets. 
Due to the debate on the measurement errors, Aghion, Meghir and 
Vandenbussche (2006) decide to present their results based on two datasets: 
they use the Barro-Lee dataset and a set of data provided by De la Fuente and 
Domenech (2002) (henceforth DD dataset). De la Fuente and Domenech 
(2002) report substantial changes in the classification criteria of educational 
attainment over successive censuses in many OECD countries, and present 
new estimations that adjust for those changes. A limitation of the DD dataset 
is that it covers only 21 OECD countries between 1960 and 1995 (the Barro-
Lee dataset covers over 100 countries between 1960 and 2000). 
Democracy as a meta-institution 
Papers establishing relationships between democracy, education and 
growth typically refer explicitly to the contradictory background of mixed 
results. Given the relevance of the issues involved, instead of discouraging 
research, this should call for new approaches to the topic, which is precisely 
what I intend to do in this work. The eight channels mentioned above (table 1) 
illustrate how democracy could intervene in the education-growth 
relationship. However, it could be argued that some of the effects identified 
could be attributed to corruption, the lack of property rights (as argued by 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2008)), the absence of rule of law and serious law 
enforceability, and the violation of human rights, among other factors. 
For instance, it can be said that it is corruption and not the lack of 
democracy that gives place to the first and second channels of table 1, or that 
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it is a weak property rights system and the absence of rule of law that 
generates the third channel. The violation of human rights could also explain 
the fourth and seventh channels. Why then do I focus on democracy? 
There are several definitions of democracy, not only because the 
accepted view of what constitutes democracy changes over time (in general 
modem definitions tend to be more inclusive than previous ones), but also 
because different authors put minimum thresholds of democracy at different 
levels (different minimum conditions that need to be satisfied for a regime to 
be called 'democracy'). However, there are fewer measures of democracy, and 
the most extended of them are highly correlated with each other, as shown by 
figures 1 to 3. 
Figure 1 shows two of the most widely used measures of democracy, 
averaged for the period 1994-2004 for a set of 157 countries. In the horizontal 
axis, the variable 'Polity' measures the degree of institutionalised democracy 
from -10 to 10 (where higher numbers mean more democracy), and is taken 
from the Polity IV database. 12 In the vertical axis, 'Freedom House' is an 
average of the Political Rights Index and the Civil Rights Index from the 
Freedom m the World Country Ratings (Freedom House, see 
www.freedomhouse.org). Both Freedom House indices range from 1 to 7, 
where lower numbers mean more freedom. As expected, figure 1 shows a 
strong negative correlation, given that Freedom House's measures decrease 
with democracy, while the Polity IV's measure increases with democracy. 
Appendix 1 presents a list of the countries included and descriptive statistics. 
12 Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers. 2004; Polity IV Data Set [Computer file; version 
p4v2004]. College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict 
Management, University of Maryland. 
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A new measure of democracy was introduced in 2006 by The 
Economist Intelligence Unit. This measure assigns scores from 1 to 10 to each 
country, where 10 is most democratic and 1 is least democratic. As this index 
became available in 2006 for the first time, there are no long time series for 
this index. 
Figure 2 shows how this index correlates to Freedom House's index 
for the year 2006 for a set of 164 countries. Again, a strong consistency 
among both measures of democracies is found. Appendix 2 presents a list of 
the countries included and descriptive statistics. 
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Figure 3 introduces a fourth measure of democracy ('Voice and 
Accountability') together with the 'Polity' variable, both averaged for 1996-
2004 for a set of 160 countries. This variable comes from Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi (2006) and measures "the extent to which a country's citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media" (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
Mastruzzi 2006, page 4). Appendix 3 presents a list of the countries included 
and descriptive statistics. 
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But how does democracy relate to the other factors identified above 
(corruption, rule of law, law enforcement, property rights, human rights)? The 
determination of the causalities among these factors is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. However, the statistical evidence suggests that more democracy is 
correlated with more transparency (less corruption), better property rights, the 
presence of rule of law, better law enforcement, more respect for human 
rights, better regulatory quality, more political stability and more government 
effectiveness. 
A well functioning democracy implies that all individuals should be 
treated equally before the law, and that this law has to be respected and 
enforced (property rights being just one of the rights guaranteed by the law); 
democracy also requires that individuals are free from oppression and 
repression (so their basic human rights should be respected); and that the 
Mauricio Armellini Page 46 
• 
10 
driving force behind the public sector procedures and the political sector's 
decisions is public well-being, and not the rent-seeking of politicians and/or 
bureaucrats (corruption). For these reasons, a well functioning democracy 
should set the institutional bases that guarantee the rule of law, human rights 
protection, transparency and law enforcement (which in turn is related to a 
better regulatory quality and more government effectiveness). 
This is in line with the results found by Rigobon and Rodrik (2005), 
who conclude that "Rule of law and democracy are generally mutually 
reinforcing and they tend to feed on each other" (page 538). Perotti and 
Volpin (2006) observe the determinants of investor protection and entry 
across a set of countries, and conclude that investment protection is better in 
countries with more accountable political institutions. The World Bank (2006) 
insists that democracy and the control of corruption go hand in hand, 
suggesting that democracy is the causal factor in that relationship: "when 
citizens can demand more accountability through the ballot box, or where 
there is freedom of expression, of the media, and of information, governments 
become cleaner and less corrupt" (The World Bank 2006, page 7). 
Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2007) test whether political rights 
(democracy) are more relevant for growth in countries that are closer to the 
technological frontier (discussed before). They claim that "Bribes are 
certainly not unknown in democracies, but since they are more open, 
associated with more freedom of the press and involve alternation in power of 
different groups, democratic leaders are generally less likely to be 
permanently captured by incumbents" (Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi 2007, 
page 10). This means that more democracy, which they claim increases 
transparency, competition and freedom of entry, increases the benefits of 
investing in new technology relative to those of bribing a policy maker to 
make them raise the barriers to entry. For this reason, they expect that 
democracy will increase the probability of entry of new firms in any given 
sector, which encourages innovation by advanced firms (which can innovate 
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and reduce the threat presented by new entrants) and discourages innovation 
in backward firms (which, being farther away from the technological frontier, 
fear that the value of any innovation may be destroyed by the new entrant). 
However, when Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2007) run their empirical tests, 
they find that a direct proxy for the probability of entry of a competitor 
('procedures.l 3) does not perform as well as democracy, which leads them to 
conclude that the democracy variables "capture something more general" 
(page 18) than the direct proxy. 
This is particularly important here: what is that 'something more 
general' that they refer to? The conclusions of the pieces of research presented 
above, together with the correlations in this section, indicate that democracy is 
associated with a 'cloud of factors' that generates a political and economic 
environment that may enhance the effect of certain factors on economic 
growth (particularly, that may be conducive to a stronger positive link 
between education and growth). Though it is difficult to associate empirically 
a cloud of (interrelated) factors with an observed phenomenon, democracy is 
useful for summarising that cloud of factors in order to explain the 
intervention of the political environment on the relationship between 
education and growth. 
Rodrik (2000) also suggests that democracy could be the ultimate 
factor behind a set of appropriate 'growth-enhancing' institutions, describing 
democracy as a "meta-institution for building good institutions'' (Rodrik 
2000, page 5). Rodrik argues that there is a range of non-market institutions 
that perform regulatory, stabilising and legitimising functions that make a 
market economy work, and that well-functioning market economies mix state 
and market, laissez faire and intervention in different degrees, without a 
unique accepted level of one or the other. In turn, the best way to combine and 
adapt those institutional arrangements to the local needs and capabilities of 
13 The direct proxy they use is the number of procedures needed to start up a business. 
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specific countries is through participatory political institutions. This means 
that democracy is a meta-institution, the institution that allows for the 
construction of other institutions better suited to local conditions, so that they 
enhance economic growth. 
Theoretically, the eight channels mentioned above and summarised in 
table 1 show why democracy itself could be channelling education into 
growth. The previous research discussed above also points in this direction. 
Empirically, the next figures show how democracy is related to the other 
institutionally favourable preconditions of growth, indicating that it could at 
least be a good synthesiser of the 'cloud' of factors. 
Figures 4 to 8 show how democracy is positively related to the factors 
mentioned above when using the same data set (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi 2006). As previously explained, the variable 'Voice and 
accountability' is a proxy for democracy. All these figures represent a data set 
of 160 countries, and values are averaged for the period 1996-2005. Appendix 
4 presents a list of the countries included and descriptive statistics. 
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Figure 7 
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The positive relationships shown in figures 4 to 8 are not limited to a 
unique data set. Using different data sources, figure 9 shows how a measure of 
corruption from Transparency International (where a higher value means less 
corruption) relates to The Economist Intelligence Unit's measure of 
democracy for 2006 for a sample of 157 countries. Appendix 5 presents a list 
of the countries included and descriptive statistics. 
Figure 9 
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Figure 10 (next page) shows that as expected, property rights seem to 
be better protected in democratic countries. The data on property rights was 
obtained from the 2007 Report of the International Property Rights Index of 
Property Rights Alliance (Horst 2007). Figure 10 presents the scores of 
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democracy (2006) and property rights (2007) for 69 countries. Appendix 6 
presents a list of the countries included and descriptive statistics. 
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R2 = 0.4925 
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I mentioned that democratic countries are expected to be more 
respectful of human rights. Figure 11 (next page) confirms this for a sample of 
184 countries, where democracy is proxied by the 'Voice and accountability' 
variable (as described above) for year 2000, and the number of Human Rights 
abuses for 1999 is taken from The Observer Human Rights Index as published 
in the special report of the 24th October 1999 (The Guardian, 24th October 
1999). Appendix 7 presents a list of the countries included and descriptive 
statistics. 
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Figure 11 
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Through the eight channels of table 1 I argued that democracies are 
associated with more economic freedom, which can facilitate a more efficient 
allocation of talent, which is conducive to a greater impact of education on 
economic growth. Figure 12 (next page) presents the Polity variable together 
with the Economic Freedom Index from The Heritage Foundation (available at 
www.heritage.org/research/features/index/downloads.cfm) for a set of 142 
countries in 2004. As expected, more democratic countries tend to have freer 
markets. Appendix 8 presents the list of countries included and descriptive 
statistics. 
All the evidence and previous research discussed above shows that 
democracy is associated with a 'cloud of factors' (less corruption, fewer 
abuses of human rights, better law enforcement, rule of law, better regulatory 
quality and government effectiveness, stronger property rights, freer markets 
and more political stability) that represent institutional conditions which can 
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foster the impact of education on growth through the channels identified 
above. 
Figure 12 
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Which of the factors of that cloud cause the others? This thesis does 
not answer this. Therefore, it may be democracy itself or the environment that 
surrounds it which is actually intervening in the link between education and 
growth. However, the arguments presented by previous researchers and the 
eight channels discussed above support the choice of democracy to map for 
the appropriate institutions that enhance the education-growth link (though it 
may not necessarily be the cause of the other factors). In other terms, I expect 
the lack of democracy and the failures associated with its absence to be the 
driving force behind the distortions that obstruct the link between education 
and growth. 
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Consequently, it is reasonable to ask whether the effect of education 
on growth depends on the level of democracy of the political system. This 
question is addressed empirically in chapter 4, but an answer is also suggested 
theoretically in chapter 3, which concludes that the economic gains of 
education should be more evident in democracy than in dictatorship. 
Outline of chapters 
Chapter 2 presents the disparities in cross-country public spending on 
education, and provides a model that shows how altruism could play a role in 
the determination of the differences in the rates of education subsidies. Novel 
datasets are exploited and new hypotheses are proposed, providing fresh 
resources for new research to focus on this field. 
The question of why and how much to spend on education is taken up 
again in chapter 3, but from a very different perspective. Chapter 3 focuses on 
the trade-offs between education and defence faced by dictatorships. This 
trade-off poses limits to dictatorships, leading to the discussion of how the 
impact of education on economic growth affects the chances of a regime 
transition. 
The discussion of the impact of education on economic growth is taken 
a step forward in chapter 4, which tests whether education affects growth 
regardless of the political system, or whether education under a democratic 
environment has different effects on growth than under non-democracy. A 
brief model is presented and the implications are tested using system-GMM 
estimation. 
Chapter 5 concludes. 
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Appendix 1: Data for figure 1 
Countries included: Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; 
Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Belarus; 
Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; 
Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central 
African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; Congo (Dem. 
Rep.); Congo (Rep.); Costa Rica; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus; Czech Republic; 
Denmark; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt (Arab Rep.); El 
Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; France; 
Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; 
Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Iran 
(Islamic Rep.); Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Ivory Coast; Jamaica; Japan; 
Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea (North); Korea (South); Kuwait; Kyrgyz 
Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lesotho; Liberia; Libya; Lithuania; Madagascar; 
Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; 
Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New 
Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Panama; Papua 
New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Romania; 
Russia; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia and Montenegro; Sierra 
Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; Solomon Islands; Somalia; South 
Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian 
Arab Republic; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; 
Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; 
United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Venezuela (RB); 
Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe. 
Descriptive 
statistics: Countries 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Mauricio Armellini 
Averages 1994-2004 
Polity Freedom House 
157 157 
2.71 3.81 
6.45 1.90 
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Appendix 2: Data for figure 2 
Countries included: Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; 
Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Belarus; 
Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia-Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; 
Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Cape 
Verde; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; 
Congo (Dem. Rep.); Congo (Rep.); Costa Rica; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus; Czech 
Republic; Denmark; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt (Arab 
Rep.); El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; 
Finland; France; Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; 
Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; 
Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran (Islamic Rep.); Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Ivory 
Coast; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea (North); Korea 
(South); Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; 
Libya; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Macedonia; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; 
Mali; Malta; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; 
Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nepal; 
Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; 
Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; 
Portugal; Qatar; Romania; Russia; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; 
Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; 
Sudan; Suriname; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; 
Taiwan; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; 
Turkey; Turkmenistan; United Arab Emirates; Uganda; Ukraine; United 
Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Venezuela (RB); Vietnam; 
Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe. 
Descriptive 
statistics: 
Countries 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Mauricio Armellini 
Values for year 2006 
Economist Freedom House 
164 164 
5.51 3.44 
2.27 1.93 
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Appendix 3: Data for figure 3 
Countries included: Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; 
Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Belarus; 
Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; 
Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central 
African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; Congo (Dem. 
Rep.); Congo (Rep.); Costa Rica; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus; Czech Republic; 
Denmark; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt (Arab Rep.); El 
Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; France; 
Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; 
Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Iran 
(Islamic Rep.); Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Ivory Coast; Jamaica; Japan; 
Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea (North); Korea (South); Kuwait; Kyrgyz 
Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; Libya; Lithuania; 
Macedonia; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; 
Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; 
Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Norway; 
Oman; Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; 
Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Romania; Russia; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; 
Serbia and Montenegro; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; 
Solomon Islands; Somalia; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; 
Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; 
Timor-Leste; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; 
Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States; 
Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Venezuela (RB); Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe. 
Descriptive 
statistics: 
Countries 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Mauricio Armellini 
Averages 1996-2004 
Voice and Polity Accountability 
160 160 
-0.21 2.78 
0.97 6.44 
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Appendix 4: Data for figures 4 to 8 
Countries included: Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; 
Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Belarus; 
Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; 
Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central 
African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; Congo (Rep.); 
Congo (Dem. Rep.); Costa Rica; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus; Czech Republic; 
Denmark; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt (Arab Rep.); El 
Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; France; 
Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; 
Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Iran 
(Islamic Rep.); Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Ivory Coast; Jamaica; Japan; 
Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea (North); Korea (South); Kuwait; Kyrgyz 
Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; Libya; Lithuania; 
Macedonia; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; 
Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; 
Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Norway; 
Oman; Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; 
Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Romania; Russia; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; 
Serbia and Montenegro; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; 
Solomon Islands; Somalia; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; 
Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; 
Timor-Leste; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; 
Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States; 
Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Venezuela (RB); Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe. 
Descriptive 
statistics: 
Averages 1996-2005 
Voice andAccountability 
Control of Corruption 
Rule of Law 
Regulatory Quality 
Government Effectiveness 
Political Stability 
Mauricio Armellini 
Countries 
160 
160 
160 
160 
160 
160 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
-0.21 0.97 
-0.13 0.99 
-0.19 0.98 
-0.13 0.95 
-0.11 0.99 
-0.28 0.91 
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Appendix 5: Data for figure 9 
Countries included: Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; 
Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; 
Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; 
Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; 
Chile; China; Colombia; Congo (Dem. Rep.); Congo (Rep.); Costa Rica; 
Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Dominican Republic; 
Ecuador; Egypt (Arab Rep.); El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Estonia; 
Ethiopia; Finland; France; Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; 
Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hong Kong; Hungary; 
Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran (Islamic Rep.); Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Ivory 
Coast; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea (South); Kuwait; 
Kyrgyz Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Libya; Lithuania; 
Luxembourg; Macedonia; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Malta; 
Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; 
Myanmar; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; 
Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; 
Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Romania; Russia; Rwanda; Saudi 
Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; South 
Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Suriname; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; 
Syrian Arab Republic; Taiwan; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; Timor-Leste; 
Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Uganda; 
Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; United States; 
Uzbekistan; Venezuela (RB); Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe. 
Descriptive 
statistics: 
Mauricio Armellini 
Countries 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Values for 2006 
Economist Corruption 
157 157 
5.61 4.08 
2.24 2.17 
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Appendix 6: Data for figure 10 
Countries included: Argentina; Australia; Austria; Bangladesh; Belgium; 
Bolivia; Brazil; Bulgaria; Canada; Chile; China; Colombia; Costa Rica; Czech 
Republic; Denmark; Ecuador; Egypt (Arab Rep.); El Salvador; Ethiopia; 
Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Guatemala; Honduras; Hong Kong; 
Hungary; India; Indonesia; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Kenya; Korea (South); 
Lithuania; Malawi; Malaysia; Mauritius; Mexico; Morocco; Netherlands; New 
Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Pakistan; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; 
Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russia; Singapore; South Africa; 
Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Tanzania; Thailand; Tunisia; Turkey; Ukraine; 
United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Venezuela (RB). 
Descriptive statistics: 
Countries 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Prop. Rights 2007 
69 
5.32 
1.79 
Appendix 7: Data for figure 11 
Economist 2006 
69 
6.96 
1.67 
Countries included: Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Andorra; Angola; Antigua 
and Barbuda; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahamas; 
Bahrain; Bangladesh; Barbados; Belarus; Belgium; Belize; Benin; Bhutan; 
Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Brunei; Bulgaria; 
Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Cape Verde; Central 
African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; Congo (Dem. 
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Rep.); Congo (Rep.); Costa Rica; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus; Czech Republic; 
Denmark; Djibouti; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt (Arab 
Rep.); El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; 
Finland; France; Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; 
Grenada; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hong 
Kong; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran (Islamic Rep.); Iraq; Ireland; 
Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kiribati; Korea 
(North); Korea (South); Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; 
Lesotho; Liberia; Libya; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Macedonia; 
Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Maldives; Mali; Malta; Marshall Islands; 
Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Micronesia; Moldova; Monaco; Mongolia; 
Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nauru; Nepal; Netherlands; New 
Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Oman; Pakistan; Panama; Papua New 
Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Romania; 
Russia; Rwanda; Samoa; Sao Tome and Principe; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; 
Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovak Republic; Somalia; South Africa; 
Spain; Sri Lanka; St Kitts and Nevis; St Lucia; St Vincent and the Grenadines; 
Sudan; Suriname; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syrian Arab Republic; 
Taiwan; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Tonga; Trinidad and Tobago; 
Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; 
United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Vanuatu; Venezuela 
(RB); Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe. 
Descriptive statistics: 
Countries 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Mauricio Armellini 
Voice and 
Accountability 2000 
184 
-0.07 
1.01 
Human Rights 
Abuses 1999 
184 
6.99 
5.89 
~--------------------------~ 
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Appendix 8: Data for figure 12 
Countries included: Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; 
Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Benin; Bolivia; 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Burundi; 
Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; 
Colombia; Congo (Dem. Rep.); Congo (Rep.); Costa Rica; Croatia; Cuba; 
Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; 
Egypt (Arab Rep.); El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; 
Finland; France; Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; 
Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; 
India; Indonesia; Iran (Islamic Rep.); Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Ivory Coast; 
Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea (North); Korea (South); 
Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Libya; Lithuania; 
Macedonia; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; 
Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; 
Nepal; Netherlands; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Oman; Pakistan; Panama; 
Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Qatar; Romania; Russia; Rwanda; Saudi 
Arabia; Senegal; Serbia and Montenegro; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovak 
Republic; Somalia; South Africa; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; Syrian Arab 
Republic; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; 
Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; 
Uzbekistan; Venezuela (RB); Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe. 
Descriptive statistics: 
Countries 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Mauricio Armellini 
Values for 2004 
Economic Polity Freedom 
142 142 
57.68 3.51 
11.86 6.66 
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Chapter 2 
What drives the cross-
country variation on 
education subsidies? 
Abstract 
To help explain the variation of public expenditure on education across 
countries, I focus on the part of that expenditure that results from subsidising 
households' expenditure on education. An overlapping generations model 
shows that countries that are less altruistic and less short-sighted should set 
higher rates of subsidy. I provide exploratory evidence that richer countries 
tend to be less altruistic than their poorer counterparts, which contributes to 
explain why poorer countries transfer fewer public resources to education 
even though their private and social returns tend to be greater than in richer 
countries. 
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Introduction 
Part of the previous chapter discussed how education affects economic 
growth, and the different approaches towards that relationship. This chapter 
provides an insight into one of the factors that may contribute to the 
explanation of the cross-country variation in the provision of public education. 
Education, as measured by the average years of schooling of 
individuals aged 15 years or more (from the Barro-Lee dataset, Barro and Lee 
1993, 2000) exhibits an important variation across countries. Figure 1 shows 
data for year 2000 14• 
Figure 1 
Average years of schooling, population aged 15 or more. Year 2000. 
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14 Data for the average years of schooling of the population aged 25 and more shows a very 
similar pattern. 
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The factors that explain the variation of figure 1 could be various and 
are beyond the scope of this chapter. One of the possible causes of that 
variation is the amount of resources (private or public) devoted to education: it 
is reasonable to expect that extending education requires the use of resources, 
and that more education requires more resources. This is not only intuitive but 
also assumed by previous scholars. For example, when researchers try to find 
a relationship between education expenditure and economic growth (Sylwester 
2000, Brauninger and Vidal 1999, Zhang 1996, Blankenau and Simpson 2003, 
Blankenau 2005), they are assuming that education expenditure creates 
education, which in turn has an effect on economic growth. This is also a 
standard feature in models that focus on the relationships between education, 
inequality and growth (for example Saint-Paul and Verdier 1993, 
Bourguignon and Verdier 2000, Sylwester 2000), in which transfers from the 
rich to the poor take the form of education expenditure, which in turn has 
effects on economic growth. 
Gradstein, Justman and Meier (2005) survey the literature and 
conclude that "There seems to be no doubt that spending on education matters 
in absolute sense. Thus, in international macroeconomic comparisons, 
especially those that include less advanced countries, more spending is 
typically associated with better educational outcomes" (Gradstein, Justman 
and Meier 2005, page 34). When looking at the total expenditure on 
education, Gradstein, Justman and Meier (2005) note the high share that 
public education expenditure has of total education expenditure. They claim 
that among the OECD countries, more than 90% of total education spending 
comes from the state, while among developing countries the share is lower but 
still high. This is confirmed in table 1, which shows the share of public 
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expenditure on education over total expenditure on education for 46 countries 
from the EdStats Database (World Bank) 15 • 
Table 1 
Public expenditure in education as a share of total expenditure on education, 
average 1996-2002. 
Country All levels Primary+ Country All levels Primary+ Seconda!)l Seconda!)l 
Malaysia 99.3 99.0 Thailand 85.4 
Portugal 98.5 99.9 Mexico 85.0 86.6 
Finland 97.9 99.3 Canada 83.3 92.1 
Norway 97.4 99.2 New Zealand 82.5 89.6 
Sweden 97.1 99.9 Israel 81.6 95.0 
Denmark 95.7 97.9 Germany 80.2 78.5 
Greece 95.4 93.1 Argentina 80.1 88.2 
Slovak Republic 95.3 97.9 Australia 77.2 84.8 
Austria 95.1 96.4 Japan 75.1 91.7 
Belgium 93.9 94.0 Bolivia 75.0 
Uruguay 93.6 93.8 Cambodia 73.0 
France 93.6 94.5 United States 72.2 91.2 
Italy 93.5 98.1 Paraguay 65.3 74.3 
Netherlands 93.0 95.3 Indonesia 64.4 76.4 
Turkey 92.7 83.9 Peru 64.3 67.8 
Switzerland 92.1 87.9 Honduras 62.0 
Ireland 91.7 96.4 Korea, Rep. 59.1 79.8 
Iceland 91.6 95.1 Philippines 58.8 65.3 
Czech Republic 89.5 90.9 Korea, Dem. Rep. 58.3 77.4 
Poland 89.2 97.1 Chile 56.2 69.6 
Hungary 88.6 92.6 Jamaica 49.6 52.4 
United Kingdom 87.2 87.7 Dominican Republic 45.5 
India 86.5 89.9 Jordan 98.2 
Spain 85.8 90.8 Turkmenistan 98.0 
Total Average 81.8 89.0 
Therefore, any attempt to understand the cross-country variation of 
education expenditure must account for variations in public expenditure on 
education. What motivates public expenditure on education? Why do 
countries differ in their levels of public expenditure on education? 
Gradstein, Justman and Meier (2005) survey the literature and refer to 
several possible factors that could explain why countries spend public money 
15 Data accessible on http://go.worldbank.org/9QQK7QK8YO 
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on education. The first factor that they identify is the existence of positive 
externalities and spillover effects that result from a more educated population. 
As they admit, empirical support for this has been elusive, with estimates of 
social returns to education being below the private returns. A second factor 
that could explain public intervention on education is the existence of other 
spillovers not directly linked to economic growth: education may decrease 
criminal activity and child mortality, improve life expectancy, extend political 
rights, improve environmental quality, etc. A third factor is social cohesion: 
public education provides some common norms that favour interpersonal trust 
and facilitate interaction. A fourth factor is imperfect credit markets, which 
could limit the access of some sectors to education. 
Pritchett (2004) claims that justifying public expenditure on education 
on the basis of positive macroeconomic returns is difficult, because of the 
elusiveness of those returns (discussed in the previous chapter). For that 
reason, he argues that the decision to spend more or less public resource on 
education is driven by factors other than private, social or macroeconomic 
returns 16. In consequence, Pritchett (2003) presents a model that explains why 
nearly all countries have public educational policies, without referring to the 
macroeconomic effects of education on growth. He argues that schooling 
conveys beliefs, and that the rulers of a nation are not indifferent about these 
beliefs. To control the beliefs embedded on instruction, powerful national 
regimes sought control of the beliefs instruction directly, so public schooling 
became a dominant form of schooling. Public schooling later expanded due to 
16 
"[S]ince I do not believe that beliefs about output externalities have played any role in 
creating or expanding support for education I am perfectly comfortable that my assessment 
that there is no evidence for output externalities in the cross national data does nor work at 
cross purposes with my normative beliefs that expending high quality schooling through 
public sector support is key to expansions in human welfare·· (Pritchett 2004, page 83). Weiss 
( 1995) raises a similar point: "education does not have to be justified solely on the basis of its 
effect on labour productivity. This was certainly not the argument given by Plato or de 
Tocqueville and need not be ours. Students are not taught civics, or art, or music solely in 
order to improve their labour productivity bur rather to enrich their lives and make them 
better citizens" (Weiss 1995, p. 151) 
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supply (pressure of strongly ideological regimes) or demand (pressure of 
increasingly powerful citizens). 
From the perspective of the private and social returns to education, 
Psacharopoulos ( 1993) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) show that 
education appears to behave like other factors of production in the sense that it 
experiences diminishing returns 17• According to those results one should 
expect poorer countries to spend relatively more on education than richer 
countries, where the marginal productivity of education 1s lower. 
Theoretically, if poorer countries kept on spending more on education, the gap 
in productivity and level of income should disappear in the long run. 
However, Psacharopoulos has measured the returns to education over a long 
period (1973, 1985, 1993, 2002) and the results show that the gap is still 
present (social returns to education in richer countries are lower than in poorer 
countries). More strikingly, poorer countries have been spending relatively 
less public money on education than richer countries (see data below), which 
probably explains the persistence of the productivity gap. 
Table 2 shows data on total public spending on education as a share of 
GDP from the World Bank Development Indicators. 
Table 2 
Education expenditure per student I GDP per capita(%) 
Category 1991 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Low income 2.76 2.96 3.13 
Lower ntiddle income 3.87 4.44 4.19 4.41 4.18 4.81 
Upper ntiddle income 4.08 4.04 4.15 3.92 4.17 4.29 4.38 4.11 
High income 4.90 4.95 5.18 4.68 5.22 5.48 5.48 5.39 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WD/J. April 2008, ESDS International. 
(Mimas). University of Manchester. 
17 In Psacharopoulos. 'social return' does not refer to macroeconomic return. Social returns 
include private benefits less total costs (private plus external). Social returns are always lower 
than private returns because the social costs include public expenditure on education, which is 
not considered in the private returns. 
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A test of difference of means cannot be performed because the World 
Bank presents the data already aggregated in the categories shown. Data for 
1992-1997 are not directly available. For this reason table 3 presents 
unweighted averages of the variable presented in table 2, where I categorise 
the countries by their income levels following the classification of the World 
Bank 18• This allows for the computation of a test of difference in means. 
These two tables suggest that richer countries have tended to spend 
relatively more public resources on education than poorer countries, and that 
the proportion of public resources devoted to education seems to be 
significantly different between poor and rich countries. 
Table 3 
Education expenditure I GDP (o/o). Simple average of countries' values 
High Upper Middle Lower Middle Low Difference p-value for T -test in differences 
income income income income High-Low in means (high vs low) 
1985 4.72 5.11 4.75 2.96 1.76 0.00*** 
1986 4.78 4.61 5.34 2.70 2.08 0.00*** 
1987 4.62 4.28 4.22 3.40 1.23 0.02** 
1988 4.75 4.05 4.30 3.45 1.30 0.02** 
1989 4.55 3.74 4.45 3.38 1.17 0.05** 
1990 4.56 4.42 4.46 3.83 0.73 0.20 
1991 4.46 4.19 4.59 3.53 0.93 0.08* 
1992 4.81 4.64 4.46 4.26 0.55 0.38 
1993 4.90 4.67 4.65 4.20 0.69 0.21 
1994 5.19 4.71 4.87 3.77 1.42 0.00*** 
1995 5.05 4.65 4.63 3.71 1.34 0.00*** 
1996 5.03 4.65 5.05 3.57 1.46 0.00*** 
1997 4.58 4.38 5.08 2.89 1.69 0.08* 
1998 5.08 5.16 4.82 2.91 2.18 0.00*** 
1999 5.11 5.60 4.76 3.03 2.08 0.00*** 
2000 4.81 5.61 5.07 3.30 1.51 0.00*** 
2001 5.12 5.40 5.37 3.52 1.59 0.00*** 
2002 5.23 5.61 5.20 3.50 1.74 0.00*** 
2003 5.40 5.43 5.04 3.46 1.94 0.00*** 
2004 5.13 5.22 4.82 3.40 1.73 0.00*** 
2005 4.78 5.25 5.41 3.81 0.97 0.04** 
Source: EdStats, World Bank (July 2008). Countries classified according to the World Bank. 
Notes: ***stands for significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level. 
18 See 
http://web.worldbank.org!WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DAT AST A TISTICS/O,contentMDK:20421 
402-pagePK:64133150-piPK:64133175-theSitePK:239419.00.htrni#High_income 
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Data on total public expenditure on education per student as a share of 
per capita GDP show the same pattern. This variable has the benefit of 
avoiding differences in education expenditure that are due to demographic 
differences across countries, such as a greater or smaller proportion of 
population being of school age. As it is presented in terms of GDP per capita, 
this variable avoids the observation of differences on education expenditure 
that are due to the scale of the national economies. Data for educational 
expenditure across countries are scarce, and data for this more specific 
variable are even scarcer. Unweighted averages for this variable (education 
expenditure per student as a share of GDP per capita) can be calculated using 
data from the EdStats database of the World Bank. Table 4 groups the 
countries by the same income categories as above. 
Table 4 
Education expenditure per student I GDP per capita(%) 
Simple average of countries' values 
High Upper Middle Lower Middle Low Difference 
income income income income High-Low 
1998 19.91 19.76 13.85 NIA 
1999 22.95 20.06 20.78 18.54 4.41 
2000 22.23 18.78 20.75 12.95 9.28 
2001 23.48 19.75 19.36 15.22 8.25 
2002 23.78 18.71 18.63 13.80 9.98 
2003 24.74 19.70 18.25 18.14 6.60 
2004 24.11 18.02 17.24 16.55 7.55 
2005 22.99 19.80 17.40 18.34 4.65 
Source: EdSrars, World Bank (July 2008). Countries classified according 10 the World Bank. 
A difference of means test is not presented because of the low number 
of observations in the category 'low income'. Only in 2005 there are more 
than 10 countries in this category. Due to this scarcity of data, the numbers 
should be taken with caution. Table 4 also suggests that poorer countries did 
not spend more on education than richer countries. Furthermore, it suggests 
that richer countries spent relatively more on education than poorer countries. 
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This may explain why the productivity gap mentioned above has not closed 
over time. 
Another measure of the differences in public expenditure on education 
is the ratio of public expenditure on education to total expenditure on 
education (which includes public expenditure and expenditure of households). 
This variable 19 is shown in figure 2 together with the GDP per capita for a 
group of 44 countries. A list of the countries included and descriptive statistics 
are presented in appendix 1. 
Figure 2 
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19 I compute this variable using data for household and government expenditure on education 
from the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation, Education Statistics, 
Volume 2006, Issue 01, ESDS International, (Mimas) University of Manchester. 
The source for GDP per capita in constant US$ (year 2000) is World Bank, World 
Development Indicators (WDI) April 2007, ESDS International, (MIMAS) University of 
Manchester. 
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Finally, table 5 provides econometric evidence that countries with a 
higher GDP per capita tend to devote more public resources to education as a 
share of GDP. The regressions are cross-country, using average values for 
each country for the period 1999-2002. Appendix 2 presents the sources of 
data; appendix 3 presents a list of the countries included in the regressions and 
descriptive statistics. 
Table 5 
Dependent variable: Public education expenditure IGDP 
(1) (2) (3) 
Constant 6.475365 3.8746810 ** 5.0371300 
(0.99) (2.46) (0.76) 
GDP per capita, constant prices. '000 0.0409 * 0.0395 ** 
(/. 72) (2.22) 
GDP per capita, PPP. '000 0.0929 
(3.19) 
Public expendirure/GDP 0.1013133 *** 0.0565867 *** 
(4.17) (3.14) 
Public expenditurc/GDP, PPP 0.0517585 
(3.31) 
lnvestrnent!GDP -0.0158723 -0.0085322 
(-0.76) (-0.41) 
lnvestment!GDP, PPP -0.0160283 
(-0.64) 
Trade/GDP 0.006240 * 0.0036379 
(1.77) -1.12 
Trade/GDP, PPP 0.0059188 
(1.77) 
Population 0-14 years/Total population -0.0305800 -0.0161686 
(-0.57) (-0.30) 
Population 15-64 years/Total population -0.0628829 -0.0117211 -0.0576044 
(-0.82) (-0.45) ( -0. 74) 
Degree of democracy 0.7918723 1.1483870 
(1.35) (/.92) 
M2/GDP 0.0027267 0.0058163 
(0.42) (0.89) 
R squared 0.2915 0.1407 0.2702 
Adjusted R squared 0.2375 0.1089 0.2161 
Countries 114 141 117 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. *** stands for significant at I% level. ** significant at 5%. * significant at I O'i'o. 
All the variables represent average values for each country for the period 1999-2002. 
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1.955556 
(1.2 /) 
*** 0.0901 
(3.84) 
*** 0.057624 
(4.03) 
-0.0168579 
(-0.73) 
* 0.0040500 
(1.30) 
-0.0064823 
(-0.22) 
* 0.7983138 
(1.53) 
0.2459 
0.2091 
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The regressions of table 5 relate public expenditure on education as a 
share of GDP to GDP per capita (main regressor) and a series of controls. 
Total public expenditure as a share of GDP and investment as a share of GDP 
are included to control for differences in public education expenditure that 
could arise from differences on how different countries allocate public 
resources in general, or from other structural differences. If two countries 
differ in their degree of intervention in the economy or in their investment 
patterns for reasons not considered here, they could also spend differently on 
education. I include these two regressors (Public expenditure/GDP and 
Investment/GDP) to control for that source of variation. 
I include a regressor that controls for the degree of openness of the 
economy (trade/GDP) to control for whether countries spend differently in 
public education because they need to 'catch up' with their commerciaf 
competitors and counterparts. A hypothesis could be that countries that are 
commercially more open are more exposed to foreign competition, so they 
need to make sure that they remain competitive and thus spend more on public 
education. I include two controls that account for the age structure of the 
population to ensure that differences in public expenditure on education are 
not due to differences in the shares of population that are of school age. I 
include a control that accounts for the degree of democracy to account for the 
possibility (discussed in chapter 1) that more democratic countries use the 
expansion of public education as a way of redistribution. Finally, I include a 
measure of monetary expansion (M2/GDP) to control for other possible 
sources of variation in the public finances that may account for differences in 
the public expenditure on education. 
The first two regressions of table 5 use GDP per capita in constant 
terms, as well as public expenditure as a share of GDP, investment as a share 
of GDP and a measure of trade as a share of GDP (imports+exports/GDP); 
regressions 3 and 4 introduce those variables adjusted by PPP. Regressions are 
shown with and without PPP adjustments because the dependent variable 
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(public expenditure on education /GDP) is not available in PPP terms: 
although it is a ratio, in order to be accurate the numerator should also be 
expressed in PPP (in fact, the ratios investment/GDP and public 
expenditure/GDP are available with and without PPP adjustment). For this 
reason, it is not completely consistent to run regressions where the dependent 
variable is not PPP adjusted but the regressors are. However, given that PPP 
measures have some benefits for cross-country comparisons, table 5 presents 
the results obtained with and without the PPP adjusted regressors. 
In all the regressions the level of GDP per capita (however measured) 
enters with a positive sign, with at least a 10% significance, suggesting that 
indeed, richer countries tend to devote more public resources to education as a 
share of GDP. 
The definition of the variable 'Public education expenditure as a share 
of GDP' is "government spending on educational institutions (both public and 
private), education administration as well as subsidies for private entities 
(students/households and other privates entities)" (World Bank, World 
Development Indicators, ESDS International, (Mimas) University of 
Manchester). According to this definition, we can think of total public 
education expenditure as consisting of three components: a fixed amount 
spent for education administration and educational institutions (£;), subsidies 
to the education expenditure of households (where the subsidy rate is w;), and 
subsidies to other private entities (subsidy rate v;). The cross-country variation 
in public education expenditure can be originated from variations in the fixed 
amount spent, or from variations in either of the two subsidies paid, so 
Total Public Education Expenditure,= E, +h,.m, + p,.v, 
where h; is the education expenditure of households in country i and p; refers 
to the education expenditure of other private entities in country i. 
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In this chapter I contribute to the explanation of variations in the cross-
country public education expenditure by focusing on some of the possible 
determinants of w; and deliberately ignoring the other possible factors, also 
ignoring the possibility of changes in w; over time. In particular, I explore how 
altruism can affect the determination of the rate of subsidy w;. I am not aware 
of any similar approach to studying the cross-country variation in public 
education expenditure. One of the reasons for this may be the lack of data on 
cross-country rates of educational subsidy and levels of altruism. I present two 
proxies to cover for this absence of data, which I describe below. Brauninger 
and Vidal (2000) analyse the impact of public subsidies to education on 
economic growth (they do not provide empirical evidence), and they also 
consider altruism in their model. However, their focus is economic growth, so 
their level of subsidies does not depend on altruism and is given exogenously. 
If people receive education early in their lives (when they are 
children), they do not decide how much education should be provided for 
themselves: the older generations decide for them. If those who make the 
budgetary decisions assign different values to the education of future 
generations (they differ in the utility they obtain from educating their children, 
i.e., their intergenerational degree of altruism differs), then they will probably 
differ in the rate of education subsidies they will set. The initial research 
hypothesis of this chapter establishes that countries with different levels of 
altruism will differ in the level of education subsidies that they will set. 
Specifically, the hypothesis is that countries with greater levels of private 
intergenerational altruism will need lower levels of public education subsidies. 
The intuition is that more private altruism necessitates lesser public subsidies 
to education, because more altruistic parents will naturally spend more on 
their offspring's education. 
The second section presents some data that suggest that more altruistic 
countries tend to set lower subsidies to education. The third section lays out an 
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overlapping generations model that provides an explanation for the data of the 
second section. The fourth section concludes. 
Data 
In this section I observe whether a relationship between the level of 
altruism and the level of public education subsidies exists in the data. Among 
other aspects, this requires a measure of education subsidies and a measure of 
altruism. There is almost no research on cross-country altruism and how it 
relates to income or other macroeconomic variables. The research available is 
mostly theoretical or based on case-studies (among many others, Stark 1995, 
Andreoni 1989, 1990, Amegashie 2006, Gerard-Varet, Kolm, Mercier Ythier 
2000). 
There ts no internationally comparable indicator for the level of 
subsidies to education. I operationalise the rate of subsidy (w) as the fraction 
of the private expenditure on education that the government refunds to the 
private individual who makes the expenditure. For example, if an individual 
spends h on education, then a rate of subsidy w means that the individual 
receives a subsidy of w.h units. In conclusion, of the total expenditure on 
education h, there are w. h units originated in public resources and (1-w ). h 
originated in private resources. According to this operationalisation, 
Public expenditure on education w.h, 
= ={J) 
Total expenditure on education m.h, + (1- m).h, 
According to this, taking [(Public expenditure on education I (Public + 
Households' expenditure on education)] should make a reasonably good proxy 
for the rate of public subsidies to education. I call this proxy Subsidies. Figure 
1 (presented above) shows data on w (horizontal axis) as defined here. Though 
a very imperfect measure of subsidies, the aim of this variable is to capture 
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how much resource the government allocates to education as a share of the 
total resources allocated to education by the government and households. 
For robustness, I also take an alternative measure which includes total 
private expenditure instead of households' expenditure. This proxy is then 
computed as [(Public expenditure on education I (Public + Total private 
expenditure on education)], where 'total private expenditure on education' 
includes the expenditure of households but also the expenditure of private 
institutions (firms). I call this proxy Subsidies-Extended. 
Regarding the level of altruism, I use two measures derived from one 
variable. The first proxy for altruism comes from question A026 of the World 
Values Surve/0: "Which of the following statements best describes your views 
about parents' responsibilities to their children?: A- Parents' duty is to do 
their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being; B-
Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own 
well-being for the sake of their children". 
The proxy for altruism is the percentage of people choosing answer A 
from the previous question in each country. The survey is carried out in 
different years in different countries, and most countries have only one 
available observation for the period 1994-2004 (where there are two available 
observations for a country I take the average of these two). Though arguably 
an imperfect measure of altruism, this may be the first time that this variable is 
used as a measure of altruism for cross-country comparisons, and possibly the 
first time that a cross-country measure of altruism is presented at all in the 
literature. I call this proxy Altruism. Previous research has used monetary 
transfers made by individuals as a proxy for altruism. For example, Bouhga-
20 European and World Value Survey four-wave integrated data file, 1981-2004, v.20060423, 
2006. The European Values Study Foundation and World Values Survey Association. 
Aggregate File Producers: ASEP/JDS, Madrid, Spainffilburg University, Tilburg, The 
Netherlands. Aggregate File Distributors: ASEP/JDS and ZA, Cologne, Germany. 
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Hagbe (2006) looks at the remittances of migrant workers as an expression of 
their altruism. Andreoni (2006) compares altruism across countries by looking 
at the percentage of cash revenues of the non-profit sector that are received 
from philanthropy. Castillo and Carter (2002) run behavioural experiments in 
South African communities, and derive their measure of altruism from the 
amount of money that the individuals are willing to transfer in their 'dictator 
game'. However, these are not real proxies for altruism but rather some of its 
consequences. Furthermore, those measures tend to be aggregated and not 
standardised21 , whereas the measure presented here focuses particularly on 
altruism from parents to children, which is the focus of this chapter. 
A second proxy for altruism is a variation of the proxy Altruism. Let us 
consider a dummy variable that takes value 1 when a country has a value of 
Altruism above the median of the sample, and 0 when the country has a value 
below the median. In other words, this proxy is a dummy that indicates 
whether the country is relatively 'altruistic' or 'non-altruistic' when compared 
to the set of countries with available data. I call this proxy Altruism Dummy. 
Due to the lack of time series data for altruism (which is a crucial 
variable in this analysis), table 6 presents the results of cross-country 
regressions, where variables are averaged for the period 1992-2002. These 
regressions capture the effect of altruism on subsidies after controlling for a 
number of macroeconomic variables (they are included for reasons similar to 
those already discussed for the regressions of table 5). The reader should bear 
in mind that this is a first exploratory observation of the effects of altruism at 
cross-country level, and that better measures of altruism and subsidies to 
education are needed. The list of countries included in each specification of 
table 6 is presented in appendix 4, together with some descriptive statistics. 
21 
"A difficult aspect of comparing data from across countries is the varied sources of 
information and the inconsistent definitions of charitable giving and non-profit 
organizations·· (Andreoni 2006, page 1209). 
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~ Subsidies- Subsidies-
::: Dependent variables: Subsidies Subsidies Subsidies Subsidies Extended Extended 
""! 
;:)" (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) c;· 
;:t.. Constant 1.0586840 *** 0.8816712 *** 1.246569 1.030423 1.142059 ** 0.8358496 *** ~ (8.68) (42.02) (2.52) (3.95) (2.86) (4.51) ("1:> 
--
-- Altruism -0.002970 I * -0.0044573 -0.0044899 §: (-/. 76) (-1.44) (-1.64) 
Altruism dummy -0.094 7775 *** -0. 1333864 ** -0.117514 ** 
(-2. 78) (-2.48) (-2.55) 
GDP per capita, PPP 6.90E-06 5.43E-06 6.46E-06 * 4.30E-06 
(1.58) ( 1.49) (1.85) (1.42) 
Trade/GDP, PPP 0.0000728 -0.0004735 0.0004737 -0.0000205 
(0.09) (-0.65) (0.67) (-0.03) 
--3 
Investment/GDP, PPP -0.0191158 -0.022030 I ** -0.0175028 ** -0.0161938 *** ~ C" 
(-1.74) (-2.37) (-2.65) (-3.32) ;-
=" Public expenditure/GDP, PPP 0.0018894 0.0017205 0.0028066 0.002951 
(0.51) (0.53) (0.89) ( 1.05) 
Degree of democracy 0.0552345 0.0842936 0.1571238 0.2011153 * 
(0.34) (0.64) (1.13) (1.76) 
M2/GDP 0.0013088 0.0020883 * 0.0002015 0.0006995 
( 1.05) ( 1.86) (0.21) (0.82) 
R squared 0.0816 0.1807 0.4780 0.5789 0.6341 0.6934 
"tt Adjusted R squared 0.0554 0.1573 0.2344 0.3824 0.4834 0.5672 
l::l Countries 37 37 23 23 25 25 ()':) 
("1:> 
Oo Notes: t-values in parenthesis,*** stands for significant at I% level.** stands for signiticant at 5%, *stands for significant at 10%. 
....... 
All the variables represent average values for each country for the period 1999-2002. 
In all the six specifications the proxies for altruism enter with a 
negative sign, suggesting that more altruistic countries tend to subsidise 
education less. Table 6 also shows that richer countries tend to subsidise 
education more than poorer countries even after controlling for altruism, 
though the effect tends to be statistically insignificant. The explanations for 
this can be diverse. Let us consider two possible explanations. First, the level 
of GDP may be related to the level of subsidies (or to other omitted variables 
that are correlated to subsidies) in ways not considered in this model. Second, 
the level of GDP may be correlated to altruism, and it may be picking up some 
of the effects of the 'real altruism' on subsidies not captured in our proxy 
Altruism. For this to be consistent, richer countries should be expected to be 
less altruistic. Previous research has also concluded that this should be 
expected (Laferre and Wolff 2006, page 951; Arrondel and Masson 2006, 
page 1047), meaning that at least part of the positive relationship between 
GDP and subsidies could simply be a consequence of this. The data are 
consistent with the expectations of previous research: the simple correlation 
coefficient between GDP and altruism is -0.2676. Although this is far from 
conclusive, it suggests at least that 'real altruism' may be negatively correlated 
to GDP too (meaning that richer countries are less altruistic), so GDP in table 
6 may be reflecting at least part of the effect of 'real altruism' not captured by 
the proxy used. 
At the same time, this explanation is consistent with the data observed 
in figure 2: if more altruism translates into lower subsidies to education, and if 
richer countries tend to be less altruistic than poorer ones, then richer 
countries can be expected to subsidise education more than poorer ones. 
Regarding the economic significance of the altruism coefficients, 
specification (4) of table 6 shows that if a country changes from 'no altruistic' 
to 'altruistic', the subsidy rate is expected to decrease by 13.3 percentage 
points (see coefficient of Altruism Dummy). Considering that the average 
subsidy of the sample is 0.8458 (84.58% ), the estimated effect of altruism on 
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subsidies is economically relevant, as it represents a drop of 15.8% of the 
original value of subsidies. Using specification (3) of table 6 to assess the 
economic significance (where the proxy is Altruism instead of Altruism 
Dummy), a country starting with the average level of altruism (73.74; Poland 
is close to this value) that sees its altruism increased by a standard deviation 
(in this sample the standard deviation of altruism is 11.87) will, on average, 
see its subsidy rate dropping by 6.3 percentage points. This drop represents a 
drop of 7.4% of the original value of subsidies, which, again, looks 
economically relevant. 
This relationship between altruism and subsidies is formalised in the 
next section, where I present a model that shows that lower levels of public 
education subsidies can be expected in countries with greater levels of private 
intergenerational altruism. 
Model 
This section presents a model that tries to explain what may be driving 
the relationship between altruism and the rate of subsidies to education. 
a. Benchmark model 
Individuals live two periods: in the first period they receive education, 
and in the second period they allocate their resources between consumption 
and their children's education. 
An individual born in period t-1 will have the following utility 
function: 
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where V, stands for utility in period r; c, stands for consumption in period t 
and h, stands for expenditure in the education of the individual's children. 
Equation (1) implies that individuals obtain utility from consuming and, 
altruistically, from educating their children. In equation (1 ), the degree of 
intergenerational altruism is represented by (1- B), as it shows the effect that 
individuals' spending on their children's education has on utility. Brauninger 
and Vidal (2000) use a similar function where altruism is reflected in a similar 
way (though they focus on growth rather than on the effect of altruism on 
subsidies). 
Individuals have an initial wealth that is a proportion a of what their 
parents spent on their education during their first period of life. An individual 
born in period t-1 will receive education during period t-1, so his wealth in 
period t will be equal to ah,_1 • 
Individuals allocate their wealth between consumption and education 
for their children. It is also assumed that the government imposes a lump sum 
tax equal to T to all individuals, and subsidises education expenditure at a 
rate al. According to this, an individual born in r-1 will face the following 
budget constraint during period t: 
(2) ah1_ 1 - T1 = c, + (1- m)h, 
Saint-Paul and Verdier (1992) assume a relationship between h, and 
h,_1 that is not very different from (2), though crucially, they do not focus on 
altruism so their analysis is conducted in another direction. 
The left-hand side of (2) shows the total resources: initial wealth 
( ah,_1 ) minus the lump sum tax. The right-hand side of (2) shows the use of 
the resources, which can be either spent on consumption or education. The 
fact that the expenditure on education is subsidised at a rate a; is reflected in 
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the factor (1- w). Individuals maximise (1) subject to (2). The optimal 
choices of this maximisation (the derivation is presented in appendix 5) are 
(3) 
(4) 
(1-8) 
hi = --.[ahl-1 - Tl] 
1-w 
b. The government 
In order to be able to subsidise education with the revenues of the 
lump sum tax, the government faces the following budget constraint: 
n n 
(5) ."L·I:.i =I w.h~.; 
i=l i=l 
which means that the sum of the lump sum taxes paid by all the individuals 
(thus the sum for individuals i= 1 to n, where n is the total number of 
individuals) equals the sum of the total subsidies paid (thus the sum of 
w.h
1 
through individuals 1 to n). Assuming that all individuals are identical, 
expression (5) can be re-expressed as 
Inserting (5') in (3) and (4), the choices of the individuals maximising 
become 
(6) h = a.(1- 8) .h 
1 1_ltJ8 r-1 
(7) c = a.8(I- W) .h 
r 1_ltJ8 r-1 
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From (6), growth depends positively on the level of subsidy: 
h,_] 1- me (6') 
h, a.(l-e) 
-=---
which was an expected result. Additionally, (6) shows that the total 
expenditure on education (h,) is positively related to the level of subsidies 
( ~~ > 0), while consumption is negatively related to the level of subsidies 
( ~~ < 0). Additionally, expression (8) below shows the effect of a change in 
subsidies on individuals' expenditure on education ( h,.(l- m)). 
(8) ah,.(l- m) = a.(l- e).h ·[ (l- m).e am I-I (1- me)2 1 ] -- <0 1-me 
Expression (8) means that if the subsidies increase, individuals spend 
less on education22 . This reveals that the subsidy 'crowds out' at least part of 
the individual's expenditure on education, which has an implication on the 
kind of altruism referred to here. From the utility function ( 1 ), individuals 
obtain utility from the total expenditure on their children's education 
regardless of who provides the resources (i.e. not just from their own 
expenditure on education). This, together with the 'crowding out' observed in 
(8) leads to the conclusion that the altruism observed here is not fully derived 
from a 'warm glow' effect (Andreoni 1989, 1990; Amegashie 2006) and that 
there is at least a component of 'pure' altruism. The utility that the parents 
obtain from their children's education does not solely depend on being 
11 The expression in (8) is negative because the term in square brackets is negative, as shown 
here: 
(1- m) .e 1 (1- m) .e 
, < -- ::::::> ( ) < 1 ::::::> (1- w).e < 1- we::::::> e- me< 1- me::::::> e < 1 (1- mer 1- me 1- me 
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themselves (the parents) the ones who make the expenditure. If it did, then this 
would indicate a 'warm glow' effect. The result obtained here means that 
parents also obtain utility from the education received by their children that 
derives from subsidies, meaning that the parents' altruism is 'pure' (Andreoni 
1989, 1990; Amegashie 2006). 
With (6) and (7), the original utility function can be re-expressed as 
(9) U I = tUn[ a.e(1- m) .hl-1 J + (1- e).ln[ a.(1- e) .hl-1 J 
1-UJB 1-UJB 
Re-arranging terms, this can be expressed as 
(1 0) U 1 = e.ln(1- m) -ln(l- m8) + ln(a.hr-1) + eln(e) + (1- e) ln(1- e) 
To choose the rate of subsidies m that maximises ( 1 0), the 
au government calculates - , from where d{t) 
(11) au e e -=---+--am 1- m 1- we 
The two terms on the right hand side of expression (11) represent the 
marginal cost and marginal benefit (respectively) of increasing subsidies: 
more subsidies decrease consumption ( ~~ < 0), which is a cost in terms of 
utility. But at the same time, more subsidies increase expenditure on education 
( ~~ > 0). From (11) it is straightforward to see that as long as 0 < e < 1, the 
marginal costs are greater (in absolute terms) than the marginal benefits23 . The 
23 Because [ (1- me) > {1- W)] 
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government, seeking to set the subsidy rate that maximises (9), is pushed to 
the corner solution OJ = 0 . 
Alternatively, if 8 = 1 then the government can choose any value in 
0 < OJ < 1. However, 8 = 1 is not consistent with the assumption of altruistic 
individuals that obtain utility from spending on their children's education 
(thus is not consistent with the utility function (1)). As a result, m= 0 appears 
as the government's choice to maximise utility. 
c. Infinite horizons 
This result only applies to a short-sighted government that does not 
weigh in the utility of future generations. If future generations are taken into 
account (in other words, if the government tries to maximise the 
intergenerational utility function), at t=j, the government's problem becomes 
~ 
Max(l) 'Lfl'-j [8.ln(1- OJ) -ln(l- (I)(})+ ln(a.h,_1) + 8ln(8) + (1- 8) ln(1- 8)] 
r=j 
subject to 0 ~ {J) ~ 1 
The optimal choice of {J) (the derivation is presented in appendix 6) is 
(12) UJ= j3 
1-8.(1- jJ) 
This result has the following implications. 
First, {J) increases with j3: 
(13) dOJ 1 =----
djJ 1- 8.(1- jJ) 
j38 
[1- 8.(1- jJ) t 
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As expression (13) shows a positive derivative24, governments that 
value the future more will subsidise education more that those that do not. 
This was an expected result: from (6), the rate of growth of education (thus, in 
this model, the rate of growth of the economy) depends positively on (J). As a 
result, considering that caring about the future requires caring about growth, 
more forward-looking governments will subsidise education more. In chapter 
1 I argued that democratic governments can be expected to be more forward-
looking than non-democratic ones. If that is the case, then this result could 
explain why democracies tend to devote more resources to education, while 
the previously observed result that richer countries devote more to public 
education could be a consequence of the positive relationship between income 
and democracy. 
At one extreme, if the government values the future as much as the 
present ( f3--+ 1 ), then ( 12) means that (J) ~ I , which is the maximum level of 
subsidy (100% subsidy). At the other extreme, a completely short-sighted 
government ( f3 =0) will set m= 0 according to (12)25 . This means that the 
more short-sighted the government, the lower the subsidies to education, and 
the lower the rate of growth of the economy. This result is robust to the 
modification of the initial model to include leisure (see appendix 7). 
Second, w increases with 8. This means that the more altruistic 
people are, the lower the subsidies to education will be. Intuitively, when 
people are altruistic enough to naturally spend on their children's education, 
there is no need for a government subsidy. However, if people are not 
24 Because I > (} => 1 > f3B + B(l- /3) => 1- {}(1- /3)- f3B > 0 => 
1 j3(} 0 aw 0 
=> '> =>-> 
1- B. (I- /3) [1- B. (I- /3) r o/3 
25 This was an expected result, as the short-sighted model presented in (I 0) is only a special 
case of this infinite horizon model presented here, with f3 =0. 
Mauricio Armellini Page 89 
altruistic at all, then the government will have to compensate for the lack of 
parents' efforts via subsidies. 
Expression (12) means that in a totally altruistic society ( 8 ~ 0 ), the 
rate of subsidy will be w ~ fJ. So the level of the subsidy rate will tend to the 
degree of 'forward-lookingness' of the government. On the other hand, in a 
totally non-altruistic society ( (} ~ 1 ), the rate of subsidy will tend to w ~ 1 , 
meaning that if people obtain no utility from spending on their children's 
education, the government will have to subsidise all the education expenditure 
in order to maximise long-run utility. This is quite different from what was 
found in (10) (the static case): in that case, the government chose W= 0 
regardless of the level of altruism. 
In the model, the introduction of infinite horizons brought the 
emergence of positive subsidies. This means that with infinite horizons, when 
individuals obtain less value from intergenerational education (i.e. are less 
altruistic), the government has to subsidise education more heavily. 
Conclusions 
This chapter presents a model that intends to contribute towards the 
explanation of the differences in public expenditure on education across 
countries. This is done through the observation of one of the possible 
determinants of the rates of subsidy to the education expenditure of the 
households. The theoretical model predicts lower rates of public subsidies to 
education in countries that are more altruistic and that have high time discount 
rates (in other terms, countries that are more 'short-sighted'). 
I tested the implications related to the level of altruism. I do not claim 
that the degree of altruism determines the level of public subsidies to the 
education expenditure of the households; rather, I provide some evidence that 
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altruism can play a role among other variables. Altruism has an important 
national idiosyncratic component, which means that at least some part of the 
cross-country divergence in public involvement in education derives from 
factors that are exogenous to standard economic analysis. 
Previous research explained why democracy and more public 
involvement in education go hand in hand (see for example Lipset 1959, 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared 
2004, Gradstein, Justman and Meier 2005). With the model of this chapter to 
hand, future research should investigate whether variations in the level of 
altruism over time are in any way correlated with changing political 
institutions (in the sense of more or less democracy), which could elucidate 
whether the political regime affects public involvement in education through 
the channels investigated in this chapter. Kolm (2006) concludes that 'private 
giving' should be less evident in democracies than in non-democracies, and 
the dataset presented here seems to point in the same direction: the simple 
correlation coefficient between the measure of democracy that I use here and 
my measure of altruism is -0.2796. If both Kolm and this sample correlation 
are indeed correct, then the correlation between income and democracy (richer 
countries are more democratic, a standard result in the literature) could be 
translated into a positive relationship between income and education 
subsidies. The argument is as follows: richer countries are more democratic; 
more democratic countries are less altruistic; less altruism means more public 
subsidies to education; so richer countries subsidise education more. Although 
this is only a preliminary hypothesis for future research, tables 5 and 6 show 
that democracy tends to be positively related to expenditure on education, and 
the explanation of this relationship through altruism should be investigated in 
the future. 
Although my main focus in this chapter is the effect of altruism on the 
rate of subsidies, I also conclude that greater discount rates (lower levels of 
f3) translate into lower rates of subsidy. This factor could also feed the 
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relationship between income and education subsidies through democracy: in 
chapter 1 I presented some arguments of why we can expect dictatorships to 
have shorter time horizons than democracies. If that is the case, then the 
correlation between richer countries and democracies could translate into a 
correlation between richer countries and lower discount rates (greater levels of 
f3 ), which means that richer countries should see greater rates of subsidy 
(which is consistent with the evidence presented in figure 1 ). This causal chain 
is also a preliminary hypothesis for future research (appendix 8 adds more 
evidence towards this hypothesis). 
This chapter provides the first proxies for cross-country altruism and 
cross-country education subsidies in the literature. Both proxies are far from 
ideal, and for that reason future research should focus on producing more 
appropriate measures of these variables in the form of time series, and 
particularly on altruism, which looks like a promising factor to understand 
how countries form their education budgets. 
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Appendix 1: Data for figure 2 
Countries included: Argentina; Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Chile; 
China; Czech Republic; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; 
Iceland; India; Indonesia; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Korea; 
Rep.; Luxembourg; Malaysia; Mexico; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; 
Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Slovak Republic; Spain; Sri 
Lanka; Sweden; Switzerland; Thailand; Turkey; United Kingdom; United 
States; Uruguay. 
Descriptive statistics: 
Countries 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Mauricio Armellini 
Averages 1996-2002 
Pub expend educ I GDP per capita, PPP Total expend educ 
44 44 
0.82 17026.06 
0.14 10166.25 
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Appendix 2: Sources of data. 
(Altruism and Subsidies are explained in the text) 
GDP per capita: GDP per capita in constant US$ (year 2000). Source: 
World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) 
April 2008, ESDS International, (Mimas) University of 
Manchester. 
GDP per capita, PPP: Penn World Table. Source: Alan Heston, Robert 
Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 
6.2, Center for International Comparisons of 
Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania, September 2006. 
Growth of GDP per capita, PPP: Constructed using the previous variable, 
and expressed in decimals (0.01 instead of l %). For 
table 6, I built this variable using the first and last 
available data on GDP per capita (PPP) for each 
country, and annualising the results. 
Public expenditure/GDP, PPP: World Penn Table. Source: Alan Heston, 
Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table 
Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of 
Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania, September 2006. Expressed in percentage 
points (1% instead of 0.01). 
Public expenditure/GDP: World Penn Table. Source: Alan Heston, Robert 
Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 
6.2, Center for International Comparisons of 
Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania, September 2006. This institution kindly 
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Investment/GDP: 
provided the 'no PPP adjusted' version of this variable. 
Expressed in percentage points ( 1% instead of 0.01 ). 
World Penn Table. Source: Alan Heston, Robert 
Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 
6.2, Center for International Comparisons of 
Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania, September 2006. This institution kindly 
provided the 'no PPP adjusted' version of this variable. 
Expressed in percentage points ( 1% instead of 0.0 I). 
Investment/GDP, PPP: World Penn Table. Source: Alan Heston, Robert 
Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 
6.2, Center for International Comparisons of 
Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania, September 2006. Expressed in percentage 
points ( 1% instead of 0.01 ). 
Public education expenditure/GDP: Source: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators (WDI) April 2008, ESDS 
International, (Mimas) University of Manchester. 
Expressed in percentage points (1% instead of 0.01). 
Degree of democracy: Measures the degree of institutionalised democracy 
from 0 to 1 (where higher numbers mean more 
democracy). This variable is a linear transformation of 
the variable 'Polity' from the Polity IV database, which 
ranges from -10 to 10. Source: Monty G. Marshall and 
Keith Jaggers. 2004. Polity IV Data Set. [Computer file; 
version p4v2004] College Park, MD: Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management, 
University of Maryland. 
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Trade/GDP, PPP: 
Trade/GDP: 
Sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross domestic product. 
Source: World Penn Table. Source: Alan Heston, 
Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table 
Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of 
Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania, September 2006. Expressed in percentage 
points ( 1 o/o instead of 0.01 ). 
Sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross domestic product. 
Source: World Penn Table. Source: Alan Heston, 
Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table 
Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of 
Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania, September 2006. This institution kindly 
provided the 'no PPP adjusted' version of this variable. 
Expressed in percentage points (1 o/o instead of 0.01 ). 
Population 15-64 years/Total population: Percentage of the total population 
that is in the age group 15 to 64. Source: World Bank, 
World Development Indicators (WDI) April 2008, 
ESDS International, (Mimas) University of Manchester. 
Expressed in percentage points ( 1 o/o instead of 0.01 ). 
Population 0-14 years/Total population: Percentage of the total population that 
is in the age group 15 to 64. Source: World Bank, 
World Development Indicators (WDI) April 2008, 
ESDS International, (Mimas) University of Manchester. 
Expressed in percentage points (I o/o instead of 0.01 ). 
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M2/GDP: Ratio of Money and quasi money (M2) as a share of 
GDP. Source: World Bank, World Development 
Indicators (WDI) April 2008, ESDS International, 
(Mimas) University of Manchester. Expressed in 
percentage points ( 1% instead of 0.0 I). 
Appendix 3: Data for table 5 
Countries common to all the specifications: Albania; Argentina; Armenia; 
Australia; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Belarus; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; 
Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Chad; 
Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; Congo (Rep).; Costa Rica; Croatia; 
Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El 
Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; Gabon; Georgia; 
Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Iran Islamic Rep.; 
Israel; Ivory Coast; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea (Rep.); 
Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Lao PDR; Latvia; Lesotho; Lithuania; Macedonia 
(FYR); Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; 
Moldova; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia; Nepal; New Zealand; 
Nicaragua; Niger; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; 
Philippines; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; 
Senegal; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Solomon 
Islands; South Africa; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Tajikistan; Tanzania; 
Thailand; The Gambia; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Uganda; 
Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United States; Uruguay; Yemen (Rep.); 
Zambia; Zimbabwe. 
Countries added for specification 2: Austria; Bahamas; Belgium; Belize; Cape 
Verde; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Lebanon; 
Luxembourg; Maldives; Malta; Micronesia; Fed. Sts.; Netherlands; Portugal; 
Mauricio Armellini Page 97 
Samoa; Serbia and Montenegro; Spain; St. Lucia; St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines; Tonga; United Kingdom; Vanuatu 
Countries added for specification 3: Angola; Guyana; Libya 
Countries added for specification 4: Angola; Austria; Belgium; Cuba; Finland; 
France; Germany; Greece; Guyana; Ireland; Italy; Libya; Netherlands; 
Portugal; Spain; United Kingdom 
Descriptive statistics: each of the four regressions in table 4 includes different 
sets of countries due to the different availability of data and the different 
variables included in each regression. For that reason, the statistics provided 
below are calculated for the pool of 182 countries from which the subset for 
each regression was obtained. 
Averages for 1999-2002 Mean Standard Min Max Deviation 
Degree of Democracy 0.649 0.326 0.00 1.00 
GDP per capita, constant prices 5772.5 9002.6 86.36 46345.8 
GDP per capita, PPP 8674.0 9025.9 363.62 47450.0 
lnvestment/GDP 22.350 8.627 3.61 53.07 
Investment/GDP, PPP 13.458 7.792 1.70 45.28 
M2/GDP 44.928 32.150 4.20 187.25 
Population 0-14 yearsffotal population 32.544 10.462 14.26 50.31 
Population 15-64 yearsffotal population 60.648 6.666 47.08 74.62 
Public education expenditure /GDP 4.663 2.079 0.61 15.36 
Public expenditure /GDP 16.706 8.147 3.67 80.71 
Public expenditure /GDP, PPP 23.972 11.434 2.84 76.21 
Trade/GDP 86.776 47.052 2.02 368.94 
Trade/GDP, PPP 88.418 48.908 2.02 373.55 
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Appendix 4: Data for table 6 
Countries common to all the specifications: Argentina; Australia; Canada; 
Chile; China; Czech Republic; Denmark; India; Indonesia; Japan; Jordan; 
Mexico; New Zealand; Norway; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Slovak Republic; 
Sweden; Switzerland; Turkey; United States; Uruguay. 
Countries added for specifications 1 and 2: Austria; Belgium; Finland; France; 
Germany; Greece; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Luxembourg; Netherlands; Portugal; 
Spain; United Kingdom. 
Countries added for specifications 5 and 6: Hungary; Korea (Rep.). 
Descriptive statistics: the regressions in table 6 include 3 different sets of 
countries due to the different availability of data and the different variables 
included in each regression. For that reason, the statistics provided below are 
calculated for the pool of 39 countries from which the subset for each 
regression was obtained. The mean of the altruism dummy is not equal to 0.5 
because the median was taken from a sample of 79 countries (full 'altruism' 
sample) to get a wider altruism standard for the median. However, the 
statistics presented here are only for the countries included in the regression. 
Averages for 1999-2002 Mean Standard M in Max Deviation 
Subsidies 0.85 0.108 0.53 1.0 
Subsidies-Extended 0.82 0.12 0.53 1.0 
Altruism 71.09 10.69 41.60 90.3 
Altruism dummy 0.359 0.48 0.00 1.0 
GDP per capita, PPP 16914 9284 2319 41034 
Trade/GDP, PPP 72.4 42.9 18.0 240.8 
Investment/GDP, PPP 21.11 4.80 11.34 37.83 
Public expenditure/GDP, PPP 19.71 7.67 8.58 50.69 
Degree of democracy 0.90 0.20 0.15 1.0 
M2/GDP 57.6 27.5 23.4 128.7 
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Appendix 5: The individual's maximisation problem 
(a5.1) Maxh c U, =Blnc, +(1-B)lnh, 
,. ' 
Subject to ah,_1 - T, = c, + (1- m)h, 
The budget constraint can be re-expressed as c, = ah,_1 - T, - (1- (t))h, , 
which can be then re-inserted in the objective function to obtain 
(a5.2) Max U, =B1n[ah,_1 -T, -(1-m)h,]+(l-B)lnh, 
Setting dU' = 0 yields 
dh, 
(a5.3) - B(l- m) + (1- B) = 0 
ah,_1 -I; - (1- m)h, h, 
Rearranging, 
(1- B) [ ] (a5.4) h, = --. ah,_1 -T, 1- (t) 
Inserting this into c, = ahr-J - T, - (1- m)h, yields 
(a5.5) c, = B.[ah,_1 - T,] 
Expressions (a5.4) and (a5.5) are maximums: this can be seen by 
calculating the second derivative of the utility function with regards to h,. 
Using the first derivative presented in (a5.3), this becomes 
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Appendix 6: Derivation of the long-sighted government's 
optimal subsidy rate 
(a6.l)Ma.xw 
~ L fJ'- J [O.ln(l- m) -ln(l- (J)(J) + ln(aoh,_1) + Oln(O) + (1- 0) ln(l- 0)] 
r=j 
I first rename R = ln(a) + Oln(O) + (1- 0) ln(l- 0), so (a6ol) can be re-
expressed as 
~ 
(a602) Max(J) L fJ'- J [O.ln(l- m) -ln(l- (J)(J) + ln(hr-1) + R] 
r=j 
which can then be re-expressed as 
( a603) M ax (J) Ooln(l- m) -ln(l- aJB) + _!!..__ + i fJ'-J [ln(hr-1)] 
1- fJ 1 - fJ r= j 
~ 
The term L pr-J [ln(h,_1)] can be re-expressed as 
r=j 
~ 
(a6.4) L pr-1 [ln(hr-1) ]= ln(h,_1) + /Jln(h,) + /l 2 ln(hr+1) + /l 3 ln(h,+2 ) + 000 
r=j 
Using expression (6), each of the terms of (a6.4) can be re-expressed in 
terms of h,_1 : 
~ 
(a605) L fJ'- 1 [ln(h,_1)] = 
r=j 
In(h,_1 ) + j3In h,_1 0 + p- In 11,_1 0 + f3· In h,_1 o + .o. ( a(l-8)) , ( (a(l-8))") 1 ( (a(l-8))3 ) I - w8 I - w8 I - w8 
from where 
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~ 
(a6.6) L pr-1 [ln(h,_1) ]= 
r=j 
ln(h,_,) + fJln(a(l- B))+ /3 2 ln ·( a(l- B) )
2 
+ /3 3 ln( a(l- B) )
3 
+ ... 
1-/3 1-wB 1-wB 1-wB 
Taking common factor ln( a(l- B)), this becomes 
1-wB 
- r 0 /32 /33 ] fl - r o2 ?f33 /34 ] I call S - lP + 2 + 3 + . . . , then 'S - lP + - + 3 + . . . , so 
S - fJS = [/3 + /3 2 + /33 + ... ] = - 1--1. So 
1- f3 S.(1- /3) = _p_, from where 1- f3 
s = f3 
(1- /3)2 
This means that (a6.7) can be re-expressed as 
(a6.8) ~ f3'-1[ln(h )]=ln(h,_,) +ln(a(l-B))· f3 f,;J r-l 1- f3 1- me (1- /3)2 
Inserting this result back in (a6.3) yields 
( 6 9) M B.ln(l- w) -ln(l- wB) __!!___ ln(h,_,) f3 1 (-a(_l -_B--'-)) a . axw + + + 0 • n 
1-/3 1-/3 1-/3 (1-/3)- 1-mB 
from where 
(a6.10) Maxw 
B.ln(l- w) -ln(l- wB) __!!___ ln(h,_, ) f3 1 ( (I _ n)) _ f3 1 (I- ,_.n) + + + ( )' . n a o ( )' . n lUO 1-/3 1-/3 1-/3 1-/3- 1-/3-
Mauricio Annellini Page 102 
I now name J = _!i_ + ( f3 f .ln(a(l- 8)) 
1-/3 1-/3-
so (a6.10) becomes 
( 6 11 ) M 8.1n(l- (JJ) -ln(l- (J)(}) ln(ht-1) _ f3 1 (l- , . ..n) J a . axw f3 + ( )2 . n wu + 1- 1-/3 1-/3 
This expression can now be simplified to 
(a6.12) Maxw 8.ln(l- W) -ln(l- (J)(J){ f3 , + _l_J + ln(h,_J) + 1 
1-/3 {1-/3)- 1-/3 1-/3 
or 
(a6.13) Max 8.1n(l- (JJ) -In( I- m8).( 1 J + ln(hr-1) + 1 
. (J) 1-/3 (1-/3)2 1-/3 
Now I search the maximum by differentiating (a6.13) with respect to 
aJ and making the result equal to zero, from where 
8 -1 ( 1 J( 8 J (a6.14)-.-+ ( )' . -- =0 1-/3 1-(JJ 1-/3- 1-mB 
So 
(a6.15) ( 1 ) = (-1 J (1- mB).(l- /3) 1- {J) 
from where 
(a6.16) w= f3 
1- 8.(1- /3) 
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I now have to determine whether this is a maximum or a minimum. 
For this, I take the second order derivative of (a6.13): 
"d
2
V 1 ( e )[ -1 e 1 ] (a6.17) -,- = --. , +--. , 
a- {J) 1 - f3 (1- wt 1- f3 {1- {J)(} )-
Whether (a6.17) is positive or negative depends on whether the square 
bracket is positive or negative. In other words, the question is whether 
[ 
-1 e 1 ] (a6.18) , +-.( ), ><0 (1- W)- 1- j3 1 - {J)(} -
Rearranging, this becomes 
(a6.19) ( e -1 + fJ) >< ( (JJ(})( (J)() + 2/3- fJ(J)()- m) 
Now I substitute m with the optimal value found in (a6.16), 
w = f3 , obtaining 
1- e.(l- /3) 
(a6.20) 
(e -1 + fJ) ><(e. f3 )(e. f3 + 2f3- pe f3 - f3 ) 
1- e.(1- j3) 1- e.(1- j3) 1- e.(1- j3) 1- e.(l- fJ) 
from where 
(a6.21)(e-1+/3)><(e. f3
2 
)(· e-jJe- 1 +2) 
1- e.(l- j3) 1- e.(l- /3) 
Operating and rearranging, this can be expressed as 
(a6.22) - e 2 + 2e -1 >< 0 
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Expression (a6.22) is never greater than zero: it is a parable with 
negative concavity, with a maximum at 8 = 1. In that maximum, 
- 8 2 + 28- 1 = 0. 
This means that at the optimal UJ, the objective function has a negative 
second order derivative, except at e = 1, where the second order derivative 
equals zero. This means that for 0 $; 8 < 1 , the optimal UJ found is a 
maximum. When 8 = 1, then (J) = 1. This is a corner solution. The first 
derivative of the utility function in terms of UJ is positive when UJ = 1, 
meaning that if 8 = 1, the corner solution UJ = 1 gives maximum utility. 
However, as I argued before, 8 = 1 is not consistent with the assumption of 
altruistic individuals that obtain utility from spending on their children's 
education (thus is not consistent with the utility function (1)). 
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Appendix 7: An extension including leisure 
The utility function to be maximised is 
(a7 .1) V, = 81 In C, + 82 ln(l- a,)+ (1- 81 - 8 2 ) In h, 
where a, is time spent on education and ( 1- a, ) is leisure time. The time spent 
on education affects the education rate of return 'a '. 
The individual's budget constraint is 
(a7 .2) C, + (1- w)h, = ah,_1 - T, 
Substituting the budget constraint in the utility function 
(a7.3) V, =81 ln[ah,_1 -T, -(1-w)h,]+82 ln(l-a,)+(l-81 -82 )lnh, 
Maximising in terms of «1: 
(a7.4) av, =0 ::::::> 81a'h,_l - 82 =0 
a a, ah,_1 - T, - (1- W).h, 1- a 
and 
Then setting av, = 0 gives 
ah, 
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Substituting the government's budget constraint (T, =ail,) in (a7.4), 
(a7 .5) and (a7 .6) I get 
_!i_=O 
1-a 
From (a7.8), !l_ =a. (1- 81 - 82 ) , so higher levels of subsidy yield 
h,_l (1- 82 - {l)(}l) 
higher rates of growth. This was an expected result. 
(a7.11) 
(a7.12) 
Inserting (a7.8) in (a7.7), h,. 1 cancels out, giving 
Assuming a = a 11 with 0 < f.1 < 1 , I obtain 
From this expression, I obtain 
From this expression, a a > 0, which was an expected result: more 
am 
subsidy to education means that individuals will be willing to work more. 
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Expression (a7.11), together with (a7.8) and (a7.9) should now be substituted 
back in to (a7 .1) to solve for (J) for the short-sighted government. 
The utility function becomes 
For the short-sighted government I compute dU, = 0 and try to solve d(l) 
for (J). However, I cannot obtain a clean expression for Ul, so I resort to 
simulation. A simulation exercise for different values of 81,82 , h,_1 and 
J1 yields a maximum utility for {J) = 0 , which is the same result obtained for a 
short-sighted government in the benchmark model. 
Figure a7 .1 shows the results of the simulation exercise. 
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For the long-sighted government I compute ''f.j3'U,, where V, is given 
1=0 
by (a7.13 ). 
The long-sighted government will then choose the level of subsidies 
that maximises 
(a7 .14) 
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·, 
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m 
m 
c:) 
(where the last term is obtained in a way similar to (a6.8)). 
Again, setting aur = 0 does not allow for a clean expression for m, 
am 
so I resort to simulation. A simulation exercise for different values of 
81,82 and f3 shows that utility is maximised for OJ > 0, which is the same 
result obtained for a long-sighted government without leisure. Additionally, 
the simulation shows that increasing altruism tends to decrease the optimal 
level of subsidies, while increasing f3 (increasing 'long-sightedness') 
increases the optimal level of subsidies. These results are consistent with those 
obtained for the long-sighted model without leisure. Table a7 .1 shows selected 
results of the simulation. 
Table a7.1 
Scenarios: 1 2 3 4 
(}1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 
82 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 
f3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 
f..L 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
hl-1 1 1 1 1 
Optimal (V 0.667 0.625 0.714 0.571 
In table a 7.1, the movement from scenario 1 to scenario 2 reduces 82 , 
which means that leisure loses weight in the determination of utility, but 
altruism increases (altruism equals (1- 81 -82 ) in this model). As can be seen, 
the optimal subsidy decreases from 0.667 to 0.625. To check whether the 
reduction in the optimal subsidy is due to the increase in altruism or the 
decrease in the weight of leisure, scenario 4 reduces 81 and leaves 82 constant 
(compared to scenario 1 ). This means that the increase in altruism is due to a 
reduction in the weight of consumption in utility. The result is again the same: 
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a reduction in the optimal subsidy rate, suggesting that again , more altruism 
means a lower subsidy rate. 
The movement from scenario 2 to scenario 3 changes only j3, trying to 
capture the effect of an increase in the 'Iong-sightedness' of the government. 
Table a7.1 shows that this increase in j3 (a reduction in the discount rate) 
translates into an increase in the optimal subsidy rate, from 0.625 to 0.714. 
Again, this result is consistent with the results obtained for a long-sighted 
government without subsidy. Figure a7.2 shows a graphical representation of 
some of the results of the simulation. 
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Appendix 8: Social discount rates, subsidies and level of 
income 
One of the reasons why I do not investigate the relationship further 
between social discount rate and the rate of subsidies is the lack of appropriate 
proxies for the social discount rate for a sufficient number of countries. 
In this appendix I use data on the average real interest rate for 1996-
2002 (World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) April 2008, ESDS 
International, (Mimas) University of Manchester) to proxy for the social 
discount rate. 
Figure 8.1 shows some preliminary evidence in favour of the 
relationship found in the model: countries with higher interest rates (lower fJ) 
tend to have lower rates of subsidy to education. The figure shows data for 42 
countries, which excludes I outlier. 
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25 
In the conclusion of this chapter I argue that the relationship between 
income and education subsidies could run through democracy: in chapter 1 I 
presented some arguments to illustrate why we can expect dictatorships to 
have shorter time horizons than democracies. If that is the case, then the 
correlation between richer countries and democracies could translate into a 
correlation between richer countries and lower discount rates (greater levels of 
f3 ), which means that richer countries should see greater rates of subsidy. 
Figure 8.2 provides some preliminary evidence in this direction with data for 
137 countries, which excludes 14 outliers and 5 countries that showed 
negative real rates of interest (though in principle there should be no reason to 
exclude these 5 countries, it is difficult to argue that a negative real rate of 
interest could be reflecting a negative social discount rate). 
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In any case, regardless of the considerations on democracy and 
dictatorship, the relationship of figure 8.2 is consistent with the evidence of 
richer countries spending more resources on education: if richer countries tend 
to have lower social discount rates, then the model of this chapter shows why 
these lower discount rates are translated to lower rates of education subsidy. 
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Chapter 3 
Bounded dictators: 
education and regime 
transitions 
Abstract 
By looking at the effect of education expenditure on income, the model of this 
chapter explains why dictators have an incentive to distort the effects of 
education on economic growth, and why democracies need income 
redistribution policies. I analyse the permanence of dictatorship and 
emergence of democracy by looking at two constraints faced by dictators. 
First, dictators need soldiers for protection but also need people to work and 
pay taxes. This creates a trade-off between spending on defence or in 
education (which in turn increases wealth and tax revenues). Second, the 
individuals who are worse-off due to the extortive powers of the dictator are 
willing to pay to reduce the size of the army that protects the dictator, which 
limits the dictator's extortive powers. 
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Introduction 
Research focused on the effects of political institutions on the 
budgetary allocations found some variations in how democracies and non-
democracies allocate resources to education and the military. In particular, the 
evidence suggests that non-democracies tend to spend more in the military 
whereas democracies tend to increase social expenditure (including 
education). 
Lebovic (2001) observes the yearly change in the budget shares of 
military and 'civilian' (all non-military) expenditure for a set of Latin 
American countries during the regional wave of democratization between 
1974 and 1995. The author finds that the level of democracy is positively 
associated with increases in the share of civilian expenditure after controlling 
for a set of budgetary and extra-budgetary variables, and concludes that 
democracy "has a significant positive effect on the size of non-military relative 
to military budgets" (Lebovic 2001, page 427). 
Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-Martin (2004) find that non-democracies 
spend more on the military. Their interpretation is that non-democracies are 
interested in setting policies that make it more difficult for the opposition to 
gain office, and this is why they find significant changes in military spending 
and policies on torture and freedom of the press. However, they do not find 
significant evidence that non-democracies have different priorities than 
democracies regarding educational expenditure. They interpret this result 
saying that education does not have a direct effect on the probability of losing 
office, so dictators do not have an incentive to modify expenditure in 
education. They observe a set of 131 countries over 1960-1990 and regress the 
share of different spending categories on the level of democracy (using the 
measure of democracy derived from Polity IV, which I use in Chapter 4; see 
Chapter 1 for a description of this variable) and a set of controls. 
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Habibi (1994) finds that the defence budget increases in non-
democracies, but finds that social expenditure (which includes education, 
health and social security) is higher in democracies than in non-democracies. 
In some of the specifications he uses, the level of democracy becomes 
significant to explain education expenditure in itself (not aggregated with 
other non-military categories of expenditure). His observation is for 1984 and 
includes 67 developed and developing countries of different regions of the 
world. 
Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer (2006) address this point. They provide 
arguments for why education and democracy should be correlated, and then 
ask: 
"why do some dictators invest in education if they know that doing so 
eventually dooms them? [ ... ]. There are several possible answers. One 
is that many dictators face an external threat, and therefore must grow 
their economies and their armies (including investing in human 
capital) to counter these threats even if this raises the risk of 
democratization. A second is that even selfish dictators unconcerned 
with external threats might derive income from economic growth, and 
therefore promote education to get richer. A third [ ... ] idea is that all 
dictators face significant risks, and that it is much better for the 
dictator's life for him to be replaced by a democracy in an educated 
country than by another dictator in an uneducated one." (Glaeser, 
Ponzetto and Shleifer 2006, page 32). 
This seems to suggest that there are opposing interests: while a dictator 
obtains some benefits from spending in the military, it is also true that some 
benefits can be identified from spending on education. Additionally, taking 
these two categories alone, there are opportunity costs of one category in 
terms of the other. All this suggests that there are some trade-offs to be 
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explained and that can be helpful in understanding how dictators make their 
budgetary decisions on defence and education. 
Acemoglu (2003), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2002 and 2006), 
Robinson ( 1999), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) and Glaeser, Ponzetto and 
Shleifer (2006) refer to the educational trade-off faced by dictators: if they 
educate the population, the economy can grow faster and they can benefit 
from that (for example, through the extraction of more resources). On the 
other hand, a more educated and richer population poses a bigger threat to the 
ruling dictator. In this sense, the dictator will not devote as many resources to 
education as his democratic counterpart. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006) claim that at first the dictator 
can offer some small transfers and benefits to the masses (like public 
education) in order to keep them satisfied and under control. But transfers can 
be instated and later removed, according to the will of the dictator and to the 
threats he perceives, so the population knows that public education can be 
transitorily provided to the masses as a way to avoid revolutions. During 
periods of acute unrest and when people can overcome the collective action 
costs (for example, because education could bring the collective action costs 
down), the power of the dictator is challenged beyond the limits that transitory 
concessions and transfers can reach. In those situations, the authors claim that 
the most cost-effective option for the dictator is to transfer more than money: 
the dictator has to transfer political power to the masses, which means that the 
dictator does not have the capacity to stop transfers and benefits in the future. 
Therefore, the extension of the franchise is a strategy to avoid revolutions 
against the dictator, who prefers to lose power slowly (extending democracy) 
rather than to violently lose everything. The new political institutions generate 
changes in economic institutions, which will favour the newly enfranchised 
population, who may use democracy to tilt economic institutions and the 
income distribution in their favour, for instance, through extending public 
education. 
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A crucial difference between this chapter and the work of Bourguignon 
and Verdier (2000) is that they put the decision to extend the political rights in 
the hands of the elite (in this case, the dictator). In their model the elite decide 
whether to provide public education (the poor are liquidity-constrained and 
cannot afford education by themselves), and they also assume that only the 
educated have political rights. In terms of the relationship between education 
and democracy, this amounts to assuming causality from education to 
democracy. Therefore, when the elite decide to extend public education, they 
are also deciding to share power with the newly educated. However, the elite 
may decide to do this because they benefit from the positive externalities of a 
more educated population, so they have to compare the benefits they obtain 
from the positive externalities with two sets of costs: directly, the costs of the 
transfers needed to educate the poor; indirectly, the costs associated with the 
probability that once educated, the newly enfranchised individuals may vote 
for more transfers from the rich to the poor. Faced with these benefits and 
costs, the elite may decide to educate only a number of poor that will not 
change the voting majority, so that the elite maintain the political power but at 
the same time can benefit from the educational externalities. This favours the 
appearance of the middle class, and at the same time reduces the growth rate 
that would be observable if all the poor received education. 
Similarly, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) put the final decision to 
democratise in the hands of the dictator: they assume that repression always 
succeeds, so the dictator can always deter democratising threats through 
repression. Ultimately, the dictator compares the costs and benefits of 
repression and democracy and then decides to choose either repression or 
democracy. In contrast, the model of this chapter allows for transitions to 
democracy to either be caused by the dictator himself or to be promoted from 
the citizenry. This, I understand, provides a more realistic approach. 
Additionally, in the model of this chapter, one of the critical factors 
that limit the ability of the dictator to maintain democracy has to do with the 
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effect that education expenditure has on income: the greater the effect of 
education expenditure on income, the more difficult it is for the dictator to 
maintain dictatorship. This, to the best of my knowledge, has not been 
incorporated before. 
The model presented in chapter 3 of this thesis does do not initially 
assume that educated individuals earn more than soldiers or informal workers 
(this is later removed when analysing the effects of the transfers on income 
distribution). This differs from Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) or 
Bourguignon and V erdier (2000), who assume that there are 'rich' and 'poor' 
individuals, but for whom the rich are the 'ruling elite' and the poor are the 
citizenry. So while I assume that there is only one dictator and that the 
citizenry is divided between educated and non-educated (with potentially 
different levels of income between those two groups), Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006) assume that there is a 'ruling elite' with a level of income 
higher than that of the rest of the citizens (who all earn the same). However, 
the most important difference between this model and that of Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006) is that in their case, income does not depend on education 
expenditure, whereas in this model, education expenditure has a central role 
(and is the determinant of the level of income of the educated population). 
The model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) is oriented in a different 
way to the model presented here: for example, they observe the effect of 
income distribution on the transitions to democracy, which is something I do 
not do in this model. One of the features incorporated by Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006) is what they call the 'cost of revolution' (jl in their model), 
which reflects the fraction of total income that is lost in a democratising 
revolution due to the economic disruption generated. The citizenry, before 
starting a revolution, compare that cost of the revolution with the benefits they 
can obtain (the share of income that during a dictatorship is held by the ruling 
elite, represented by (}in their model). In the model of this chapter, the concept 
of J1. is partly reflected in the level of transfers T, as they represent the cost that 
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has to be paid (by the educated individuals) to obtain democracy. On the other 
hand, the benefits of democracy (the (} of Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) are 
here derived from two different factors: (i) the cessation of the dictatorial taxes 
paid by the educated individuals during dictatorship (having them removed in 
democracy is a benefit for them); and (ii) the increase in income during 
democracy that results from more resources being directed to education. Also, 
other benefits of democracy include the transfers that some non-educated 
individuals receive from the educated ones, though those benefits are not taken 
into consideration by those who ultimately promote the transition to 
democracy (the educated individuals, who promote the transitions, do not see 
the benefits of the transfers received by the non-educated; on the contrary, 
those transfers are costs for educated individuals). 
In the second section I set up a model; in the third section I determine 
the maximum level of dictatorial taxes; in the fourth section I characterise the 
demand for soldiers; the fifth section describes the transitions to democracy; 
in the sixth section I introduce a dynamic version of the model and analyse the 
variation of corruption; in the seventh section I conclude. 
Setup of the static model 
A dictator lives one period, at the beginning of which he has to decide 
how to spend his budget of one monetary unit given that his options are public 
education and defence. Public education is initially assumed to increase 
output, while defence increases his probability of not being overthrown by the 
people; in other words, the probability of no democratising revolution. If the 
dictator is not overthrown by a revolution, he will be able to seize a fraction t 
(taxes) of the output of the economy, while if there is a revolution, I initially 
assume that he will not be able to seize anything. These taxes are not 'normal' 
taxes but 'dictatorial taxes', that is, extractions by the dictator to increase his 
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personal wealth. In this sense, those taxes reflect the extractive power of the 
dictator as such. 
The available budget of l monetary unit does not depend on the taxes t, 
because the budget of 1 monetary unit is fixed, whereas the taxes t are the 
dictator's extraction for his own benefit and do not feed back into the public 
budget. For clarity, it can be assumed that the money that the dictator extracts 
through taxes goes to his private bank account abroad, and does not enter the 
circuit of the public finances. 
I assume that all the expenditure in defence is used to hire soldiers, so 
total expenditure in defence equals the wage of a soldier (w) times the number 
of soldiers (n). Note that n refers to the 'dictatorial soldiers', that is, not the 
'usual' soldiers during times of peace and democracy, but to the soldiers that 
the dictator hires to protect his dictatorship. Given that the dictator has only 
one monetary unit to allocate and that the only options are defence or 
education, the resources that go to education are (1-w.n). This direct trade-off 
between education and defence represents a simplification of the budgetary 
trade-offs discussed in the introduction of this chapter (for example Lebovic 
2001 and Habibi 1994). 
The wage rate w is given exogenously to the dictator at the level 
w=w*, as the dictator is himself a relatively small employer in the economy. 
The wage rate is determined in the informal labour market, which cannot be 
taxed by the dictator due to high monitoring costs26 . 
26 The fact that the dictator pays the soldiers a wage equal to the market wage means that the 
dictator cannot simply force the uneducated individuals to work for his defence. This could 
rest in two assumptions: (i) the uneducated individuals in the informal sector are difficult to 
reach by the government, something that is consistent with the idea of an underground or 
informal economy in itself. In consequence, publicly offering a market wage rate is the way to 
attract these individuals. (ii) If uneducated individuals are forced to work for free, they will 
not be committed to their job and their productivity will be close to zero. For example, an 
individual that is forced to work in the army will not be willing to risk his life to defend the 
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Individuals can become soldiers and receive the wage rate w=w*, or 
can receive education and produce output (those individuals are said to be in 
the education/production sector), or can work in the informal sector (which 
does not require education) at the wage rate w* without being taxed. 
Consequently, the total population N is divided among educated individuals 
(V), soldiers (n) (who are uneducated), and informal workers (X) (who are also 
uneducated). I assume that the total population N is fixed, and so is U, so the 
dictator can only recruit from the pool of uneducated individuals (X +n). 
Total public expenditure on education (1-w.n) affects the level of 
production and income of the individuals in the education/production sector, 
so each of them produces more when public expenditure in education is 
higher. However, there is no mobility in or out of the educated sector: soldiers 
and informal workers cannot enter the education/production sector (nor can 
educated individuals become informal workers or soldiers), though there is 
perfect mobility among soldiers and informal workers (because both groups 
are formed by uneducated individuals). 
I refer to the output produced by each individual m the 
education/production sector as y, which is assumed to increase with (l-w.n) 
but with no increasing returns to scale: doubling the expenditure on education 
does not more than double output per worker (the second derivative of output 
on education expenditure, y", is nonpositive). If no money goes to education, 
output per worker in the education/production sector is assumed to be zero: 
y(O )=0. This income function means that all of the educated individuals earn 
the same income (because public education expenditure is the same for all), 
and all the non-educated earn the same (because soldiers are paid the wage of 
the informal sector). However, I do not assume a priori that educated 
dictator, so the dictator will not be getting any real protection at all. Therefore, the dictator 
pays the soldiers the market wage to get an army of individuals who will willingly provide all 
the protection they can. When they do so, the 'defence function' is p, as described below. 
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individuals earn more than soldiers or informal workers (while Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006) do that, see above) 
I assume that the probability of no democratising revolution (or 
probability of dictatorial peace) increases linearly with the proportion of 
soldiers in the total population, such that p =!!:..... Therefore, the smaller the 
N 
number of soldiers, the less likely it is that the dictatorship will persist. I also 
assume that given N, there is a fixed level of soldiers n below which 
revolutions cannot be avoided. This means that p is defined as 
(1) {
0 if n < n} 
p= n. -
N 1f n ~ n 
Individuals in the education/production sector are the only ones that 
pay the dictatorial taxes t. Given that they are the only ones paying the cost of 
the dictatorship, they are also willing to pay to end the regime and force a 
transition to democracy. For that reason, they will offer transfers to the 
soldiers if they do not protect the dictator, so that n is not reached and the 
dictatorship collapses. The higher the taxes t extracted by the dictator, the 
higher the cost faced by the educated individuals, so they will be prepared to 
pay higher transfers in order to avoid dictatorship. This means that the dictator 
cannot freely increase t: as t increases, the educated individuals will offer 
greater incentives to the uneducated individuals in order to persuade them not 
to join the army. 
This model does not incorporate voting mechanisms, so considerations 
like the extension of the franchise (as in Saint-Paul and Yerdier 1993 or 
Bourguignon and Yerdier 2000) are deliberately ignored. 
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Dictatorial Taxes 
In this section I determine how much the educated individuals will be 
willing to transfer to the uneducated individuals in order to persuade them not 
to join the army and therefore avoid dictatorship, and how this limits the 
taxing powers of the dictator. 
According to the defence technology described above, the dictator may 
be able to avoid democracy only if n ~ n. This means that his budget of 1 
monetary unit will be enough to reach a positive level of expected income if 
w * .n $; 1 . If w * .n > 1 (or if w* > ~ ), then the dictator cannot hire the 
n 
minimum number of soldiers and dictatorship has probability p=O. Note that 
both w* and n are given for the dictator, so he may just be unable to avoid 
democracy with his budget of 1 monetary unit. 
This means that the educated individuals can offer a transfer T to the 
would-be soldiers so that 
(2) 1 w*+T >-
n 
in which case democracy is unavoidable. The transfer that makes democracy 
unavoidable is then 
(3) 1 1 T >--w*~T =-- w*+a 
n n 
where a ~o+. 
This transfer T does not have to be paid to all the uneducated 
individuals (potential soldiers). To avoid dictatorship, the transfer has to be 
paid to a number of uneducated individuals such that there are not enough 
uneducated individuals left to be employed as soldiers. From the uneducated 
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population (N-U), the dictator needs n individuals in the army to have a 
chance to maintain his power. This means that if (N-U-n) individuals 
receive the transfer, the dictator will at most be able to hire exactly n soldiers 
and have a chance to keep dictatorship. If, however, the educated individuals 
pay the transfer to (N-U - n + £) individuals (where £ ~ o+ ), then the 
dictator will not be able to employ the necessary n individuals and 
dictatorship will collapse. 
The total amount of transfers that the educated individuals will have to 
pay to secure democracy is then 
(4) r. (N-u-n+£) 
(5) 
So each educated individual will have to pay 
T.(N -U -n +£) 
u 
Educated individuals will be willing to pay the amount (5) for 
democracy only if their net income in democracy is greater than their net 
income in dictatorship. 
I defined above the net income of an educated individual in 
dictatorship as y. (1-t ). I now denote the level of income of an educated 
individual in democracy with g. The difference between y and g is only that in 
democracy there is no money going to a dictatorial army, so w.n=O. For this 
reason, g=y(l ), that is, the income an individual gets in democracy is the same 
that he would get if the dictator devotes all the resources to education and 
nothing to defence. If income were insensitive to education expenditure, then 
y=g. Here I assume that income does increase with education expenditure, so 
g>y. According to this notation and to (5), if educated individuals transfer 
money to the uneducated in order to promote democracy, then the net income 
of an educated individual in democracy becomes 
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(6) T.(N -U -n +&) g-
u 
Educated individuals will prefer democracy to dictatorship as long as 
the net income in democracy exceeds the net income in dictatorship: 
(7) T.(N -U -n +&) (1 ) g- >y. -t 
u 
Rearranging (7) can be re-expressed as 
(8) 1 1 [ T.(N-U-n+&)] t> --. g--'-----~ y u 
If (8) applies, the educated individuals will be able to offer transfers to 
the non-educated individuals, such that not enough of them will be willing to 
protect the dictator, making the dictatorship collapse. 
Expression (8) shows that the greater the income in democracy (g) 
compared to that of dictatorship (y), the lower t must be to avoid democracy. If 
education has a great impact on the income of the educated individuals, the 
ratio g increases, which means that democracy is very rewarding for 
y 
educated individuals. According to (8), this means that educated individuals 
will be willing to offer more to promote a transition towards democracy. The 
dictator will be willing to set a tax rate beyond the limit of (8) only if he makes 
sure that he can decrease g . This is of crucial relevance for the implications 
y 
of this model and will be discussed further below. 
From (8), the dictator can only influence t (a policy variable) and y 
(which depends on the number of soldiers he hires). The rest of the variables 
are given for the dictator. For that reason, I denote 
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(9) [ 
T.(N-V-n+E)] 
7= g-~ V 
so (8) becomes 
(8') z t>l--
y 
Note that z is fixed and does not change with any policy variable, as all 
the variables on the right hand side of (9) are fixed. From (8'), the maximum 
tax rate that the dictator can set is 
(10) z t=l--
y 
Any tax rate greater than (1 0) will fall in the boundaries defined by 
(8'), which means that transfers offered by the educated individuals produce a 
transition to democracy. In fact, if (1 0) applies, educated individuals are 
indifferent between democracy and dictatorship, so I assume that the dictator 
can keep his dictatorship. 
The next section deals with the other variable that the dictator can 
influence in (10): the number of soldiers (n) and through it, the value of y. But 
the value of y also affects t (so n affects t), so when the dictator chooses n, he 
is also setting y and the highest possible level of taxes. 
Demand for soldiers 
Total income in the formal sector will be equal to the income per 
educated worker times the educated population (the population in the 
education/production sector). The educated population is V, so total formal 
income is y. V, a portion t of which is the dictator's tax extraction. However, 
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this will only be available to the dictator in case of dictatorship, which has 
probability p. 
According to this, the expected income of the dictator (E( D)) is 
(11) E(D)= p.y.U.t 
Considering the wage w, the dictator needs to choose the number of 
soldiers to be employed (n) that maximizes his expected total income, given 
that he has only one monetary unit to spend and that the maximum tax rate that 
he can set is given by (l 0). 
As he hires more soldiers, the probability of no revolution (p) increases 
and he secures his expected income (so (11) increases). However, hiring more 
soldiers at the ongoing wage rate decreases the resources that can be allocated 
to education, so y decreases, which reduces ( 11 ). A decreasing y also means 
that the right hand side of (10) falls, which means that the maximum level of 
taxes that the dictator can set decreases, which also decreases ( 11 ). All this 
raises a series of interesting trade-offs. 
Expression (11) shows that for any given value of n, the income of the 
dictator increases with the level of taxes. In other words, for any level of n the 
dictator chooses the highest possible tax rate, which is given by (10). Also, for 
dictatorship to persist, the condition n ~ n has to be satisfied, so p = .!!:__ • 
N 
Inserting this and (l 0) (the highest possible tax rate) in expression (11 ), the 
income of the dictator can be expressed as 
(12) E(D) ~ ~ yl+- ~] ~ ~ [n.y-n.z] 
If an interior solution exists, to choose the optimal number of soldiers 
to hire the dictator sets 
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(13) aE(D) v I an = N.[y-w.n.y-z]=O 
from where n is such that 
(14) y(l- wn)- z n=..:.......c..--'---
w.y~(l- wn) 
The existence of an interior solution requires the following second 
order condition to be satisfied: 
(15) aE(D) _ !!__ (-? I 2 ") 0 , - . __ w.y +n.w .y < 
a-n N 
The right hand side of (15) is always negative (2. w.y' is always 
positive, whereas y" was assumed nonpositive), so (15) stands. 
An interior solution means that the dictator employs: (i) fewer soldiers 
than the total uneducated population, and (ii) at least the minimum number of 
soldiers ( n ). Requirement (i) is consistent with the assumption that the 
dictator is a price taker in the labour market (w* is given for the dictator). If he 
employed all the uneducated individuals, he would be a monopsonist and his 
decision would influence the wage rate. The total uneducated labour force is 
(N-U), so the first requirement of the interior solution means that expression 
(13) has to be negative when evaluated at (N-U): 
(16) =-.[y-w.n.y-z] <0 aE(D)I v I 1 
an n=N-U N n=N-U 
Requirement (ii) means that expression (14) applies for n such that 
v(l-wn)-z _ . . v(l-wn)-z _ . 
· ~ n . Instead, If n IS such that - < n , then the dictator 
w.y 1(1- wn) w.y '(1- wn) 
is in a corner, and will either face a revolution ( n < n means p=O, in which 
case his income becomes 0) or hire n soldiers at the market wage rate. He will 
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only be able to do this if w.n ~ 1 (his total budget equals 1 ). Summarising, the 
dictator's demand for soldiers is 
(17) If y- z ~ n 
y'.w -
If y- z -
--<n -y'.w 
. . y-z Intenor soluuon: n = -· -
y'.w 
(a) 
Corner If w.n < 1 - n = n (b) 
If w.n = 1 - dictator indifferent 
between n = n and n=O (c) 
If w.n > 1 - n = 0 (d) 
In case (a), the dictator can reach an interior solution following (13). 
In case (b), the dictator is in a corner, but at least he can afford to hire 
enough soldiers to get a positive expected income. 
In case (c) the dictator has the option to use his entire budget in the 
army and stop the revolution (in which case (1-wn)=O, so y=O), or to hire less 
than the minimum required number of soldiers and face a revolution. In both 
cases his income is zero, so he is indifferent between both scenarios. 
In case (d) the dictator cannot afford to hire enough soldiers to stop a 
democratising revolution. 
Demand depends negatively on g according to (14) and ((17) (a)) 
(because z depends positively on g). The reason for this is that if the payoff of 
education is high (so g is high compared to y) then the educated individuals 
will be willing to pay more to end dictatorship. To avoid this, the dictator tries 
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to increase the value of dictatorship for the educated individuals via a higher y, 
which requires a lower n. 
Comparative statics 
Changes in the market wage rate (which is given exogenously to the 
dictator) give place to changes in the optimal n to be chosen by the dictator. 
Here I find how the optimal choice of n changes when the wage rate changes. 
v-z For values of -· - ~ n (when case (a) applies in (17)), expression 
y'.w 
(13) can be re-expressed as 
(18) t(n, w) = y- w.n.y '- z = 0 
Therefore, 
(19) 
Given that t represents the first order condition in n, then the 
denominator of ( 19) is nothing else than the second order condition expressed 
in (15), which is negative. In consequence, the sign of (19) depends on the 
sio-n of at 
0 aw· 
(20) at . . 2 .. 2 . 2 .. aw = -y .n-n.y +n .w.y =- .y .n+n .w.y 
Considering that 2.y '.n is positive and that y" is nonpositive, then 
expression (20) is negative. This means that numerator and denominator of 
(19) are negative, so (19) (which is preceded by a negative sign) is negative. In 
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fact, a negative relationship between n and w should have been expected since 
I am analysing the demand for soldiers: when soldiers are more expensive, the 
dictator will demand fewer soldiers. 
For values of Y- z < n (cases (b), (c) or (d) apply in (17)), changes in 
y'.w 
w mean that either n remains at n = n (if (b) applies to the new value of w), or 
a revolution arises and n=O (if (d) applies to the new value of w). If (c) applies 
to the new value of w, the dictator is indifferent and either n = n or n=O is 
possible. 
Transitions to democracy 
Expression ( 1 0) shows the maximum level of taxes that the dictator can 
set. It is particularly relevant to note that the dictator is not an unconstrained 
agent: dictatorship can give place to democracy (or vice-versa) depending on 
whether condition (8) holds or not. Therefore, even though the dictator has all 
the political power, his extractive powers are constrained, and that is a key 
implication of this model. 
Figure 1 represents the tax space for democracy and dictatorship. 
< 
t 
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Figure 1 
Dictatorship 
Transfers from educated 
individuals mean there 
are not enough soldiers 
to sustain dictatorship 
a ~;~~~~c; 71 : 
Expression 
(10) 
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For (10) to be achievable in dictatorship, (10) has to be positive 
(otherwise dictatorship requires a negative tax rate). This depends on the size 
of the impact of education expenditure on income: if .E._ is too large (i.e. if the 
y 
impact on income of an additional education expenditure of w.n monetary 
units is too large), the dictator cannot set positive taxes (according to (10)), so 
dictatorship gives place to democracy. In particular, if the income of an 
educated individual in democracy is much higher than that of an educated 
individual in dictatorship (so .E._ becomes higher, which means that the extra 
y 
w.n spent on education have a great effect on income), the educated 
individuals in democracy are able to transfer enough money to the soldiers to 
stop dictatorship. 
All this means that dictatorships reqmre that the level of income 
achievable in democracy by an educated individual is not much higher than 
the level of income achievable in dictatorship by an educated individual. A 
low .E._ means that the additional resources that would go to education in the 
y 
case of a transition from dictatorship to democracy (w.n) will have a low 
impact on income. 
For this reason, the dictator has an incentive to blur the effects of 
education on income during periods of dictatorship (he cannot do anything 
during democracy), so that the educated individuals perceive a lower .E._ 
y 
during dictatorships and do not offer credible transfers to the uneducated 
individuals. In other words, it is to the dictator's advantage if education does 
not appear to be the path towards growth in dictatorship. If for whatever 
reason (some hypothesis are presented in the next chapter) the effect of 
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education on income is different on democracies and non-democracies, then 
the ratio .f will be perceived differently from each regime. 
y 
According to this model, transitions from dictatorship to democracy 
can be triggered by transfers from educated individuals to non-educated 
individuals. If educated individuals earn more that non-educated individuals, 
as assumed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) or Bourguignon and Verdier 
(2000) (and a point on which there seems to be a consensus; see 
Psacharopoulos 1993, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2002, Griliches and Mason 
1972 among many others), in democracies one should expect more transfers 
from the rich to the poor than in non-democracies. 
Also according to this model, the educated individuals will offer 
transfers only if they earn a larger net income in democracy than in 
dictatorship; in other words, they will promote a transition to democracy if 
their income in democracy (net of transfers paid to the uneducated) is greater 
than their income in dictatorship (net of dictatorial taxes). In consequence, the 
income of the educated also goes up in a transfer-promoted democracy, so the 
total effect of a transition from dictatorship towards democracy on income 
distribution depends on the value of some of the parameters (see appendix 1). 
However, the finding that democracies should have more redistributive 
policies in place transferring income from the educated to the non-educated 
(loosely, from the rich to the poor) is consistent with the arguments of 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and 
Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), who expect that democracies will have more 
redistributive tendencies than non-democracies. In fact, in Bourguignon and 
Verdier (2000) the democracies are by definition more redistributive (or more 
redistributive systems are by definition more democratic), because the more 
the richer transfer resources for the poor's education, the more extended is 
democracy. 
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Appendix 2 presents an example of this model using a linear function 
fory(l-wn), wherey(l-wn)=l-wn. 
A dynamic model 
In this section, I modify some of the assumptions made so far and 
extend the model to a dynamic framework with an infinite horizon. I also 
reassess the choices of the different agents. In the use of notation and in the 
presentation of equations, I try to follow Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). 
However, I argued above that their model is oriented in a different way to the 
model presented here: they observe the effect of income distribution on the 
transitions to democracy, which is something I do not do in this model. But 
also, the model that I present here puts emphasis on the transitions to 
democracy that can be promoted by the educated individuals, whereas 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) put the final decision to democratise in the 
hands of the dictator. 
For each of the three agents identified in the previous sections 
(dictator, educated individuals, and soldiers) I define V/ as the return to an 
individual of type i starting in the regime r. The types of individual will be 
represented by d, e, s, meaning dictator, educated individuals, and soldiers 
respectively, and the regime r will be represented by D/C and DEM, meaning 
dictatorship and democracy. Democracy (state DEM) occurs with probability 
(1-p) while dictatorship occurs with probability ( p ). I assume that p is constant 
whatever the current state, so the probability of a dictatorial coup in 
democracy equals the probability of remaining in dictatorship. 
In state D/C, individual i = i has an income of x per period. As a result, 
the value function for individual i starting in an initial state DIC becomes: 
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where I am using the discount factor f3 (with 0 < f3 <I). Expression (21) says 
that the value to individual i in dictatorship consists of what happens today 
(first term x) plus what is expected to happen tomorrow (continuation value), 
represented by the term P[ p.V~1c + (1- p).V~EM J. Analogously, assuming that 
in state DEM individual i has an income of k, the value function of individual 
i starting in an initial state DEM is: 
Using this initial setup, I analyse the value functions of each of the 
three types of agents, and from there I try to understand how democracy and 
dictatorship interact. 
Dictator 
As shown in the previous sections, m a period of dictatorship the 
income of the dictator equals y. Ut. Note that this expression is not 
premultiplied by 'p' because I am considering the dictator's revenue in a 
period of actual dictatorship, so as dictatorship is already settled during this 
initial period his present revenue is y. Ut with probability I. However, the state 
may change in the future, so the value function of the dictator starting in 
dictatorship becomes 
(23) V~IC = y.U 1 + /3[ p.V~/C + (1- p ).V~EM J 
from where 
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(24) vd _y.V.t+/3(1-p).~~I:.M DIC- 1_ /Jp 
Note that if there is complete certainty that dictatorship will continue in 
the future (so p=l), expression (24) becomes 
(25) vd = y.U.t DIC 1_ fJ 
Expression (25) shows that if there is complete certainty that 
dictatorship will continue, the value of dictatorship for a dictator equals the 
sum of the infinite discounted revenues. On the other hand, if there is complete 
certainty that democracy will arise (so p=O), then expression (24) becomes 
(26) ~~c = y.U.t + fJV/fEM 
This expression means that the dictator will obtain the revenues of this 
period (where the state is dictatorship) and from next period onwards he will 
get the payoffs of democracy. The setup of this model assumes that the same 
individual dictator is reappointed if democracy reverts to dictatorship in the 
future. Although this is exceptional in terms of historical evidence, I am using 
Acemoglu and Robinson's (2006) approach, which assumes a dictatorship that 
is led by a ruling elite. In this case, it does not need to be the same individual 
dictator who is reappointed, but the same elite or oligarchy. 
Regarding the value for the dictator starting in democracy, I now 
assume that during democracy, the dictator earns an income of g. For 
example, the dictator can lead a peaceful transition to democracy and becomes 
an educated individual, in which case his income in democracy is g = g . In 
this scenario, (22) becomes 
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from where 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
Vd = g + fJ p.Vl~IC 
DEM 1-/3(1-p) 
Inserting (28) in (24 ), 
d y.U.t.[1-fJ(1-p))+g.fJ.(1-p) 
VD/C = 1- fJ 
Re-inserting (29) into (28)27 , 
V d _~ flg.(1-p)+y.U.t.p DEM - g + "~-....::.1-_-fl'------''--
With (29) and (30) I determine under which circumstances the dictator 
will prefer dictatorship to democracy and vice versa. The dictator will prefer 
dictatorship to democracy as long as V~1c ~ V~EM (where I am assuming that if 
v~IC = v~EM' he chooses dictatorship). From (29) and (30), 
If, as stated above, the dictator can lead a peaceful transition to 
democracy and get an income of g =gin democracy, then (31) shows that the 
dictator chooses between dictatorship and democracy depending on whether 
the income of a dictator during a period of dictatorship ( y.U .t) is greater or 
smaller than the income of an educated individual in democracy (g). Another 
way to express (31) with g = g is the following: 
27 Appendix 3 details the steps to obtain expression (30). 
28 Appendix 3 details the steps to obtain expression (31 ). 
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(32) t?._L 
y.V 
The higher the income of an educated individual in democracy 
compared to that of an educated individual in dictatorship (i.e. the higher g in 
relation toy), the higher the threshold set by (32), and accordingly, the higher 
the taxes required for dictatorship to persist. In other words, the greater the 
income that is 'repressed' by dictatorship (i.e. the higher .f), the more 
y 
oppressive the dictator will have to be to persist. This means that the dictator 
will only choose dictatorship if taxes can be high enough; otherwise he will 
prefer democracy. The lower boundary for t set in (32) only applies if the 
dictator can make a peaceful transition to democracy and move to the 
education/production sector and earn an income g. 
Now let us assume that the dictator feels that the conditions are not 
given for him to go through a peaceful transition and enjoy the income of an 
educated individual in democracy, so he will not give up power voluntarily. In 
other words, he cannot be accommodated in the democratic regime and gain 
access to the income g of an educated individual. This can be seen as a return 
to the initial assumption that in democracy the dictator has no income. In this 
case, (31) becomes 
and (32) becomes 
(34) 0 t?.--~t?.O 
y.U 
This means that the dictator will prefer dictatorship as long as the tax 
rate is not negative. The dictator will always prefer t?. 0 to t < 0 because in 
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the second case his income is negative, whereas in the first case it is not, so the 
dictator will always prefer dictatorship to democracy. 
Note that the minimum threshold set by (34) IS lower than the 
minimum threshold set by (32). In other words, if the dictator can achieve 
g = g in democracy, the range of possible levels oft is more limited than if in 
democracy he expects g = 0. If the dictator feels that the conditions are not 
given for him to go through a peaceful transition and enjoy the income of an 
educated individual in democracy, he will not give up power and dictatorship 
may persist for a wider range of values of t. This provides a formal 
explanation to why some countries have passed 'amnesty' legislation to 
guarantee transitions to democracy: making sure that the dictator can achieve 
g = g , the parameter space for dictatorship is reduced and democracy 
becomes more likely (which is in line with Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer's 
2006 quote in the introduction of this chapter). 
Educated Individuals 
In a period of dictatorship the net income of an educated individual 
equals y.(l- t). Following the same procedure as in the previous section, the 
value function for an educated individual starting in dictatorship becomes: 
(35) v;/C = y.(l- t) + JJ[p.v;JC + (1- p ).V;EM J 
from where 
(36) V' = y.(l-t)+fJ(l-p).V;EM DJC 1- PP 
Similarly, the value function for an educated individual starting m 
democracy is: 
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from where 
(38) V' = g + f3 p.V;IC 
DEM 1-,8(1- p) 
Inserting (38) in (36), the following value function for an educated 
individual starting in dictatorship is obtained: 
(39) V' = [y.(l-t) ](1- /3.(1- p)) + (g ]/3(1- p) 
D/C 1_ f3 
In the numerator of (39), the net income of an educated individual in 
dictatorship and in democracy (respectively) appears in square brackets. The 
income in democracy (g) is weighted by ( /3(1- p)) because democracy can 
happen in next period (thus the discount factor f3) with probability (1-p ). The 
complement of that weight is ( 1- /3(1- p)), which is exactly the weight given 
in the numerator to the income in dictatorship [y.(1- t)]. Inserting (39) back 
in (38), the value for an educated individual starting in democracy is: 
(40) e [g].(1-fJp}+[y.(l-t)]fJp V DEM = -'--"------___;;,.,.--~-
1- f3 
Expression (40) has a similar interpretation to (39): the numerator 
shows the income in dictatorship weighted by its probability (p) discounted 
by f3 (because dictatorship can happen in next period, so the income for 
dictatorship is multiplied by f3 p ), plus the income in case of democracy 
weighted by the complement of the weight of dictatorship ( 1- f3 p ). 
From (39) and (40) I determine when the educated individuals will 
prefer dictatorship to democracy and vice versa. As long as v;1c ~ v;EM, the 
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educated individuals will prefer dictatorship to democrac/9. From (39) and 
(40), 
As g > y, then (41) is false. This means that educated individuals will 
never prefer dictatorship to democracy. They will only be indifferent between 
both regimes when t=O and g = y (in which case education expenditure does 
not affect income, which is not what I assume here). 
Transfers 
From the rejection of (41) above, for educated individuals v;£M > v;,c. 
In consequence, educated individuals have an incentive to offer a transfer to 
the uneducated individuals if they stay out of the army. As before, if 
(N-U-n+£) non-educated individuals are persuaded not to join the army, 
the minimum threshold n will not be reached and dictatorship collapses. That 
will require the level of transfers per non-educated individual given by (3). In 
consequence, 
42) e [ T.(N-U-n+£)] /3[ e e J ( VD£M = g- u + pVDIC +(1- p)VD£M 
(43) v;IC = y(l-t) + /3[ pV;IC + (1- p)V;£M J 
With the transfers, the educated individuals will be indifferent between 
democracy and dictatorship if (42)=(43) (in which case I assume dictatorship 
29 Where I am assuming that if indifferent, they choose dictatorship 
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persists), and they will prefer to make transfers to reach democracy if 
(42)>(43), which can be expressed as 
(44) [ 
T.(N -U -n +£)] (l ) g- >y. -t 
u 
Operating, ( 44) implies 
(45) 1 1 [ T.(N -u -n +£)] t> --. g--------y u 
which the same result obtained in (8) for the static case. 
If the tax rate satisfies (45), then transfers will take place and 
democracy will override dictatorship. As in expression (8), in expression (45) 
the parameter space for dictatorship decreases as .f increases (a greater ratio 
)' 
.f means that the highest possible tax rate in dictatorship decreases). 
y 
For a given amount of education expenditure (that is, for a given [1-
w.n]), the ratio .f measures the impact on the level of income of spending an 
)' 
additional amount of w.n on education, that is, the increase in income that can 
be induced through an increase of w.n monetary units in education expenditure 
(because g=y(l)). According to (32), (41) and (45), dictatorships benefit from 
a lower .f, and indeed, dictatorships have to give way to democracies if .f is 
)' )' 
too high according to those expressions. Put in other words, for a given 
amount of education expenditure, dictatorships (compared to democracies) 
need to show a lower impact of education on income to survive. 
The assumption that the dictator can earn g in democracy means that 
the tax rate consistent with dictatorships has upper and lower constraints: 
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while (45) provides the upper constraint, expressiOn (32) shows the lower 
constraint. Putting both expressions together, dictatorship will be possible if 
(46) 
t 
g I [ T.(N -U -n +£)] --~1:51--. g--------'-
y.U y V 
Expression (46) is represented graphically in figure 2. 
Dictator abandons 
power voluntarily 
Figure 2 
Dictatorship 
Transfers from educated 
individuals means there 
are not enough soldiers 
to sustain dictatorship 
(h~~~~~cJ7/ : 
Expression 
(32) 
Expression 
(4.5) 
t 
If the income of an educated individual in democracy is much higher 
than that of an educated individual in dictatorship (so .K becomes higher, 
y 
which means that there is a greater effect of education expenditure on income), 
there is room for the educated individuals in democracy to transfer money to 
the soldiers, so dictatorship ends. At the same time, if .K is too high, the 
y 
dictator may find he is better off abandoning his position and favouring a 
transition to democracy, in which case he can become an educated individual. 
From expression ( 46), there are at least three requirements for 
dictatorship to exist: 
-First, the right hand side of (32) cannot be greater than the right hand 
side of (45). This can be expressed as 
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(47) _L ~ 1 _ _!_.[g _ T.(N -u -n +e)] 
y.U y U 
which can be re-expressed as 
(47') g U [ T.(N-U-n+£)] - ~ --. 1 +--'-------'-
y l+U y 
Again, (47') shows that the greater the impact of education expenditure 
on income (the greater ~ ), the smaller the tax space of dictatorship. 
y 
-Second, the right hand side of (45) has to be positive (otherwise 
dictatorship requires a negative tax rate). Again, this also depends on the size 
of the impact of education expenditure on income: if ~is too big, the dictator 
y 
cannot set positive taxes (according to (32)), so dictatorship gives place to 
democracy. 
-Third, the right hand side of (32) has to be at most equal to 1 
(otherwise dictatorship requires a tax rate greater than 1). This can be 
expressed as 
(48) _L~l 
y.U 
Therefore, (47') and (48) give the conditions under which the dictator 
will be able to set a positive tax rate that will avoid democracy. These two 
conditions make it clear that dictatorships require a low level of ~. In other 
y 
words, dictatorships require that the level of income achievable in democracy 
by an educated individual is not much higher than the level of income 
achievable in dictatorship by an educated individual. A low ~ means that the 
y 
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additional resources that would go to education in the case of a transition from 
dictatorship to democracy (w.n) will have a low impact on income. 
A variation: transfers in corruption 
Suppose that while in the army, soldiers benefit from the proximity to 
the ruling power and from being insiders in the military body that exercises 
government. These benefits are not legal, but obtained through bribes and 
other forms of corruption. I summarise all these benefits that a soldier i could 
get, in the parameter ~; . 
I assume that the parameter ~; is distributed uniformly between 0 (no 
benefit) and a maximum benefit 8 across all the non-educated individuals. 
The dictator does not know the value of ~ of each uneducated individual, but 
he knows its distribution. Temporarily, I will refer to the wage that the dictator 
pays as wc . Therefore, 
and 
(50) V·'··; = w* +fJ[pvs.i + (1- p)V,,; ] DEM DIC DEM 
where I added the upperscript i to the value functions to represent the fact that 
each soldier ends up receiving a different income according to the extra 
benefits perceived. Now, the dictator can internalise some part of the bribing 
benefits into the soldiers' wage, so that wc + J; ~ w* (note that no soldier 
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will want to stay in the army if WC+ a;< w* ).30 In particular, the dictator can 
keep on paying the market wage w* and let the soldiers fully benefit from the 
bribes (in which case and 
If the dictator internalises part of the benefit 8; in the wage he pays 
and offers a wage w= wc lower than the market wage w*, the soldiers will 
receive the payment wc from the dictator and the bribes 8; from their bribers. 
(51) 
Soldiers will only accept to work for the dictator if 
V"·; >V"'"; 31 
DIC- DEM 
which can also be expressed as 
To minimise the payments he makes, the dictator will try to recruit the 
uneducated individuals with the highest levels of 8;. For example, if the dictator tries 
to recruit the lowest possible number of soldiers ( n ), then he will need to identify 
the level of 8; = 8 such that n uneducated individuals have 8; ~ 8. This will allow 
him to minimise the payments wc and let the bribing benefits contribute to attract 
uneducated individuals towards the army. Given that a; is uniformly distributed 
30 As the dictator does not know the 8; of each uneducated individual, the dictator will offer 
c the same wage w to all of them. 
31 Again, I am assuming that if both values are equal, the soldiers prefer dictatorship. 
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between 0 and J across all non-educated individuals, and considering that the total 
number of non-educated individuals is (N-U), then 
(53) A [N-u-n]-t5= .8 
N-U 
so the wage we will be such that 
(54) (w*-8) ~we~ w* 
With ( w * -8> ~ we: expression (54) means that the wage paid by the dictator 
( we ) has to be such that we + J ~ w * . This will attract the n indi victuals for which 
~ ~ J, because the total payments they will receive (we from the dictator and 
~ ~ J from their bribers) will be equal or higher than the wage they can obtain 
working in the informal sector. This means that J is the maximum level of bribing 
benefits that the dictator can internalise in the soldiers' wages. 
With we ~ w*, expression (54) says that the internalisation can at least be 
zero, and the dictator can pay the market wage on top of the bribing benefits received 
by the soldiers. 
Originally I assumed that the dictator has a chance to stay in power only 
ifw*.n~l. Now, as he is only paying we, that constraint becomes wc.n~l. This 
means that the level of transfers that leaves the dictator with no chance of hiring 
soldiers (from the dictator side) becomes 
(55) c 1 c T =--w +a 
n 
where a ---7 o+. Expression (55) is similar to (3), with the difference that now we 
replaces w*. According to (54), we ~ w*, so in consequence Tc ~ T, which means 
that the level of transfers that leaves the dictator without chance of hiring soldiers has 
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increased or stayed the same. If it increased, it IS now more expensive for the 
educated individuals to 'outbudget' the dictator. 
In particular, according to (54), ( w * -J) ~ wc . Therefore, substituting (53) in 
(54), the smallest possible level of wc is 
(56) [
N-U-n]-wc = w*- .§ 
N-U 
which means that (inserting (56) in (55)), the highest possible level of Tc is 
(57) Tc =::- w*- .§ +a=::-w*+ .§+a 1 { [N-u -n:J -} 1 [N-u-n]-
n N-U n N-U 
However, this may still not be enough to end dictatorship, because (57) only 
accounts for the dictator side. Now 'outbudgeting' the dictator may not be enough: 
avoiding dictatorship requires that the uneducated individuals receive transfers that 
compensate for the bribes too. If the dictator offers a wage wc, then the potential 
benefits that each uneducated individual perceives from joining the army are 
distributed uniformly between [ wc; wc + J"]. 32 So the potential benefits that each 
uneducated individual perceives from joining the army over and above working in 
the informal sector at a wage rate w*, are distributed uniformly between 
[WC- w*; WC+ J- w* J. 
In consequence, if educated individuals were to pay a transfer F to persuade 
(N-U-n+£) non-educated individuals not to join the army (which is a condition 
to avoid dictatorship), then their transfer has to compensate for the extra income that 
32 Because the bribes are distributed uniformly between [ 0; J"] and the wage paid by the 
dictator is wc . 
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the uneducated individuals perceive from joining the army over and above working 
in the informal sector at the wage rate w*. 
(58) F = . we+§ -w*-(wc -w*) [ N-U-n+£] [ - J N-U 
The first square bracket of (58) derives from the fact that there are (N-
U) uneducated individuals, of which (N-U-n+£) have to be persuaded not 
to join the army. The second square bracket of (58) shows the difference 
between the maximum possible payment ( wc + 8- w *) and the minimum 
possible payment ( wc- w*) that a soldier can receive in the army (including 
bribes) over and above the market wage rate (this has been derived above). 
Uneducated individuals are distributed uniformly along that difference. 
Therefore, the multiplication of both square brackets in (58) shows the level of 
transfers F that will be required to persuade (N - U - n + £) uneducated 
individuals not to join the army and secure a higher level of net income 
through transfers in democracy. 
Expression (58) can be re-expressed as 
(58') [ N-U-n+£]-F= .§ N-U 
Now, the transfer that the educated individuals have to offer to avoid 
dictatorship is given by Max ( F;Tc ). We do not know a priory whether 
Tc >< F , because 
(59) Tc >< F ::::::> -- w + .§+a >< .§ 1 • [N-U-n]- [N-U-n+£]-
n N-U N-U 
::::::>(assuming E=a=O) 
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Now that the dictator pays w= wc we know that dictatorship requires 
wc .n ~ I , but we do not know whether w * .n >< I . 
Educated individuals will be willing to pay this transfer only if 
V~EM > V~IC (assuming that if V~EM = V~JC, the educated individuals prefer 
dictatorship), where now V~EM is given by 
(60) V e =[ _Max(F;Tc).(N-U-n+£)] P[ ve (l- )V' J DEM g + p · DJC + p · DEM 
u 
and V~1c is still given by (43), reproduced here 
(43) V~1c = y(I-t)+ P[PV~1c +(I- p)V~EM J 
According to (60) and (43), the condition v~EM > v~IC translates into 
(61) [ 
Max(F,Tc)(N-U-n+£)] (I .) g- > y. -t u . 
From where 
This is very similar to ( 45), with the difference that in (62), 
Max(F,Tc)replaces T. As I showed that Tc ~T, then the threshold level of 
taxes obtained in (62) is greater than the threshold obtained in (45). 
Expressions (57) and (58) show that the more corrupt the system is (the higher 
are the bribes obtainable, so the higher is "S ), the higher will be Tc and F 
respectively. In expression (62), this means that if all other factors are 
constant, more corruption (higher "S ) translates to a higher tax rate reachable 
by the dictator without giving way to democracy. In consequence, dictators 
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will benefit from giving concessions and power of influence to the soldiers. 
This is consistent with the assertion in chapter 1 that dictatorships are more 
corrupt than democracies. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I approached the issue of the sustainability of 
dictatorships and democracies from the perspective of the effects of education 
expenditure on income, given a finite labour market. 
Previous researchers have referred to the educational trade-off faced by 
dictators, in the sense that more education means more income and thus more 
revenue, but at the same time this poses a risk for the dictator (Bourguignon 
and Verdier (2000), Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer (2006), Acemoglu (2003), 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2002 and 2006) and Robinson (1999); see 
discussion in the literature review of the first chapter). However, this is the 
first time that the returns to expenditure in education (in terms of increased 
personal income) are included in the analysis, which is the main innovation of 
this chapter. 
I do not claim that the returns to expenditure in education determine 
the existence of dictatorships or democracies. However, I have shown that this 
factor puts some restrictions on the power of the dictators, influencing the 
transitions to democracy and dictatorship. Having the political power does not 
mean that the dictator has no restrictions; he needs people to support him and 
protect him, and he also needs people to work in the productive sector in order 
to have a source of tax revenue. As he needs others, this gives power to those 
'others', thus the transfers offered by educated individuals are a threat to the 
stability of the dictatorship. The analysis of transitions between democracy 
and dictatorship has never before been approached through looking 
simultaneously at the effects of education expenditure on income and the 
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pressures from a limited labour market on the extractive powers of the 
dictators. This is the single most important contribution of this chapter. 
For this model I have used the military versus education/production 
because it gives a clear image of the kind of trade-offs faced by dictators. 
However, this model can be extended to cover more general considerations: 
the dictator needs not only the military, but also bureaucracy to run the state 
apparatus. Likewise, the model can incorporate minimum technological 
thresholds of employment in the bureaucratic apparatus, representing the fact 
that the state cannot be run with less than a certain number of employees (a 
concept similar ton in this chapter). This presents the same kind of trade-offs 
as those analysed in this model with the military, but expanded to all the staff 
that the dictator needs to hire. 
The model presented in this chapter explains why redistributive 
policies should be more extended in democracies than in non-democracies 
(which has been argued by previous researchers), and why some countries 
need to resort to amnesties to facilitate peaceful transitions to democracy. 
Another key implication is related to why dictators should be expected 
to 'blur' the effect of education on income, an implication that is empirically 
tested in the next chapter. According to Pritchett's (2001) 'piracy' argument, 
in some countries the institutional environment is 'sufficiently perverse' so 
that education does not lead to macroeconomic growth. In the terms of the 
model of this chapter, Pritchett's hypothesis means that in those 'perverted' 
environments, the ratio !L has to be relatively low (if education does not lead 
y 
to growth, then g=y). In this case, according to (45) and (32), dictatorship is 
more likely to ensue. The 'perversion' of the education-growth link can come 
from different sources (more on this in the next chapter) but one of the sources 
can be related to the parameter g used here: if the dictator corrupts the system 
so that certain sectors get special favours, influence and power (I have shown 
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above that the dictator is interested in increasing "S) regardless of their 
education, then the relative benefit of education perceived by society 
decreases. This gives way to at least two possible outcomes. 
The first possible outcome is that of countries with a 'perverse' 
institutional environment, with low impact of education on growth, and which 
are non-democratic. A second possible outcome arises for countries without 
'perverse' institutional environments, where in consequence education 
expenditure has a greater impact on growth. This increases the ratio 1.., 
y 
making democracy more likely. In consequence, this second outcome includes 
countries with non- 'perverted' institutional environments, with higher impact 
of education on growth, and with democratic governments. 
There are reasons to believe a priori that each of those outcomes should 
have some degree of stability. For instance, let me assume that a dictatorial 
country has a non- 'perverted' institutional environment, in Pritchett' s (200 1) 
sense. In this case, a greater impact of education on income means that a 
relatively higher g should be expected, which facilitates a transition to 
y 
democracy. The final outcome is a democratic country with a high 1.. and a 
y 
non- 'perverted' institutional environment. In the same way, in a democratic 
country with a 'perverted' institutional environment such that education has a 
lower impact on income, 1.. will be relatively lower, which facilitates a 
y 
transition to non-democracy. As a result, the final outcome is that of a non-
democratic country with a low 1.. and a 'perverted' institutional environment. 
y 
According to this, non-democracies could be summarising the 'black 
box' to which Pritchett refers with the 'institutionaVgovemance environments' 
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that are 'sufficiently perverse' to prevent education from having a positive 
impact on economic growth. This closes the circle and reinforces the idea of 
two stable equilibria: for the first outcome, non-democracies have 'perverse' 
institutions that lead to lower impacts of education on growth (lower ~ ), 
y 
which in turn facilitates non-democracy. For the second outcome, democracies 
have 'non-perverse' institutions that lead to greater impacts of education on 
growth (higher ~ ), which in turn facilitates democracy. However, for this to 
y 
be operating, it remains to be tested whether democracy gives place to greater 
impacts of education on growth than non-democracy. This will be tested in the 
next chapter. 
As discussed in the literature review of chapter 1, scholars have agreed 
that richer countries tend to be more democratic than poorer countries (Lipset 
1960, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and 
Y ared 2004, Dahl 1971 among many others), though establishing causalities 
does not generate a similar consensus. If richer countries tend to be more 
democratic, then the characteristics of the two previous equilibriums could be 
extended and described as follows: 
a) If richer countries are more democratic than the poorer countries 
(as demonstrated by previous scholars), they will also tend to show higher 
macroeconomic returns to education expenditure (as shown in this chapter, ~ 
y 
should be greater in democracies than in non-democracies). This group is then 
characterised by countries that are richer, show higher macroeconomic returns 
to education, and are more democratic. 
b) If poorer countries are less democratic than the rich countries (as 
demonstrated by previous scholars), they will also tend to show lower 
macroeconomic returns to education (as shown in this chapter, g should be 
y 
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smaller in non-democracies than in democracies). This group is then 
characterised by countries that are poorer, show lower macroeconomic returns 
to education, and are less democratic. 
More research into the stability of these two equilibria is needed, 
although at this stage and for the reasons detailed above, the findings obtained 
in the last chapters suggest that these two equilibria are stable and that some 
degree of institutional persistence should be expected. 
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Appendix 1: The distributional effects of transfers in the static 
model 
This model does not present a general conclusion on whether the 
transition from dictatorship to democracy results in a more equal or unequal 
distribution of income. 
Intuitively, the argument is as follows: in dictatorship, the dictator can 
extract a proportion of taxes such that the income of the educated individuals 
is very low and very close to that of the non-educated individuals. This would 
create a virtually equal distribution of income. However, in democracy the 
educated individuals can make transfers to a great proportion of non-educated 
individuals (to avoid dictatorship), such that the income of the non-educated 
increases, reducing the gap between the income of the educated and the non-
educated. 
In dictatorship, educated individuals earn a net income of y. (1-t) and 
non-educated individuals earn w*. If democracy is achieved through transfers 
from the educated to the non-educated individuals, then there are three levels 
of mcome: (i) educated individuals earn a net income of 
T.(N-V-n+c) ( .. ) th (N V - ) d d. d .. d al h g - ; 11 e - - n + E non-e ucate m IVI u s t at 
V 
receive transfers earn a net income (w*+ T); (iii) the (V+ n- £) non-educated 
individuals that do not receive transfers earn a net income of w*. 
Figure (al. I) provides a representation of the change in the dispersion 
of income. 
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Figure al.l 
Dicta.mrshlp Democracy 
Educated y.(l-t) < 
T*(N-U- n +E) g- ---'------'-
V 
< w*+T* (N-U-n+ E) individuals 
Non-educated = w* (U + n-E) individuals 
Figure (a 1.1) shows that for the educated and non-educated 
individuals, a transition from dictatorship to democracy represents a Pareto 
improvement from the point of view of income: nobody is worse off, while the 
educated individuals (and some non-educated) are better off. 
However, the effect on the distribution of income is ambiguous for the 
following reasons: 
First, the range of income disparities increases: whereas (V + n- £) 
non-educated individuals do not receive transfers in democracies and their 
income remains constant in both regimes, all the educated individuals see their 
income increase in democracy when compared to dictatorship. This means that 
the distance between the incomes of the educated and the non-educated that do 
not receive transfers ((V + n- £) of non-educated individuals) increases, 
which translates into a more unequal distribution of income. 
Second, there is the disparity of income between the educated 
individuals and the (N-V- n + £) non-educated individuals who receive 
transfers. To assess whether the income gap between these two groups 
increases or decreases with the transition from dictatorship to democracy, I 
check 
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T.(N -U -n +c) 
g- u y.(l-t) (a 1.1 ) >< ..:.__; _ _;_ 
w*+T w* 
The left hand side of expression (al.l) shows the ratio of incomes 
between these two groups in democracy, and the right hand side shows the 
ratio of incomes between these two groups in dictatorship. Operating, 
expression (aLl) implies 
(a1.2) t >< l-[ w* ].[.f __ T_.(N_-_V_-_n_+_c_)] 
w*+T y U.y 
This means that the income gap between these two groups will increase 
m democracy relative to dictatorship if 
t>l-[ w* ]·[g__T.(N-U-n+c)] 
w*+T y U.y 
and will decrease if 
t < - . -- . 1s oo s s1rm ar to t e tmtts set 1 [ w* J [g T.(N-U-n+C)] Th. 1 k . ·1 h 1· . w*+T y U.y 
by expression (10). However, given that [ w* ] <I, the right hand side of 
w*+T 
(a1.2) is greater than the right hand side of (10). For this reason, expression 
(a1.2) can be incorporated into figure I in the way shown in figure (a1.2). 
Figure a1.2 
< 
Transfers from educated 
individuals mean there 
are not enough soldiers 
to sustain dictatorship 
Dictruorship (/j~~~~~cf 7J ; 
Expression Expression t t 
(1 0) (a1.2) 
I IlL...---+) 
Zone A Zone B 
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Figure (a1.2) reproduces figure 1 but adds 2 zones (A and B) derived 
from expression (a1.2). When democracy arises through transfers, the relevant 
area is that to the right of expression (10) in figure (al.2). Whether income 
distribution between the educated individuals and the non-educated 
(N-V- n + £) individuals that receive transfers gets more or less equal, 
depends on the origina1level of taxes in dictatorship: if taxes are in Zone B (so 
expression (a1.2) becomes t > 1- . -- · ), then the [ 
w* ][g T(N-U-n+£)] 
w*+T y U.y 
ratio of incomes between these two groups will increase, making income 
distribution more unequal. If taxes are in Zone A (so expression (al.2) 
becomes t < 1- . -- · ), then the ratio of incomes [ 
w* ][g T(N-U-n+£)] 
w*+T y U.y 
between these two groups will decrease, making income distribution more 
equal. 
The impact of this second factor in the income distribution of each 
regime is ambiguous: it depends on the level of taxes in dictatorship, but also 
on the relative size of the non-educated population that receives transfers. If 
the proportion of the population that falls in this category is small, then the 
impact of this factor on total income distribution will be small. 
Third, there is another factor not reflected in (a 1.1) that has an impact 
on the distribution of income: in dictatorship, one individual (the dictator 
himself) receives a (presumably relatively) large income, whereas in 
democracy that same person will be earning either the same income as the 
educated individuals or no income at all (this depends on the assumptions 
made). This could also affect the distribution of income in one direction or the 
other. The effect of this will depend (among other factors) on the size of the 
total population. 
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The three arguments presented above show that there are contradictory 
effects on income distribution derived from regime changes, though the model 
presented in this chapter showed that democracies can be expected to have 
more redistributive policies in place transferring income from the educated to 
the non-educated (loosely, from the rich to the poor). 
Appendix 2: An example of the static model with linear y 
This appendix presents an example of the static version of the model, 
using a linear function y(l-wn)=l-wn. In this case, y'=1 and g=y(l)=l. From 
(14) it follows that 
y - ., 1- wn - 7 1- z (a2.1) n=--~ = ~ =>wn=I-wn-z=>2wn=l-z=>n=--
w.y' w.I 2w 
T.(N -u -n +£) T.(N -u -n +£) (a2.2) z=g- =1-------
U U 
(a2.3) T.(N-U-n+c) n=-.:...._ ____ __:_ 
2wU 
Inserting the expression for T as in (3): 
(~ -w+a }<N-u-n+£) 
n = -'------'--------
2wU 
(a2.4) 
Considering that w=w* is given exogenously for the dictator, then 
(*-w*+a }<N-U-n+£) 
n= 
2w*U 
(a2.5) 
which can be re-expressed as 
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(a2.6) n =[-1 .(~ +a)-1]. (N-U-n+£) 
w* n 2U 
Expression (a2.6) represents the demand curve for soldiers. It is 
straightforward to see that the relationship between n and w* is negative, as 
would be expected from a demand curve. For dictatorship (and demand for 
soldiers) to exist, w*n ~ 1, so - 1- ~I, which means that n>O. 
w*n 
According to (I 0), the maximum level of taxes that the dictator can set 
IS 
1
_ (*-w*+a }cN-U-ii+E) 
(a2. 7) t = 1-_____ _,U"---------
1- w*n 
which can be re-expressed as 
(~- w*+a }(N-U ;n +£ )- w*n 
t=~------~~----------~----
1-w*n 
(a2.8) 
Inserting the value of n from (a2.5) and operating, this becomes 
(a2.9) 
(~- w*+a }(N -V -n +£) 
t = --~-,----------"------,------------
2U - ( ~ - w *+a} ( N - u - n + £) 
To interpret expression (a2.9) it is worth simplifying it using T rather 
than ( ~ - w *+a). Therefore, (a2.9) becomes 
T.(N -u -n +£) ( a2.1 0) t = _ ___:_ ___ --'------,-
2U -T.(N -U -n +£) 
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Expression (a2.1 0) defines the maximum level of dictatorial taxes as a 
function of exogenous variables. Expression (a2.1 0) implies that: 
(i) For other factors constant, when a higher level of transfers are 
required to stop dictatorship (when T is greater), the dictator 
can set a higher tax rate. This is an expected result: more 
expensive democracies (that is, the higher the transfers 
necessary to obtain democracy) mean that the dictator can set a 
higher price for dictatorship (higher tax rates) without risking 
being overthrown. 
(ii) For other factors constant, a larger educated population (greater 
U) means that the tax rate will be lower. This was also 
expected: when the educated population is greater, it is cheaper 
for each educated individual to pay the required transfers to 
obtain democracy, so the dictator needs to lower the tax rate to 
avoid democracy. 
(iii) For other factors constant, a greater minimal size of the army (a 
greater n ) means a lower maximum tax rate. This was also 
expected: when the minimum number of soldiers that the 
dictator has to recruit increases, dictatorship becomes more 
expensive for him and democracy becomes cheaper for the 
educated individuals (because the number of people they need 
to keep out of the army to make dictatorship collapse 
decreases). 
Finally, the choice of y=(l-wn) implies the relationship ~ = - 1-, 
y 1-wn 
which is particularly relevant for the implications derived from this chapter. 
With w=w*, any increase in n will increase ~ = - 1-; in other words, for a 
y l-wn 
fixed level of wages, the greater the size of the army, the more the income of 
an educated individual in dictatorship is repressed (and so the more the 
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educated individuals will be willing to pay the necessary transfers to obtain 
democracy, which is why the maximum possible level of dictatorial taxes is 
negatively related to .f). From expression (a2.5), n is negatively related to V 
y 
and n, and positively related with T, so increases in T increase .f, whereas 
y 
increases in V or n decrease .f . 
y 
An increase in w* has two opposing effects on w*n: first, there is the 
positive direct effect of a greater w* on w*n, but also greater w* decreases n. 
So the total effect of an increase in w* on w*n can be seen in (a2.11) (obtained 
from multiplying expression (a2.5) by w*): 
(~- w*+a }(N -V -n +£) 
(a2.11) w*n=....:...._---~-----
2U 
From expression (a2.11 ), an increase in w* translates into a decrease in 
w*n. This means that an increase in w* translates into an increase in (1-w*n), 
from where an increase in w* translates into a decrease in .f = 1 
y 1- w* n 
Summarising, the greater the market level of wages, the less income is 
repressed by the dictatorship (which in turn means that educated individuals 
will be less likely to pay the transfers necessary to obtain democracy). 
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Appendix 3: Detailed steps of some operations 
Detailed steps to get expression (30) 
I obtained expression (30) after inserting (29) into (28), where 
(28) 
(29) 
vd _ 8 + pp.v~Jc 
DEM - 1- PO-p) 
vd =y.UJ.[1-P0-p)]+g.p.O-p) 
DIC 1_ p 
After inserting (29) into (28), I obtain 
(a3.1) vd = g + PP 
DEM 1 _ p (1- p) 1 _ p (1- p) 
y.U.t.[1- PO-p)]+ g.p.(1- p) 
1-p 
Vd ___ ,.::._g _ + ppyUt + ppgp(l- p) (a3.2) DEM -
t-PO-p) 1-p o-P)(l-/J(l-p)) 
(a3.3) V~EM = g .[1+ p 2 p(1- p)]+ ppyUt 
1-PO-p) 1-p 1-p 
(a3.4) V~EM = g .[1+p2 pO-p)]+ppyUt 
1- PO-p) 1- p 1-p 
(a3.5) V~t:M = g ·[1-P+P2p(l-p)]+ppyUt 
1-PO-p) 1-p 1-fJ 
(a3.6) V~EM =_j_.[1-fJ+P2p0-p)]+{JpyUt 
1- p 1- p(l- p) 1- fJ 
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But (1- j3 p) = , so (a3.6) becomes [ 1- j3 + /3
2 p(l- p)] 
1-/3(1-p) 
(a3.7) vd =_j_.(1-f3p)+j3pyUt 
DEM l _ j3 1 _ j3 
(a3.8) vd =_j__gj3p +j3pyUt 
DEM 1 - j3 1 - j3 1 - j3 
But _j_ = g + g j3 , so (a3.8) becomes 
1-/3 1-/3 
from where 
(a3.10) VgEM = g + j3[g(l- p)+ pyUt], which equals (30). 
1- j3 
Detailed steps to get expression (31) 
I obtained expression (31) after comparing (30) and (29). 
(29) vd = y.UJ.[1-f3(1-p)]+g.f3.(1-p) DIC 1_ j3 
(30) vd =A +f3[g(l- p)+ pyUt] DEM g 1_ j3 
(31) y.U.t ~ g 
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For simplicity, instead of using expression (30), to represent V~EM I use 
the equivalent following expression (derived above): 
(a3.7) vd_ =_L.(1-fJp)+[JpyUt 
DEM l _ fJ l _ fJ 
y.U.t.[1-fJ(1-p)]+g.fJ.(I-p) g ( fJ ) fJpyUt (a3.11) ~ --. 1- p +..:........:...'---
1-[J . 1-[J 1-[J 
(a3.12) y.U.t.[1- fJ(l- p) ]+ g.fJ.(l- p) ~ g.(1- fJp) + fJ pyUt 
(a3.13) y.U.t.[l-fJ(l-p)-fJp]~ g.(l-fJp-fJ(l-p)) 
(a3.14) y.U.t.[1- fJ] ~ g.(l- fJ) 
(a3.15) y.U.t ~ g, which equals (31). 
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Chapter 4 
The democratic factor in 
the education-growth 
relationship: a possible 
resolution of the micro-
macro paradox 
Abstract 
This chapter analyses empirically whether the degree of democracy of the 
political system interacts in the education-growth relationship. Different 
measures of education are used (expenditure and years of schooling) in panels 
of data analysed using Arellano and Bover's ( 1995) and Blundell and Bond's 
(1998) system-GMM estimation. The results show that a democratic 
environment is favourable to the impact of education on economic growth, 
though democracy may not have a direct impact on growth. 
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Introduction 
The first chapter made the case for the hypothesis that will be tested in 
this chapter. The consistency of positive effects of education on personal 
income at the microeconomic level suggests that something similar should 
happen at the macroeconomic level. As Pritchett (1996, 2001) points out, 
education externalities, if existent, should make macroeconomic effects 
greater than microeconomic effects. If education is good for growth, when an 
individual receives education it should not only increase their productivity and 
consequently their personal income, but also the spillovers of a more educated 
and more productive individual should benefit the rest of the economy as well. 
However, the results obtained at macroeconomic level tend to show that 
macroeconomic returns to education are lower than the microeconomic returns 
(in other words, that education has a positive impact on individuals' income, 
but its effect on macroeconomic growth is less clear). Pritchett (1996) refers to 
this as the 'micro-macro paradox', because initially, we should expect 
macroeconomic effects to be at least as important as the microeconomic 
effects (plus possible externalities). 
Following Pritchett (1996, 2001, discussed in the introduction), some 
political environments can be perverse in that more education does not lead to 
economic growth, but to private benefits at the expense of social costs. 
Pritchett does not provide details of the political environments he is thinking 
of. In chapter 1 I argue that democracy (or the lack of it) reunites the 
conditions that synthesize that environment, at least for the following reasons: 
dictatorships are less accountable than democracies and can distort resources 
aimed at education; the absence of rule of law derived from the arbitrariness 
of the dictator may discourage investment (with negative effects on the growth 
potential of the education embedded in the individuals); individuals (and their 
education) are more likely to be killed or exiled in repressive dictatorships 
than in democracies; democracies have longer time horizons, which is 
consistent with the 'technology' of the education process (more on this 
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below); dictatorships tend to spend part of the educational resources in 
indoctrination, which is not necessarily economically productive; in some 
cases dictatorships allocate the division of labour centrally, which can be 
economically less efficient that the forces of the free market. All these 
channels were summarised in table 1 of chapter 1. 
This chapter presents a possible resolution of the 'micro-macro' 
paradox using democracy as a catalyst for the effect of education on 
macroeconomic growth: according to the hypothesis that will be tested in this 
chapter, democracy increases the marginal effect of education on growth, 
because the channels mentioned above (and summarised in table 1 of chapter 
1 as the 'eight channels') mean that education in the 'right environment' 
(democracy) is more productive than education in the 'wrong environment' 
(non-democracy). In this sense, the lack of democracy can be interpreted as 
the 'perverse environment' to which Pritchett refers. Therefore, though 
education can always have a positive impact on personal income, a lack of 
democracy may prevent the transformation of that private benefit into a social 
benefit. Moreover, it may work in the opposite direction, giving place to the 
apparent 'micro-macro' paradox. 
Addressing this question will shed light on the relevance of education 
and political institutions to the growth process, and will also help to explain 
some of the divergence found in the literature. At the same time, the policy 
implications to be drawn are of paramount relevance: if democracy has indeed 
a role to play in the education-growth relationship, should not some countries 
(mainly poor ones) get the 'right institutions' before engaging in education 
spending? 
This is consistent with the findings of chapter 3: there, I showed that 
dictators have an incentive to make the ratio ( ~) look smaller, so that the 
perceived gains from democracy look smaller and the individuals who could 
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benefit from a transition to democracy do not offer the transfers required to 
produce a political change (the ratio ( ~) represents the gains in income 
resulting from additional funds (precisely w.n monetary units) spent on 
education). 
The second section presents a simple model to formalise part of the 
theoretical argument and to motivate the search for empirical evidence, which 
is done in the third section. 
Results from previous research 
Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2007) test whether the economy's 
proximity to the world technological frontier33 increases the positive effects of 
democracy on economic growth. They test this using interaction terms: they 
multiply their measure of proximity to the technological frontier by a measure 
of democracy, and find that the interaction is significant and negative, while 
the direct effect of democracy on growth is positive. This means that when 
countries are close to the technological frontier (so the distance decreases), the 
effect of democracy on growth is positive (the positive direct effect of 
democracy is greater than the interaction term, which may be zero if the 
country is in the technological frontier, or very small in absolute terms if the 
country is close to the frontier). For countries that are far from the 
technological frontier, the negative interaction term overrides the positive 
direct effect of democracy, meaning that democracy becomes growth-
33 To measure the world technological frontier in a particular sector, the authors compute the 
logarithm of the value added per worker in that sector in different countries. The country with 
the highest value sets the world technological frontier in that sector. The distance of a country 
from the technological frontier of one particular sector is calculated on the basis of the 
difference between the logarithm of its value added per worker in that sector and that of the 
country that sets the world technological frontier for that sector. 
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diminishing. Although the effect of democracy on growth has been 
approached by other scholars before (see chapter 1), Aghion, Alesina and 
Trebbi (2007) argue that the novelty of their contribution is that no one before 
has interacted democracy with the economy's proximity to the world 
technological frontier. The novelty of this chapter is derived in the same way: 
though previous scholars have observed the effect of education and democracy 
on economic growth, no one has actually interacted both factors as I do here. 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) acknowledge that the effect of 
education on growth depends on other policies and institutions, though they 
do not refer explicitly to democracy. They show that mapping for education 
through cognitive skills can account for three times the variation in economic 
growth than models that use years of schooling to map for education. Using 
data from different international student achievement tests (in literacy and 
numeracy), they build a measure of cognitive skills which outperforms years 
of schooling as an explanatory variable for economic growth. They conclude 
that this is due to the fact that including years of schooling in the growth 
regressions implicitly assumes that a year of education produces the same 
increase in knowledge and skills regardless of the educational system, whereas 
the cognitive skills actually acquired by the population are a better indicator of 
the outcome of the education received. For example, differences in the quality 
of the education establishments or the educational systems of two countries 
can explain why two individuals with the same number of years of schooling 
may have different levels of productivity, and therefore have different impacts 
on economic growth. A particularly relevant feature of Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2008) is that they use interaction terms between their measure of 
education and measures of the 'appropriateness' of institutions, which is 
similar to what I do in this chapter. This leads them to the conclusion that 
education not only impacts on growth directly, but also that better institutional 
quality increases the impact of education on growth, which is precisely what I 
test in this chapter. However, there are a number of considerations to be made 
when comparing what I do here to Hanushek and W oessmann (2008). 
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First, Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) do not consider democracy as 
one of the institutions conducive to growth. Instead, they use trade openness 
and protection against expropriation. Though I do use trade openness as one of 
the possible explanatory factors of growth, my main institutional regressor 
(and the one I interact with education) is democracy. In chapter 1 I explain 
why I believe that democracy may be a better measure of the appropriate 
institutional framework for education to have an impact on economic growth. 
Second, data on cognitive skills, as measured by Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2008), is now available for only 77 countries (see Hanushek and 
Woessmann 2009). On average, the number of countries included in the 
regressions of Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) is less than half the number 
of countries included in the regressions of this chapter (additionally, the 
authors admit that their sample is biased towards developed economies). Even 
more limiting, the internationally comparable data on cognitive skills is in 
most cases available as one or two observations per country. In Hanushek and 
Woessman (2009), the closest that the authors get to a time series analysis is a 
observation of 15 (rich) countries with two data points (1975 and 2000). This 
makes it hard to assess whether changes of cognitive skills over time really 
have an impact on economic growth. The data available allows for the 
observation of cross-sectional correlations between education and growth, 
rather than within variations (how changes in cognitive skills affect the rates 
of growth). Expression (5) in the model of the next section tries to capture the 
within variation of GDP due to changes in education; testing that with 2 data 
points for 15 rich countries is far from ideal. 
Third, the analysis of Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) compares a 
unique initial year with a unique final year, whereas that of the regressions 
included in this chapter uses time series including various years. The option to 
use time series is one of the benefits derived from the relative abundance of 
the data I use when compared to that used by Hanushek and Woessmann 
(2008). 
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These last two considerations were also identified by Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004) when they conclude, after using a test-scores variable, that "the 
overall indication is that the quality of education is far more important for 
economic outcomes than the years of schooling. Unfortunately, the limited 
amount of international data on test scores makes it difficult to go further with 
this analysis" (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004, page 537). 
For this reason, the analysis of this chapter becomes all the more 
relevant: if educational quality is only a proxy for the quality of institutions 
(as argued by Bosworth and Collins 2003), then including measures of the 
governing institutions (like democracy) may be better than introducing 
measures of cognitive skills and arguing that those are the result of the 
mediating effect of educational quality on years of schooling. In other words, 
democracy may already include the relevant part of the 'appropriate' 
institutional environment, probably (as concluded by Bosworth and Collins 
2003) doing a better job than the 'educational quality' that is supposedly 
embedded in the cognitive skills. 
A related (though not equal) approach is taken by Baum and Lake 
(2003). Their analysis has two steps. First, they estimate a regression of 
female school enrolment rate on democracy and some controls34 . They find 
that democracy contemporaneously affects the female school enrolment rate. 
Second, they estimate a regression of GDP per capita growth on some 
controls, democracy and female secondary enrolment lagged 4 periods, and 
find that female secondary enrolment positively affects economic growth 4 
periods later, while democracy has an insignificant (and negative) effect on 
economic growth. They interpret these results saying that democracy has no 
direct effect on economic growth, though it has an indirect effect through 
education: more democracy increases education (first regression), which in 
34 The authors focus on female school enrolment rates because they anticipate that these 
enrolment rates will be more sensitive to variations in regime type than that of men. 
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turn increases economic growth (second regression). To measure that indirect 
effect, the authors multiply the coefficient of democracy in the first regression 
by the coefficient of female secondary enrolment in the second regression. 
The indirect effect estimated in this way becomes positive and significant (at 
10%) only for countries with a GDP per capita above US$ 2500. However, 
this does not explain how democracy intervenes in the impact of education on 
growth; in this model the effect of education on growth is not affected by 
democracy. In turn, Baum and Lake's (2003) contribution is to provide a 
causal chain through which democracy may affect growth via a quantity 
effect: more democracy means more education (though the idea that 
democracy affects education contemporaneously is questionable), which some 
periods later is translated into more growth. All this also has the caveat that 
the results are only significant for countries above a certain threshold of GDP 
per capita, and that it is only tested for female secondary enrolment. 
Benchmark model 
In this section I present a simple model to show the effects of piracy 
on the education-growth relationship. This model is original and I am not 
aware of previous models trying to formalise the same idea. 
I assume an economy in which individuals can obtain their income 
from working in activities that generate value. The value they generate from 
their work depends positively on the level of public human capital, referred to 
as h. I will operationalise this concept later in the chapter; in the meantime let 
us assume that h is a measure of average human capital in the society. 
Therefore, for each individual 
(1) Y; = y(h) 
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where "y;'' is the income of each individual, which depends positively on the 
level of public human capital. The individuals that obtain their income from 
work are called 'workers'. Given that there is a unique h for the whole 
economy, all the individuals have the same income (Y; = yj, '\li, j), so I just 
refer to the level of individual income as y. I focus on the income of one 
period and assume that the income of the previous period is fixed and given, 
so the determination of y in this period given the income of the previous 
period implicitly determines the rate of growth. 
Alternatively, individuals can obtain their income from 'piracy', that 
is, from stealing, asking for bribes, or engaging in corruption, blackmailing or 
different illegal activities (such as breach of copyrights, piracy, etc). These 
individuals (herein called 'pirates') get hold of a portion of the workers' 
income. 
The size of that portion (A) depends on the ability of these pirates, 
which in turn depends positively on the level of public human capital. This 
means that pirates benefit from education through two channels: on one hand, 
education increases the income of the workers, so the pirates have more to 
steal from. On the other hand, education makes the pirates more skilled, so 
they can increase the portion of the worker's income that they can grab (},). 
However, there are costs attached to this kind of illegal activity. These costs 
cover a wide range of punishments: fines, prison, moral costs, etc. Therefore, 
the net income of a pirate can be expressed as 
m 
A(h).Iy(h) 
(2) P= I -R I I 
n-m 
where I assume that there are m workers in a total population of n individuals 
(so there are n-m pirates) and R represents all the costs related to piracy. The 
expression A (h) means that ). depends positively on human capital. I assume 
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that each pirate gets a similar share of the total loot, so the total amount 
extracted from the workers gets divided equally among the n-m pirates. 
Note that in (2) R has a subindex i meaning that each individual 
perceives different costs from engaging in piracy. There may be various 
reasons for this: for example that different individuals assign different values 
to the probability of being caught, or that individuals with abilities in different 
fields face different regulations, or that some individuals may feel that they 
have political or judicial contacts to help them avoid being penalised. 
Each individual will choose between becoming a worker or a pirate 
according to the direction of the following inequality 
m 
..ti_v 
(3) y.(l-1) >< I -Ri 
n-m 
(where (h) has been omitted for simplicity). In expression (3), the left hand 
side reflects the income of a worker net of the pirates' extractions, and the 
right hand side reflects the income of a pirate as expressed in (2). Rearranging, 
(3) becomes 
Expression (3') says that individuals who perceive higher costs from 
piracy will become workers, whereas those that perceive lower costs will 
become pirates. Consequently, in societies where the law is perceived to be 
enforced more rigorously (and so the costs of piracy tend to be higher), there 
will be fewer pirates than in those where there is a general perception of 
anarchy. At the same time, the higher is A., the more attractive is piracy as an 
option for individuals. 
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I refer to the total income of the economy as its GDP. As the pirates do 
not generate new income but just redistribute existing income, the GDP of this 
economy can be calculated as 
(4) GDP=m.y 
Expression (4) takes into consideration that all the workers earn the 
same income ( v. = v ., '<::fi, j ). From (4), 
...' I ~ } 
(5) 
Expression (5) means that when the level of human capital changes, 
GDP changes for two factors: first, educated individuals earn more when the 
society is more educated, and second, the number of individuals choosing to 
become productive workers (m) may change as a result of the additional 
public human capital. 
am To be able to solve (5), I need to calculate -, and for that, I need an 
ah 
expression for m. From expression (3'), I refer to R* as the value of R; that 
leaves an individual indifferent between becoming a pirate or a productive 
individual. R* is then 
(7) 
Rearranging, 
m=n.[(l-A).y+R*] 
y+R* 
When h increases, so do y and A.. Starting from a scenario where the 
agent is indifferent between being a pirate and being productive, I look at what 
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change in h is needed to make the agent change his position either towards 
becoming a pirate or a productive worker. I answer this question by changing 
h minimally in the neighbourhood of R* (R* is held constant) and analyse the 
effects of a marginal change of h on m. Therefore, leaving R * fixed and 
analysing the effects of a marginal change of h on m, expression (7) shows 
that an increase in h will have a negative effect on m: while y increases both in 
the numerator and denominator of (7), ). also increases, so ( 1- A.) decreases, 
which means that the numerator either decreases or increases less than the 
denominator (this depends on whether the effect of h on y or on ( 1- },) is the 
greater)35 . In consequence, 
(8) 
(9) 
am <0 
ah 
With (8), I can re-express (5) as 
aGDP =m. ay +v.{am <O} 
a1z ah · ah 
In terms of the literature discussed above, the more 'perverse' the 
educational environment, the more piracy benefits from education. In terms of 
this model, this means that an increase in h will have a greater impact on },, 
which, according to (7), makes the negative effect of (8) stronger. This, 
according to (9), decreases the effect of education on GDP and increases the 
likelihood that the negative term in the right hand side of (9) dominates over 
the first positive term in the right hand side, making the total effect of 
education expenditure on GDP negative. 
35 An alternative way to see this is as follows: for the individual who is indifferent between 
becoming a pirate or becoming a worker, an increase in human capital means that he will only 
remain indifferent if m falls. Assume for a moment that m does not fall when the general level 
of human capital increases: in this case, (3') shows that piracy will be more rewarding than 
working (the right hand side of (3 ') increases over the left hand side, because y and). increase 
with education). Therefore. in this case, the individual who was previously indifferent 
becomes a pirate, which means that m falls. 
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The first term on the right hand side of expression (9) implies that the 
greater the number of people in the working sector (the greater m), the greater 
the impact of education on GDP. In other words, for a given dy, more people dh 
involved in piracy means a lower impact of education on GDP. This is the 
effect to which I refer above (after expression (5)) as 'first factor'. For all the 
reasons mentioned in chapter I, democracies can be expected to be better than 
non-democracies at enforcing the law, respecting property rights, fighting 
corruption and respecting human rights. This means that on average, 
individuals living under democracy will perceive higher costs (R;) from 
engaging in piracy. Additionally, if a democratic government has a genuine 
interest in the well-being of the majority of the population as opposed to just 
that of a group or elite, they will do what is necessary to increase aggregate 
GDP. In this model, this requires increasing the perceived costs of piracy ( R;), 
which increases m. 
This model not only addresses the issue of how democracies can 
increase the impact of education on growth. It also addresses the micro-macro 
paradox to which I previously refer: whereas at microeconomic level both 
workers and pirates benefit from more education (and depending on the 
functional form of A., pirates may even benefit more than workers), at 
macroeconomic level the impact of education can be lower than at 
microeconomic level. For instance, if m<n (so pirates exist) and the 
institutional environment is such that education has a relatively strong effect 
on the extractive abilities of the pirates, then (9) shows that the effect of 
education on GDP is smaller than that on individual incomes. 
If there is no piracy, then the addition of the micro effects for the n 
individuals should be equal to the macro effects. From (1), it is 
straightforward that 
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(10) 
which is the addition of individual incomes. If there is no piracy, then n=m, so 
expression (4) becomes 
(11) GDP=n.y 
from where 
(12) fJGDP (Jy ---=-.n dh dh 
It is straightforward to see that expression (1 0) equals expression (12), 
which means that when there is no piracy, the macroeconomic effect of 
education on GDP equals the sum of the microeconomic effects on 
individuals' incomes. This shows that in the absence of piracy, there is no 
macro-micro paradox, whereas piracy brings in the discrepancy of the effects 
of education at micro and macro level. 
Data and results 
In this section I present empirical evidence to test the hypothesis that 
democracy plays a role in the education-growth relationship, in the sense that 
more democracy means that education has a greater impact on growth. 
Addressing this hypothesis will shed light on the relevance of education and 
political institutions to the growth process, and will also help to explain some 
of the divergence found in the literature. At the same time, the policy 
implications to be drawn are of paramount relevance: if democracy has indeed 
a role to play in the education-growth relationship, should not some countries 
(mainly poor ones) get the 'right institutions' before engaging in education 
spending? 
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Empirically, I test this using interaction terms. I run regressions where 
the dependent variable is growth in GDP per capita, and among the 
explanatory variables there is a measure of education, a measure of 
democracy, and the product of both (the interaction term). An interaction term 
with a positive coefficient means that more democracy enhances the positive 
impact of an additional unit of education on growth. In other words, an 
interaction term with a positive coefficient means that the marginal product of 
education increases with democracy. 
I use two proxies for education: one is an input of the education 
process (public expenditure on education) and the other is the average years of 
schooling of people aged 15 and more. This means that the variable h of the 
model of the previous section is proxied here by the level of public 
expenditure in education and by the average years of schooling. A third 
alternative to operationalise h could be to use a measure of cognitive skills, as 
in Hanushek and Woessman (2008). I do not use their measure of cognitive 
skills to operationalise h for the reasons that I discussed before. 
Growth. democracy and public expenditure on education 
The data used to test the relationship between public expenditure in 
education and growth under different degrees of democracy consists of a panel 
of 116 countries for the period 1980-2003. I average the data over non-
overlapping three-year periods ( 1980-1982, 1983-1985, 1986-1988, 1989-
1991, 1992-1994, 1995-1997, 1998-2000, 2001-2003). 
The arising dataset is an unbalanced panel consisting of 116 countries 
over 8 periods. The sources of data are presented in appendix I; the list of 
countries is presented in appendix 2 under the heading 'Group 1: All 
countries'; descriptive statistics for the variables used in this section are 
presented in appendix 3. 
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I estimate variations of the following equation; 
+f3 •. Democracy;_l-l + f31 .Democracy;_,_4 + f36 .[PubEducExpend * DemocracyJ.l-1 + 
+f37 .[PubEducExpend *Democracy];_,_. +[Controlsu]'.t5 +V;+ v, + v;_, 
where lnGDPpc;_ 1 stands for natural logarithm of real GDP per capita of 
country i in period t, lnGDPpcGrowth stands for the natural logarithm of the 
growth of real GDP per capita (period over previous period), PubEducExpend 
stands for public expenditure in education as a share of GDP, and Democracy 
is a measure of democracy (where 1 is totally democratic and 0 is totally 
nondemocratic, see appendix 1 for details on this measure of democracyi6. 
[Controls] represents a vector of five control variables: total public 
expenditure as a share of GDP, investment as a share of GDP, the percentage 
of population between 15 and 64 years in the total population, annual inflation 
rate, and a measure of trade (exports plus imports, over GDP). 
The GDP per capita lagged one period controls for conditional 
convergence, while the measures of education and democracy enter with 
different lags to test for short and long-run effects. The reason for the different 
lags is that for education expenditure to have an impact on growth, the 
expenditure has to be undertaken, then be 'transformed' into education 
(expenditure in education is an input in the education process) and finally the 
individuals that receive that education have to enter the labour market. This is 
not an instantaneous process, so I test different possible lags for this effect to 
occur (Sylwester 2000 considers the effects on economic growth of different 
36 Though an institutional measure, the variation of the variable Democracy should not be 
underestimated: the descriptive statistics in appendix 3 show that this variable varies relatively 
more than most of the other variables included in the analysis (the comparison is made using 
the coefficient of variation). This is true not only for the 'overall' but also for the 'within' 
variation, which observes the variation of each county's values around their own mean. 
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lags of education and finds that different lags have different effects). This is 
discussed and tested below. 
The simultaneous determination of growth and lagged GDP per capita 
biases the fixed-effects estimation of (13). Additionally, previous research 
(Bond, Hoeffler and Temple 2001) has shown that the first-differenced GMM 
estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) tends to behave particularly 
poorly in growth equations that include a low number of periods (the lagged 
levels of the variables are weak instruments for first-differences). Similarly, 
Castell6-Climent (2008) stresses that fixed effects and first difference GMM 
might not be appropriate when variables are persistent over time (which is 
what she observes in her democracy and education data, but it is also what 
Bond, Hoeffler and Temple 2001 expect from growth regressions, given the 
persistency of output). This is because when variables vary significantly 
across countries but remain stable within countries, taking the first differences 
eliminates most of the variation in the data (which comes from the variability 
across countries). For that reason, including a regression in levels the system 
GMM estimator incorporates the cross-country variation. Consequently, I 
estimate equation (13) using a system-GMM estimator, as developed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
However, in order to check whether first-differences would also bias 
the results in this case, I follow Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001). They 
estimate their growth equation using different methods (OLS, fixed-effects, 
first-difference GMM and system-GMM) and obtain a coefficient on lagged 
income from first-difference GMM that lies below that obtained from a fixed-
effects estimation (which they expect to be downward-biased). They conclude 
that this provides evidence that the first-difference GMM estimate of the 
coefficient of lagged income is biased, whereas when the coefficient is 
estimated using system-GMM estimation, its value lies above the downward-
biased first-difference and below the upward-biased OLS. From this, they 
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conclude that the system-GMM yields an improvement in precision compared 
to the first-difference GMM. 
To reproduce the steps followed by Bond, Hoeffler and Temple 
(2001), I estimate four different specifications (which are detailed in table 2) 
using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and fixed-effects, and compare the 
coefficient on lagged income (lnGDPpc) with that obtained using difference 
GMM (Arellano and Bond 1991 ). The results obtained for the coefficient on 
lagged income are reported in table 1. 
Table 1 
Coefficient for lagged In of GDP per capita 
Dependent variable: In of GDP per capita growth (period over previous period) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS -0.0119 -0.0129 -0.0139 -0.0114 
Fixed effects -0.4269 -0.4278 -0.4382 -0.4596 
Difference GMM -0.4158 -0.4171 -0.4322 -0.4913 
System GMM -0.0203 -0.0166 -0.0224 -0.0159 
The four columns corre~pond to The four specificaTions of Table 2. SysTem-GM M is insTrumenred 
wiTh levels lagged Two and Three Times in The differences equarion and firsT-differences lagged once as 
insTruments in rhe levels equation. Difference GMM is insTrumenred wiTh levels lagged rwo and Three 
Times. excepT in The firsT equaTion. where iT is insTrumenTed wiTh levels Lagged Three and four Times. 
In table 1 I follow the same steps than Bond, Hoeffler and Temple 
(2001) and obtain results that are aligned with theirs: when estimated by 
difference GMM, the coefficient of lagged income is close to or below the 
coefficient estimated using fixed effects, suggesting a bias in difference 
GMM37. In all four specifications, the estimation by system-GMM yields 
coefficients for lnGDPpc that are between those estimated by OLS and by 
fixed-effects estimation. Considering these results and the recommendations 
37 In the first three specifications, the coefficient from first-difference GMM is not strictly 
below those of the fixed-effects estimation (although they are relatively close); in the fourth 
specification, the coefficient from first-difference GMM is below that of the fixed-effects 
estimation. 
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found in the literature (above), I use system-GMM estimation for the 
regressions presented in the rest of the chapter. 
While in Arellano and Bond's (1991) first-differenced GMM estimator 
the endogenous and predetermined variables are instrumented with lags of 
their own levels, the system-GMM estimator combines those equations with 
an additional set of equations in levels with lagged first-differences as 
instruments. In this case, equation (13) is instrumented using levels lagged 
two and three times in the differences equation, and first-differences lagged 
once as instruments in the levels equation. 
Table 2 shows the estimations obtained with different specifications. 
The Hansen test and the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) do not suggest the 
presence of problems with the choice of instruments or the specification of the 
models. Following Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen (2001), a goodness of fit 
measure is provided, calculated as the squared correlation between the 
predicted growth in GDP per capita and the actual growth in GDP per capita. 
This squared correlation between actual and predicted variables is equivalent 
to the standard R2 for OLS. However, in this context the interpretation of this 
measure has to be taken with caution, as the objective of instrumentation is, in 
a way, to reduce the explanatory power of the model by removing potentially 
endogenous variation in the regressors. 
As mentioned above, I do not expect public money spent on education 
to have a positive effect on per capita GDP growth in the short run. Education 
expenditure is just an input in the education process: this expenditure has to be 
converted into an educational output (abilities, skills) through the education 
technology, which later has to be put into practice in the labour market. For 
this reason, a reasonable assumption is that money spent today in education 
will have a positive impact on GDP only in the future, whereas in the short 
run it acts as expenditure with no positive effects. 
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Depe11dent variable: Ln uf GDP per capita gruwth (periud uver previuus periud) 
~ (I) (2) (3) (4) 
:;:: In of GDP per capita (I lag) -0.020317 ** -0.0165523 * -0.0223878 ** -0.0159306 
.... 
-. (-2.33) (-1.83) (-2.44) (-1.45) (") 
s· 
Trade/GDP 0.0001123 0.0001031 0.0002053 0.0001004 ~ 
~ (0.47) (0.46) (0.93) (0.39) 
~ Annual inflation rate -0.0004420 -0.0003998 -0.000392 -0.000496 
-
-~: (-1.39) (-1.28) (-1.32) (-1.25) 
Public expenditure/GUP 0.0025139 0.0015714 0.0022357 0.0015503 
( 1.11) (0.69) (1.0/) (0.67) 
lnvestmcnt/GDP 0.0061 !:!52 *** 0.0062208 *** 0.0063528 *** 0.0062034 *** 
(6.30) (7.16) (6.77) (6.00) 
Population 15-64 years/Total population 0.0062086 *** 0.0053006 *** 0.0061624 *** 0.0052842 *** 
(3.09) (2.83) (3.27) (2.97) 
(a) Public education expcnditure/GUP (I lag) -0.024425 *** -0.020564 -0.0228263 *** -0.0216 *** o-3 
(-3.40) (-1.29) (-3.84) (-3.23) = 
'=' 
(b) Public education.:xpenditurc/GDP (4 lags) 0.005824 *** 0.001766 0.0034009 ** 0.0034209 * ;" 
(4.50) (0.61) (2.19) (1.82) N 
(c) Democracy (I lag) 0.0040912 0.0078333 
(0.13) (0.10) 
(d) Democracy (4 lags) 0.0388487 -0.0425651 
( 1.35) (-0.95) 
lnt.:raction (a) and (c) (I la g) -0.001!:!478 
(-0.10) 
Interaction (b) and (d) (4 lags) 0.0189237 ** 0.0105115 ** 0.0170143 ** 
( 1.98) (2.06) (2.56) 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first JilT. (p-value) 0.505 0.649 0.589 0.329 
"'t:: Hansen test (p-value) 0.224 0.546 0.430 0.589 t:::l 
Oc Goodness of tit 0.334 0.369 0.353 0.387 ~ 
.._ Countries 116 116 116 90 
Oo Observations 348 348 348 257 Oo 
Notes: t-values in parenthesis. ***stands for significant at I% level. **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%. 
System GMM instrum<!nt<!d with levels lagged two and three times in the diiTer<!nc<!s <!quation, and first-differences lagged once as instruments 
in the levels equation. 
This expectation is corroborated by Sylwester (2000), who showed 
that "Although public education expenditures are positively associated with 
future economic growth, the contemporaneous effect upon growth is negative" 
(Sylwester 2000 page 379). For this reason, I introduce the measure of public 
education expenditure (Public education expenditure/GDP) lagged one and 
four periods (equivalent to 3 and 12 years respectively), trying to capture the 
different effects of different time lags. 
The series of public education expenditure are not very long (there are 
only sufficient data back to 1980), so it is not possible to introduce many lags 
and still have long enough series. For that reason, I limit the analysis here to 4 
lags. 
The results obtained corroborate the expectation regarding the length 
of the lags of the education expenditure variable: 'Public education 
expenditure/GDP' appears with a negative coefficient when lagged one period 
but with a positive coefficient when lagged four periods. 
In the first specification, both coefficients for education expenditure 
are significant at 1% level. For the democracy variable, neither of the lags 
appears significant at 10% level. The negative sign on the lagged level of 
GDP per capita (which is significant at 5% level) suggests that there is some 
degree of conditional convergence operating. The controls 'Investment/GDP' 
and 'Population 15-64 years/Total population' are significant at 1% and have 
the expected positive sign, meaning that countries that invest more and have a 
younger population grow faster than those that do not. The other three controls 
are not significant. 
The five controls are consistent across the four specifications in the 
sense that they neither change sign or their level of significance. I include a 
measure of trade, inflation, and investment/GDP to control for some of the 
standard regressors in the growth literature (see a discussion in Yi Feng 1997 
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or Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). I also control for (public expenditure/GDP) 
and (population of 15-64 years/total population) for reasons that are more 
specific to the factors analysed here. First, as public education 
expenditure/GDP is one of the key regressions in table 2, controlling for 
public expenditure/GDP becomes relevant. A country that spends relatively 
more public money in general will probably spend more on education too. 
Given that a greater total public expenditure may also affect economic growth, 
only observing the effects of higher public expenditure on education without 
leaving total public expenditure constant would bias the estimate of the effects 
of education expenditure on growth. Second, I include a control to account for 
the age structure of the population (population of 15-64 years/total population) 
to check whether the effect of education expenditure on growth may not be 
just a result of different age structures of the populations across countries, 
such that 'younger countries' grow faster and also need to spend more money 
on education because of their age structure. 
In the second specification I add two interaction terms: the product of 
democracy and the measure of public education expenditure, lagged one and 
four periods (again, equivalent to 3 and 12 years respectively). While the 
interaction term lagged 1 period does not have a significant coefficient, when 
lagged 4 periods the coefficient is significant at 5% level. An interesting result 
is that when both interaction terms are added, both lags of the education 
expenditure variable cease to be significant (though they maintain their sign). 
In the third specification I remove the democracy variables (which did 
not appear with a significant coefficient in the first two specifications) and the 
first Jag of the interaction term. The result is that both lags of the education 
expenditure variable become significant again (at I% level for I 1ag and 5% 
level for 4 lags), while the interaction term with 4 lags remains significant at 
5% level. 
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A positive and significant interaction term means that the effect of 
education expenditure on growth is amplified with more democracy: the 
marginal effect of public education expenditure on growth depends on the 
level of democracy, so more democracy means that each pound spent on 
public education has a greater impact on growth. This means that public 
education expenditure affects GDP per capita growth directly and indirectly: 
directly, it has a long-run effect (positive) and a short-run effect (negative); 
indirectly, it has a positive effect through the political system in the long-run 
(the interaction term). 
To assess the economic significance of the interaction term, let us 
consider a country with the average level of Public Education 
Expenditure/GDP and the average level of democracy. According to appendix 
3, the mean of Public Education Expenditure/GDP is 0.4525 and the average 
level of democracy is 0.5984, so Mexico in the period 1992-1994 is an 
example of a country with values relatively close to the average levels of both 
variables. From this point, and using the third specification of table 2, if 
democracy increases by one standard deviation (0.3628), this country would 
experience a 1.70 percentage points higher GDP per capita growth rate four 
periods later38 . The growth rate considered refers to the logarithm of GDP 
over that of the previous period (where one period is the average of 3 years), 
so the referred 1. 70 percentage points are an approximation for an increase in 
the growth rate over 3 years. Annualising this 3-year increase in the growth 
38 This result comes from the following computation: 
(a): Value of the interaction term before the increase in democracy: 
Interaction coefficient* (Average Education Expenditure/GDP) *Average Democracy= 
0.0105*4.4525*0.5984=0.0280 
(b): Value of the interaction term after the increase in democracy: 
Interaction coef*(Average EducExp/GDP)*(Average Democracy+ 1 Srd Deviation)= 
=0.0105*4.4525*(0.5984+0.3628)=0.0450 
Finally, the increase in the interaction term is (b)-(a)=0.0450-0.0280=0.0170 
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rate yields a yearly increase of 0.56 percentage points, which is economically 
significant. 
An alternative way to assess the economic significance of the 
interaction term would be to consider the case of a country with the average 
level of Public Education Expenditure/GDP that moves from absolute lack of 
democracy (Democracy=O; Bahrain in 1986-1988 is an example of a country 
with this combination of values) to perfect democracy (Democracy=]; Spain 
in 1992-1994 is an example with this combination of values): in this case, the 
country would observe a 4.68 percentage points higher GDP per capita growth 
rate four periods later. Again, the 4.68 points apply for a period of 3 years 
over the previous period, so the annualised equivalent is an increase in the 
yearly growth rate of 1.54 percentage points. This is a significant effect from 
an economic point of view. 
The result obtained for the interaction term means that different 
political contexts translate into different impacts of education expenditure on 
growth. 1n a way, this supports Pritchett's (1996) 'piracy' argument: in certain 
environments (in this case, non-democratic ones) more education could mean 
more pirates, which erode the potential benefits of education on the economy 
through a diversion of resources. This could also help explain the divergence 
in micro and macro returns to education in cross-country regressions (Krueger 
and Lindahl 2001 ): though education is generally associated with increased 
personal earnings, it may have different impacts on economic growth 
depending on the institutional settings. 
To check whether the results obtained are driven by the richest 
countries, I re-run the third specification of table 2 removing the high-income 
countries from the sample. The 'high income' countries were those defined as 
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such by the World Bank39. The resultant 'no rich' countries are listed in 
appendix 2, under the title 'Group 2: no rich subset'. The result of re-running 
model 3 for this particular subset is shown in column 4 of table 2. Column 4 
shows that the results do not change dramatically when excluding the richest 
countries from the sample. 
Observing this relationship for the least rich countries is particularly 
relevant because those are the countries that have more to gain from the 
interaction term. This is because the poorest countries transfer less resource to 
education (see chapter 2) and have worse democratic performances (see for 
example Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2004). 
The next subsection checks the robustness of this claim usmg a 
different proxy for education. 
Growth. democracy and years of schooling 
In this subsection I use average years of schooling as a proxy for 
education. Using this variable avoids the criticism that some researchers have 
made of the power of education expenditure to explain economic growth. 
Particularly, the creators of the dataset from which I obtain the education 
achievement data (Barro and Lee 1993, 2000) show that this indicator of 
education attainment explains economic growth better than previous proxies 
for human capital. The advantages and disadvantages of this variable when 
compared to Hanushek and Woessman's (2008) cognitive skills variable were 
discussed earlier in this chapter. 
39 See 
http://web.worldbank.on!/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DAT AST ATISTICS/O,.contentMDK:?0421 
402-pagePK:04133150-piPK:64133175-theSitePK:239419.00.htmi#High income 
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As mentioned above (and in chapter 1, table 1), one of the reasons why 
education expenditure may not promote growth in non-democracies is that in 
this kind of regime the ruling elite can divert expenditure in education to 
favour themselves, subsidizing for example higher education for a minority 
even in contexts of high illiteracy. A second reason is that although corruption 
is present in both democracies and non-democracies, the accountability of a 
democratic system is higher than that of a non-democracy. In fact, there is 
evidence that in some countries a large share of government spending in 
education is not actually going to education (Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer, 
Muralidharan and Rogers 2006; Duflo and Hanna 2005). If these factors are 
indeed playing a role, then for a given expenditure in education one can expect 
a higher education attainment in democratic countries than in non-
democracies. In other words, it may not be a matter of quality of data, but just 
that Barro and Lee's (1993, 2000) dataset has a smaller mediating effect of 
democracy in the education-growth relationship. However, if the mediating 
effect of democracy is strong enough (as my hypothesis suggests) then this 
effect should also occur through Barro and Lee's indicator of educational 
attainment. 
The data used to test the relationship between years of schooling and 
growth under different degrees of democracy consists of a panel of 103 
countries for the period 1960-2004. I average the data over non-overlapping 
five-year periods (1960-1964, 1965-1969, 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 
1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004). The averages are taken over 
five-year periods because the data is only available every five years, so there 
is no way to obtain shorter periods. 
The arising dataset is an unbalanced panel consisting of 103 countries 
over 9 periods. The sources of data are presented in appendix 1; the list of 
countries is presented in appendix 2 under the heading 'Group 3: All 
countries'; descriptive statistics for the variables used in this section are 
presented in appendix 4 (the descriptive statistics are different to those 
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presented in the last section because the time periods are different and the set 
of countries is different). 
I estimate variations of the following equation; 
(14) In GDPpcGrowth,., = /30 + /31.ln GDPpci.r-1 + /32 .GrowthAvYearSch,., + f3rDemocracy,., + 
f34 .[GrowthAvYearSch *Democracy l., +[Controls,.,1,.,_1]' .8 + v, + v, + v,., 
where lnGDPpcu stands for natural log of real GDP per capita of country i in 
period t, lnGDPpcGrowth stands for natural log of growth of real GDP per 
capita (in percentage points), GrowthAvYearSch stands for the growth of the 
average years of schooling for people of 15 years of age and more, and 
Democracy is the same measure of democracy that was used previously. 
[Controls] represents a vector of four control variables: investment as a share 
of GDP, population between 15 and 64 years as a share of total population, 
annual inflation rate and a measure of trade (as previously). 
Though the structure of this equation is similar to that of equation (13), 
there are some changes that need to be explained. 
First, total public expenditure as a share of GDP is now excluded from 
the set of controls. The reason is that equation (13) measures the effect of 
public education expenditure on per capita GDP growth, so there, controlling 
for total public expenditure makes sense: a country that spends relatively more 
public money in general will likely spend more on education too. Equation 
(14) does not measure the effect of public education expenditure on growth, so 
controlling for total public expenditure is no longer relevant. 
Second, while the measure of education is lagged in equation (13), in 
equation (14) it is not lagged. There are at least three reasons for this. First, 
the measure of education in equation (13) is calculated for each period, 
whereas for equation (14), the growth in the years of schooling implicitly 
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incorporate two different periods. Second, the length of the periods in this 
regression is longer than in the previous one (5 years per period versus 3 years 
per period), so when considering the growth on the average years of schooling 
I am covering a longer number of years than before. Third, the reasons that 
justify lagging public education expenditure in a growth equation do not stand 
to support lagging the growth in the average years of schooling. When I 
lagged the public education expenditure I argued that education expenditure is 
only an input in the education process, meaning that the expenditure has to be 
converted into an educational output through the education technology in 
order to be put into practice in the labour market. However, the average years 
of education are already an output of the education system which can readily 
increase the performance of labour as a productive factor in the economy. For 
this reason, I do not Jag the growth in the average years of schooling. 
Third, whereas Democracy was lagged one and four periods m 
equation (13), it appears without lags in equation (14). This is a direct 
consequence of the second difference just explained. The measure of 
democracy must be contemporaneous with the measure of education in order 
to capture any interaction effects; since in equation (14) the measure of 
education is not lagged, then the measure of democracy is not lagged either. 
Fourth, equation (13) included the population between 15 and 64 years 
of age as a share of total population among the regressors, and this variable 
was not lagged. Now, this variable is lagged one period. This is because the 
role of this control variable changed when compared to equation (13). In that 
case, the main regressor was public expenditure on education, which covered 
individuals of different ages (total expenditure in education compnses 
primary, secondary and tertiary education), so the role of the population 
variable was to control for different structures of the population. In contrast, in 
equation (14) the main regressor is the growth of average years of schooling 
for people of 15 years of age and more. In order to assess the impact of an 
increase in the years of schooling of that age group on the growth of GDP per 
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capita, I control for the initial relative size of the population between 15 and 
64 years of age, which is the group in which I expect that a change in the 
average years of education will have a greater impact on the growth of GDP 
per capita. 
Finally, whereas equation (13) is instrumented using levels lagged two 
and three times in the differences equation and first -differences lagged once as 
instruments in the level equation, equation (14) is instrumented using levels 
lagged three and four times in the differences equation and first-differences 
lagged twice as instruments in the level equation. The reason for this can be 
found in table 3: for all the specifications, the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
first differences rejects the null of no second-order autocorrelation in 
differences, while the same test for AR(3) fails to reject the null of no third-
order autocorrelation in differences. 
Table 3 shows the results for this set of regressions, in which the 
AR(3) tests and the Hansen tests do not show evidence of problems with the 
choice of instruments or the specification of the models. 
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~ ()Q 
(1:> 
...._ 
Dependellf variable: In ofGDP per capita growth (period over previous period) 
(1) (2) 
In of GDP per capita (I lag) 0.0036082 -0.001158 
(-0.21) (-0.06) 
Trade/GDP -0.0000122 -0.0000343 
( -0.04) ( -0.11) 
Annual inflation rate -0.0000742 *** -0.0000666 *** 
( -3.48) (-3.07) 
lnvestment/GDP 0.0052345 ** 0.0051947 ** 
(2.47) (2.1 0) 
Population 15-64 yearsffotal population (I Jag) 0.0052061 0.0055019 
(1.15) (1.24) 
(a) Growth of average years of schooling -0.0017292 -0.002331 * 
of individuals aged 15 years and more (-1.61) (-/.86) 
Democracy 0.0322647 
(0.69) 
Interaction terms: Democracy and (a) 0.0041327 * 0.0062543 ** 
(/. 73) (2.07) 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first diff. (p-valuc) 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(3) in first diff. (p-value) 0.441 0.720 
Hansen lest (p-value) 0.842 0.358 
Goodness of fit 0.279 0.261 
Countries 103 103 
Observations 656 656 
(3) 
-0.0021774 
(-0.10) 
0.0001533 
(0.49) 
-0.0000718 
(-2.94) 
0.00490 
(2.47) 
0.0041655 
(0. 77) 
0.0904738 
(1.63) 
0.001903 
(1.67) 
0.000 
0.231 
0.573 
0.271 
103 
656 
~ Notes: t-values in parenthesis. *** stands for significant at I% level, ** signilicant at 5%, * signiticant at I 0%. 
(4) (5) 
0.0097958 0.0076133 
(0.39) (0.32) 
0.000021 I 0.0003425 
(0.06) ( 1.02) 
*** -6.65E-05 *** -6.87E-05 *** 
(-2.71) (-2.77) 
** 0.0046097 * 0.0031012 
( 1.89) ( 1.39) 
0.0048542 0.0069378 * 
(0.93) (1.68) 
* 0.0038769 ** 0.0028294 ** 
(2.15) (2.03) 
0.001 0.003 
0.395 0.116 
0.346 0.810 
0.255 0.245 
103 74 
656 461 
System GMM instrumented with levels lagged three and four times in the differences e4uation, and tirst-differences lagged twice as instruments in the levels equation. 
o-l 
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In all the specifications the control for annual inflation has the 
expected negative sign and is significant at 1%. The control for 
investment!GDP has the expected positive sign in all the specifications and is 
significant at 5% in the first three specifications, is significant at 10% in the 
fourth specification, and is not significant in the fifth specification. The other 
two controls are not significant in any of the specifications, with the exception 
of population of 15-64 years of age/Total population, which is significant at 
10% in the fifth specification. 
In the first specification I include the interaction term and its two 
components. Whereas both components are insignificant, the interaction term 
itself is positive (as expected) and significant at 10% level. In the second and 
third specifications I remove each of the components (one at a time) of the 
interaction term. 
ln the second specification the interaction term (positive and 
significant at 5%) enters with the growth of average years of schooling of 
individuals aged 15 years and more. This last variable appears with a negative 
sign and is significant at 10%. This has an interesting interpretation: for low 
levels of democracy ( 0 ~ Democracy< 0.373) the direct effect of the average 
years of schooling prevails, so an increase in the average years of schooling 
has a negative net impact on GDP per capita growth, whereas for 
0.373 <Democracy~ 1, the interaction term prevails and the net impact on 
GDP per capita growth of an increase in the average years of schooling is 
positive. This means that for low levels of democracy an increase in education 
is detrimental for the economy, probably due to 'piracy' in Pritchett's sense. 
In the third specification the interaction term (positive and significant 
at 10%) enters with democracy. This last variable is positive but insignificant. 
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In the fourth specification I remove both components of the interaction term; 
the interaction term appears significant at 5% level. 
To assess the economic significance of the interaction term, I proceed 
in the same way as in the previous sub-section. Let us consider a country with 
the average growth of the average years of schooling of individuals aged 15 
years and more, and the average level of democracy. According to appendix 4, 
the mean for the first variable is 11.904 and the mean for the second variable 
is 0.5859, so Iran in 2000-2004 is an example of a country with values 
relatively close to the average levels of both variables. From this point, using 
the fourth specification of table 3, if democracy increases by one standard 
deviation (0.3674), this country would experience a 1.70 percentage points 
higher GDP per capita growth40. The growth rate considered refers to the 
logarithm of GDP over that of the previous period (where one period is the 
average of 5 years), so the referred l. 70 percentage points is an approximation 
for an increase in the growth rate over 5 years. Annualising this 5-year 
increase in the growth rate yields a yearly increase of 0.34 percentage points, 
which is economically significant. 
An alternative way to assess the economic significance of the 
interaction term would be to consider the case of a country with the average 
growth of the average years of schooling of individuals aged 15 years and 
more, that moves from an absolute lack of democracy (Democracy=O; Brazil 
in 1970-1974 is an example of a country with this combination of values) to 
40 This result comes from the following computation: 
(a): Value of the interaction term before the increase in democracy: 
Interaction 
coef*(A verageGrowthYearSch)*A verageDemocracy=0.0039* I 1.9044*0.5859=0.0270 
(b): Value of the interaction term after the increase in democracy: 
Interaction coef*( Average GrowthYearSch)*(Average Democracy+ I Std Deviation)= 
=0.0039* 1 I.9044*(0.5859+0.3674 )=0.0440 
Finally, the increase in the interaction term is (b)-(a)=0.0440-0.0270=0.0I70 
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perfect democracy (Democracy=]; Papua New Guinea in 1995-1999 is an 
example with this combination of values): in this case, the country would 
observe a 4.62 percentage points higher GDP per capita growth. Again, the 
4.62 points apply for a period of 5 years over the previous period, so the 
annualised equivalent is an increase in the yearly growth rate of 0.91 
percentage points. This is a significant effect from an economic point of view. 
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that democracy 
increases the marginal contribution of education to economic growth. In fact, 
the results obtained with average years of schooling are similar to the results 
obtained using the expenditure variable, which adds robustness to the results. 
To check whether the results obtained are driven by the richest 
countries, I re-run the fourth specification of table 3 removing the high-
income countries from the sample. The 'high income' countries were defined 
with the same criteria as above. The resultant 'no rich' countries are listed in 
appendix 2, under the title 'Group 4: no rich subset'. The result of re-running 
model 4 for this particular subset is shown in column 5 of table 3. Column 5 
shows that the results do not change dramatically when excluding the richest 
countries from the sample. 
Final remarks 
The empirical evidence analysed in this chapter supports the 
hypothesis that democracy has a role to play in the education-growth 
relationship: the more democratic a country, the greater the expected impact of 
education on economic growth. This holds in models that approximate 
education using public expenditure on education as a share of GDP and in 
models that use a measure of average years of schooling. This suggests that 
democracy encapsulates the institutional and governance environment that 
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Pritchett ( 1996, 200 l) understands is required to avoid 'piracy' and to make 
education an input for economic growth. 
This finding has several implications. For future research it means that 
political institutions and education should not be considered as different inputs 
or sources of growth; instead, researchers should look at their interactions and 
synergies. Additionally, it is also possible that democracy affects growth 
through interactions with other factors, and this should also be investigated by 
future research. 
For policy implementation, the main implication that can be drawn is 
that the importance of getting the 'right' institutions is greater than previously 
thought, as institutions affect growth indirectly. This can help define an 
agenda for policymakers, who according to this finding, will first need to get 
the right institutions before engaging the public finances in further educational 
efforts. 
This does not mean that full democracy is the only institutional 
condition that makes education conducive to economic growth. On the one 
hand, in chapter I I showed that I take Democracy only to map for a 'cloud of 
factors' that may be intervening in the education-growth relationship. 
However, I did not choose Democracy naively among that cloud of factors: I 
chose it based on the existing literature discussed in chapter 1, and on my 
belief that democracy itself may be playing a stronger role than the other 
factors (see the eight channels discussed in chapter 1 and summarised in 
chapter 1, table 1). On the other hand, the 'East Asian Miracle' of 1966-1995 
is an example of countries with above-average increases in schooling and 
above-average GDP growth, mostly under non-democratic political 
environments. How does this fit with the findings of this chapter? 
Young ( 1995) analyses four East Asian countries (Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) and concludes that their impressive 
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growth was mostly due to increases in inputs rather than increases in 
productivity. Bosworth and Collins (1996) extend Young's work (they include 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) and conclude in the same 
direction: productivity growth was not impressive according to world 
standards, and economic growth was a consequence of a quantity effect (more 
inputs put into production). 
Krugman (1994)41 argues in the same direction (though probably more 
dramatically). Krugman compares the experience of the East Asian 'miracle' 
countries in the period 1966-1994 with that of the Soviet Union in the 
nineteen fifties, and concludes that in both cases growth was a result of a 
massive increase in inputs rather than in returns per unit of expenditure. In the 
case of the Soviet Union, he argues, the authoritarian regime allowed an 
unprecedented ability to mobilize great amounts of resources and thus fuel 
growth. In this sense, non-democracy can be conducive to economic growth 
through the mobilization of physical and human capital (education), though 
not necessarily to increases in growth per unit of input used. Growth is then 
the result of a quantity effect. This is consistent with the findings of Pinto and 
Timmons (2005): "regimes with more political competition may not grow any 
faster or slower than less competitive regimes, but they grow differently, 
relying more on intensive as opposed to extensive growth" (Pinto and 
Timmons 2005, page 28). 
The fact that the East Asian countries observed by Young (1995) and 
Bosworth and Collins (1996) did not manage to increase the macro returns of 
education is consistent with the findings of this chapter for a non-democratic 
environment. In fact, according to the findings of this chapter, growth would 
have been even more spectacular in the East Asian countries in the presence of 
41 Krugman 's argument borrows heavily from an earlier version of the paper of Alwyn Young 
to which I refer here (Krugman refers to the version in the NBER, Working Paper 4680, 
March 1994 ), and that is why Krugman' s paper appears to be previous to Young's. It is not. 
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the 'right' political institutions. Democracy and the 'cloud of factors' could 
have brought other 'efficiency enhancing' transformations through the eight 
channels identified above and the accompanying (causality not implied) 
improvements in regulatory quality, government effectiveness, property 
rights, rule of law, corruption, political stability, freer markets, law 
enforcement and human rights. On top of the direct effect that each could have 
had on growth, those factors could have made the increased inputs 
(particularly education) work more efficiently, thus increasing their macro 
returns and fostering even more growth. 
Rodrik (1997) finds that institutional quality "does exceptionally well 
in rank-ordering East Asian countries according to their growth 
performance" (Rodrik 1997, page I )42 . If institutions played a direct role (as 
he finds), why could they not have also played an indirect role in the way 
proposed in this chapter? The lack of significant total factor productivity 
growth in the context of the non-democratic East Asian experience seems to 
suggest that institutions also have an indirect role to play. 
42 In the same paper, Rodrik also challenges Young's (1995) and Bosworth and Collins' 
( 1996) findings, suggesting that their conclusions about the ·quantity effect' were a result of 
their rigid initial assumptions about the production function. Bosworth (in Bosworth and 
Collins 1996) shows that their initial assumptions are consistent with the empirical evidence 
available. The reason why Bosworth's answer in 1996 seems to be previous to Rodrik's critic 
in 1997 is because Rodrik anticipated his critic in a comment at the end of Bosworth and 
Coli in· s 1996 paper, which Bosworth replied in a comment in the same paper. 
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Appendix 1: Sources of data 
In of GDP per capita: Natural logarithm of GDP per capita in constant US$ 
(year 2000). Source: World Bank, World Development 
Indicators (WDI) April 2008, ESDS International, 
(Mirnas) University of Manchester. 
Public expenditure/GDP: Taken from the variable 'KG' of the World Penn 
Table. Source: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and 
Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and 
Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, September 
2006. This institution kindly provided the 'no PPP 
adjusted' version of this variable, which I use here. 
Investment/GDP: Taken from the variable 'KI' of the World Penn Table. 
Source: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina 
Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and 
Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, September 
2006. This institution kindly provided the 'no PPP 
adjusted' version of this variable, which I use here. 
Public education expenditure/GDP: Source: World Bank, World Development 
Indicators (WDI) April 2008, ESDS International, 
(Mimas) University of Manchester. 
Degree of democracy: Measures the degree of institutionalised democracy 
from 0 to 1 (where higher numbers mean more 
democracy). This variable is a linear transformation of 
the variable 'Polity' from the Polity IV database, which 
ranges from -10 to 10. Source: Monty G. Marsh all and 
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Keith Jaggers. 2004. Polity IV Data Set. [Computer file; 
version p4v2004] College Park, MD: Cent er for 
International Development and Conflict Management, 
University of Maryland. 
Average years of Schooling for the population aged 15 years and over: 
Trade/GDP: 
Source: Robert J. Barro and Jong-Wha Lee (2000), 
'International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates 
and Implications', Center for International 
Development at Harvard University, working paper No 
42. Taken from EdStats Database, World Bank. The 
growth of this variable (table 3) is expressed m 
percentage points, calculated as 
lOO*(Value,- Value,_ 1 ). 
Value,_1 
Sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross domestic product. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
(WDI) April 2008, ESDS International, (Mimas) 
University of Manchester. 
Annual inflation rate: Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
(WDI) April 2008, ESDS International, (Mimas) 
University of Manchester. 
Population 15-64 years/Total population: Percentage of the total population 
that is in the age group 15 to 64. Source: World Bank, 
World Development Indicators (WDI) April 2008, 
ESDS International, (Mimas) University of Manchester. 
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Appendix 2: Countries used in tables 2 and 3 
Countries lncludecl'ln regressions of table 2: 
' 
: . Countries li1cluded In regressions of table 3 
Group 1 : All countries Group 2: Group 3: All countries Group 4: 
"No Rich" subset "No Rich" subset 
Albania Lac PDR Albania Nepal Algeria Kuwait Afghanistan Sao Tome & Principe 
Algeria Latvia Algeria Nicaragua Argentina Lesotho Albania Senegal 
Argentina Lesotho Argentina Niger Australia Liberia Argentina Seychelles 
Armenia Madagascar Armenia Nigeria Austria Malawi Azerbaijan Slovak Republic 
Australia Malawi Azerbaijan Oman Bahrain Malaysia Bangladesh Solomon Islands 
Austria Malaysia Bangladesh Pakistan Bangladesh Mali Belarus Somalia 
Azerbaijan Mali Belarus Panama Belgium Maurttius Bhutan South Africa 
Bahrain Mauritania Bhutan Paraguay Ben in Mexico Botswana Sri Lanka 
Bangladesh Maurttius Bolivia Peru Bolivia Mozambique Burkina Fa so Sudan 
Belarus Mexico Botswana Philippines Botswana Nepal Burundi Tanzania 
Belgium Moldova Bulgaria Poland Brazil Netherlands Cambodia Tonga 
Bhutan Mongolia Burkina Faso Romania Bulgaria New Zealand Cameroon Turkey 
Bolivia Morocco Burundi Rwanda Cameroon Nicaragua Chad Ukraine 
Botswana Mozambique Cameroon Senegal Canada Niger Chile Uzbekistan 
Bulgaria Namibia Central African Rep Sierra Leone Central African Rep Norway Colombia Yemen. Rep. 
Burkina Faso Nepal Chad Solomon Islands Chile Pakistan Comoros Zambia 
Burundi Netherlands Chile South Africa China Panama Congo. Rep. 
Cameroon New Zealand China Sri Lanka Colombia Papua New Guinea Cuba 
Canada Nicaragua Colombia Sudan Congo. Dem. Rep. Paraguay Djibouti 
Central African Rep Niger Congo. Rep. Swaziland Congo. Rep. Peru Dominican Rep. 
Chad Nigeria Costa Rica Syrian Arab Rep Costa Rica Philippines Ecuador 
Chile Norway Dominican Republic Tanzania Croatia Poland El Salvador 
China Oman Ecuador Thailand Cyprus Portugal Eritrea 
Colombia Pakistan Egypt. Arab Rep. Togo Czech Republic Romania Ethiopia 
Congo. Rep. Panama El Salvador Tunisia Denmark Rwanda Fiji 
Costa Rica Paraguay Ethiopia Turkey Dominican Rep Senegal Gabon 
Cyprus Peru Fiji Uganda Ecuador Sierra Leone Gambia, The 
Denmark Philippines Gabon Ukraine Egypt. Arab Rep. Singapore Georgia 
Dominican Republic Poland Gambia. The Uruguay El Salvador Slovak Republic Ghana 
Ecuador Portugal Ghana Venezuela. AB Fiji Slovenia Guatemala 
Egypt. Arab Rep. Romania Guatemala Zambia Finland South Africa Guinea 
El Salvador Rwanda Hatti Zimbabwe France Spain Guyana 
Ethiopia Saudi Arabia Honduras Gambia. The Sri Lanka Iraq 
Fiji Senegal Hungary Germany Sudan Jordan 
Finland Sierra Leone India Ghana Swaziland Kazakhstan 
France Solomon Islands Indonesia Greece Sweden Kenya 
Gabon South Africa Iran. Islamic Rep. Guatemala Switzerland Kiribati 
Gambia. The Spain Ireland Guinea-Bissau Syrian Arab Rep Liberia 
Ghana Sri Lanka Jamaica Hani Tanzania Libya 
Greece Sudan Jordan Honduras Thailand Lithuania 
Guatemala Swaziland Kazakhstan Hungary Togo Malawi 
Hatti Sweden Kenya India Trinidad & Tobago Malaysia 
Honduras Switzerland Kyrgyz Republic Indonesia Tunisia Maldives 
Hungary Syrian Arab Rep Lac PDR Iran. Islamic Rep Turkey Maurrtania 
India Tanzania Lalvia Ireland Uganda Mauritius 
Indonesia Thailand Lesotho Israel United Kingdom Mexico 
Iran. Islamic Rep. Togo Madagascar Italy Untted States Moldova 
Ireland Trinidad & Tobago Malawi Jamaica Uruguay Mongolia 
Israel Tunisia Malaysia Japan Venezuela. RB Mozambique 
~aly Turkey Mali Jordan Zambia Nicaragua 
Jamaica Uganda Maurttania Kenya Zimbabwe Niger 
Japan Ukraine Maurttius Korea. Rep. Nigeria 
Jordan Untted Kingdom Mexico Palau 
Kazakhstan Untted States Moldova Panama 
Kenya Uruguay Mongolia Papua New Guinea 
Korea. Rep. Venezuela. AB Morocco Paraguay 
Kuwait Zambia Mozambique Poland 
Kyrgyz Republic Zimbabwe Namibia Romania 
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Coefficient M in Max Observations 
of variation 
In of GDP per capita growth overall 0.0302 0.1076 3.565 -0.602X2 0.29R28 N = 7KX 
between 0.0593 1.965 -0.12617 0.24787 11 = 116 
within 0.0905 2.998 -0.58291 0.41106 N/11 = 6.79 
In GDP per capita owrall 7.4323 1.5804 0.213 4.63667 I 0.55055 N = 905 
between 1.5675 0.211 4.79938 10.36176 n = 116 
within 0.1723 0.023 6.54618 8.28129 N/11 = 7.80 
Democracy overall 0.5984 0.3628 0.606 0 I N = 901 
between 0.3121 0.522 0 I n = 116 
within 0.1838 0.307 -0.09784 1.19216 Nln = 7.77 
Public education expenditure/UDP overall 4.4525 2.4986 0.561 0.4 41.8 N = 802 
between 2.2492 0.505 1.242R6 21.22 n = 116 
within 1.3871 0.312 -9.96751 25.03249 N/n = 6.91 
Trade overall 69.0415 36.0625 0.522 11.34016 238.7488 N = 892 
between 33.4609 0.485 19.28616 176.5348 11 = 116 
within 13.0174 0.189 17.22289 131.2556 N/n = 7.69 
lnllation overall 45.6417 309.7403 6.786 -3.80549 5244.197 N = 840 
between 172.4902 3.779 -0.30565 1329.887 /I = 116 
within 275.8129 6.043 -1281.402 3959.952 N/n = 7.24 
Public expenditure/GDP overall I fi.3096 6.8437 0.420 2.4 47.7 N = 900 
between 6.1141 0.375 3.7625 33.9125 11 = 116 
within 3.0358 0.186 0.79706 34.10955 Nln = 7.76 
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Summary and conclusions 
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It has been argued that the benefits of education go beyond the 
increase in personal or macroeconomic income. Re-quoting Weiss (1995), 
"education does not have to be justified solely on the basis of its effect on 
labour productivity. This was certainly not the argument given by Plato or de 
Tocqueville and need not be ours. Students are not taught civics, or art, or 
music solely in order to improve their labour productivity but rather to enrich 
their lives and make them better citizens" (Weiss 1995, p. 151 ). 
But is this true? Does education enrich our lives? Does it make us 
better citizens? Measuring the degree of 'richness of life' or 'good citizenship' 
are difficult tasks that require different kinds of abilities, so I left those aside. 
Instead, I focused on what I expected would be the easiest assessment of all: 
the effect of education on income. To my surprise, I learnt that this is not an 
easy task either and that several scholars have been debating it for years. 
If the effect of education on aggregate income is not clearly visible, 
why have almost all countries devoted great amounts of public resources to 
education for as long as data are available? What is guiding policy? And why 
have different countries devoted different proportions of their resources to 
public education? 
I have not come up with a complete explanation as to why 
governments allocate money to public education. However, I have added a 
novel factor to explain at least part of the divergence in international public 
education expenditure: according to chapter 2, altruism tends to act as a 
deterrent for public subsidies to education. We should expect less altruistic 
countries to publicly subsidise education more than more altruistic countries, 
probably because (the following statement is not proved here and is offered as 
a hypothesis) the state has to compensate for the lack of educational care that 
non-altruistic parents will devote to their children. Chapter 2 also shows that 
more forward-looking countries can be expected to subsidise education 
relatively more than less forward-looking countries. 
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However, it is on the topic of altruism that chapter 2 adds more to the 
current knowledge, for at least two reasons. First, altruism has not been 
presented before as a possible source of divergence in public subsidies to 
education. The chapter presents theoretical and empirical evidence that 
altruism may be a relevant factor. Second, the exploration of cross-country 
data using a proxy for the level of altruism is novel in the literature to the best 
of my knowledge. More should be done to obtain better measures of altruism, 
although I am confident that the proxy presented in chapter 2 is the best 
available reliable proxy, and should be at least considered in the future by 
researchers who want to understand how governments make their decisions of 
education subsidisation. 
I do not know what shapes the degree of altruism of a society. At this 
stage, I would assume that the degree of altruism is an idiosyncratic fixed 
characteristic of a society. This means that it could be taken as an exogenous 
factor constraining the policy decisions (in this case, the decisions on public 
expenditure on education). 
Therefore, the decision of how much to devote to education cannot be 
understood only by considering the effect of education on economic growth. 
Other factors have an influence and impose constraints too. Whereas chapter 2 
investigates the constraints imposed by altruism, chapter 3 incorporates the 
constraints on public education expenditure faced by an agent that intuitively 
could be assumed to have no constraints at all: a dictator. Although a dictator 
does not necessarily maximise a social utility function and may only be 
guided by his own interests, chapter 3 shows that this does not mean that he 
faces no constraints when deciding how much to spend on public education 
and how much to extract from the economy for his own benefit. The model 
presented in that chapter identifies some trade-offs and shows how the effect 
of education expenditure on income growth interfere with the dictator's 
decision of how much to extract from the economy for his own benefit, 
imposing constrains on his decision making process. 
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The analysis of the transitions between democracy and dictatorship has 
not been approached before through looking simultaneously at the effects of 
education expenditure on income and the pressures from a limited labour 
market on the extractive capacity of a dictator. That is the single most 
important contribution of chapter 3. This novel approach allows for the 
determination of threshold levels of extortive taxes and the analysis of regime 
transitions. In addition, the model explains why redistributive policies can be 
expected to be more extended in democracies than in non-democracies (which 
has been argued by previous researchers), and why some countries need to 
resort to amnesties to facilitate peaceful transitions to democracy. 
One of the key findings of chapter 3 relates to why dictators have an 
incentive to 'blur' the effect of education on income, so that the absence of 
democracy is related to a lower impact of education on macroeconomic 
income. This is hypothesised in chapter 1, but only empirically tested in 
chapter 4. The evidence presented in chapter 4 fails to reject the hypothesis 
that the effect of education on economic growth is greater in democracies than 
in non-democracies. This holds in models that map for education through 
public expenditure on education as a share of GDP and in models that use the 
average years of schooling of the population. The contribution of chapter 4 to 
the existing knowledge is to show that the prevailing political regime (the 
degree of democracy in this case) plays a role in the effect of education on 
economic growth. In this way, democracy summarises the institutional and 
governance environment that Pritchett (1996 and 2001) understands is 
required to avoid 'piracy' and to make education an input for economic 
growth. 
This can help set an agenda for policymakers, who should ensure that 
they set the right institutions in place before engaging the public finances in 
additional educational efforts. Though institutional economics has long 
claimed this, chapter 4 argues for new indirect effects that have not been 
addressed previously. Chapter 4 also has implications for future research. This 
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is the first time that the effect of education on economic growth has been 
measured using interaction terms between education and the level of 
democracy. I am confident that this approach can be used in the future to 
assess the indirect effect of other factors on growth. 
In particular, as more data on cognitive skills becomes available and 
time series can be constructed for a wide set of countries, the analysis of 
chapter 4 should be reproduced to check whether the results hold in the long 
run with that new data. In general, the analysis of the last chapter opens the 
door for analysis of the indirect effect of institutions on growth through 
factors other than education. 
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